Is Japan Losing its Independence?

Record Trade Deficit in Japan and Nuclear Reality: Is Japan Losing its Independence?

Noriko Watanabe and Walter Sebastian

Ex: http://moderntokyotimes.com

The anti-nuclear lobby in Japan and the mass media in this nation on a whole continue to focus on the negative side of nuclear power stations. Not surprisingly, the government of Japan is dithering about this issue just like other important areas – for example the declining birth rate. However, Japan can’t afford to maintain its current energy policy because it is hindering the economy too much. Either Japan must re-focus on nuclear energy which helped in the modernization of this nation in the post-war period – or, Japan must bite the bullet and formulate an alternative energy policy and quickly.

The Ministry of Finance announced earlier this week that the trade deficit in 2013 reached a record figure. This should set off alarm bells in the corridors of power because the $112 billion dollar trade deficit will put enormous strains on the economy. After all, with no real energy policy existing currently in Japan, then it seem more than feasible that the next few years will follow the same pattern.

Issues related to the nuclear crisis in Japan appear to have been blown up out of all proportion. After all, the huge loss of life occurred because of the brutal tsunami that followed the massive 9.0-magnitude earthquake on March 11 in 2011. This isn’t meant to belittle the trauma caused to the local area in Fukushima because within a certain zone it is clear that problems continue to exist. However, the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear crisis is more based on bad management, the age of the plant, deficiencies within the planning mechanisms of this nuclear plant, lack of accountability, limited safety mechanisms – and other areas of importance. Of course, the earthquake triggered the tsunami but the nuclear crisis that erupted was based on human failure when faced with the brutal reality of nature.

Vojin Joksimovich, nuclear specialist and writer at Modern Tokyo Times, stated last year: “Japan has few natural resources and imports about 84% of its energy requirements. Nuclear power has been a national strategic priority since 1973. The country’s 54 nuclear plants have provided some 30% of the nation’s electricity. This was expected to increase to 40% by 2017 and to 50% by 2030. Japan has a fuel cycle capability including enrichment and reprocessing of used fuel for recycle and waste minimization. Shutdowns of 48 units capable of generating electricity have resulted in soaring fossil fuel, mostly LNG imports. Five nuclear utilities have been compelled to raise electricity rates: household rates 8.5-11.9%; commercial rates 14.2-19.2%.” 

“According to the NASA climate change study, summarized in the May 2013 issue of the Nuclear News, using nuclear power to generate electricity instead of burning fossil fuels prevented an average of 1.84 million air pollution deaths and 64 billion metric tons of CO2- equivalent greenhouse gas emissions between 1971 and 2009. In the time frame 2000-2009 the nuclear plants prevented on average 76,000 deaths/year. It appears that the NRA has ignored these types of considerations, while pursuing the absolute safety quest for the nuclear plants.” 

In the same article Vojin Joksimovich says: “There is now abundance of evidence showing that the worst accident in the history of commercial nuclear power has not harmed the Japanese public. The University of Oxford physics professor Wade Allison, author of the remarkable book Radiation and Reason: The Impact of Science on a Culture of Fear, testifying in the British House of Commons in December of 2011, was the first one to tell the world that the accident has not harmed the Japanese public: “No acute fatalities, no acute injuries, no extended hospitalizations due to radiation, unlikely cancer fatalities in 50 years.”

“World Health Organization (WHO) report followed: “Low risk to population, no observable health effects.”United Nations Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) report, with contributions from 80 international experts, says: “No immediate health effects, unlikely health effects in future among general public and vast majority of workers.” Most Japanese were exposed to additional radiation less than natural background level of 2.1mSv/yr. The report concludes that observable effects are attributable to stresses of evacuation and unwarranted fear of radiation. This means that the most serious health effects were not caused by radiation but by fear of it by the Japanese authorities. Lastly the Fukushima Medical University (FMU) is conducting a health management survey of all 2 million Fukushima Prefecture residents. Thus far the maximum dose received was only 19mSv. This writer, while in a local hospital, has received doses of 30-40mSv from CT scans. It means that he has received higher dose than ~99% of the Japanese population from the Daiichi accident.”

Now Japan is stuck by either adopting a pragmatic nuclear policy based on modernizing the entire system and implementing tougher standards – or to continue with importing dirty energy at a negative cost in terms of health related issues and hindering the economy. Of course, Japan could try to radically alter its energy policy by implementing a policy that boosts alternative energy – the effects and costs remain debatable. However, the current status quo of relying on expensive imported fossil fuels to bridge the non-existent energy policy isn’t viable.

The huge deficit is based on increasing imports that followed in the wake of the March 11 9.0-magnitude earthquake that triggered the tsunami and nuclear crisis in Fukushima. Since this period, imports continue to rise in relation to the demand of fossil fuels. Therefore, despite exports rising in Japan to nearly 10% in 2013, it is clear that the import imbalance, weak yen and the reliance on fossil fuels are all hitting the economy hard.

Forbes says: “A surge in Japanese fossil fuel demand following the Fukushima nuclear crisisin 2011 pushed imports to their highest-ever level of 81.26 trillion yen.”

“In other words, steep post-Fukushima energy bills are taking a toll on Japan’s economy.”

“Prior to the Fukushima fiasco, nuclear reactors supplied a third of Japan’s electric demand.”

Lee Jay Walker at Modern Tokyo Times says: “The yen will continue to feel the effects of the current account deficit and if this isn’t addressed then traders may well sell off more yen. This in turn will have an adverse effect on import costs thereby creating a downward economic spiral. Therefore, given the reality that exports reached a near 10% increase last year, it is clear that Japan needs to address its energy policy along with other essential areas related to the economy.”

Akira Amari, Fiscal and Economic Policy Minister, is extremely anxious about the deficit. He warns that unless this issue is addressed then Japan “may become like the United States in depending on other countries for its financial funds.”

If the above scenario happens then Japan will further lose its independence and this also applies to the nuclear angle. After all, the development of the nuclear sector was an area of self-reliance given the overall weakness of Japan in relation to natural energy resources. Now, however, Japan is beholden to more imported fossil fuels; the nation relies on America for protecting the nation state in relation to the armed forces of this nation being stationed in Japan; while imported foodstuffs are a natural fact of life; and if the trade deficit continues then soon Japan may rely on foreign nations for funds. Therefore, the current leader of Japan needs to focus on a proper energy policy because the current status quo is undermining the economy along with other negative ills.

Lee Jay Walker gave guidance to both main writers

http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2014/01/27/the-cost-of-misguided-energy-policies-japans-record-trade-deficit/

http://www.moderntokyotimes.com/2013/07/16/restart-of-japanese-nuclear-plants-politically-correct-radiophobia-harms-the-general-public/

[e-mail]

http://moderntokyotimes.com

Les Ainu et la politique des minorités ethniques au Japon

Les Ainu et la politique des minorités ethniques au Japon

par Rémy VALAT

« Le Japon est un peuple ethniquement et culturellement homogène », telle est l’idée dominante, héritée de la mythologie et de l’idéologie politiques modernes – qui a longtemps prévalu dans ce pays. À ce titre, pendant la période d’expansion coloniale en Asie (1895 – 1945), les populations ethniquement non japonaises ont été assimilées par la force (les habitants des îles Ryûkyû – l’actuelle préfecture d’Okinawa – et les Ainu) ou réduites au travail forcé (Coréens). D’autres minorités sont le résultat des migrations internationales contemporaines et de divisions culturelles au sein même de la société japonaise.

 

Survol sur les minorités au Japon

 

Le Japon est le « pays des dieux », un pays unique peuplé par une race homogène : une interprétation courante des groupes ethniques et des nations souhaitant se singulariser par rapport aux autres. Cette vision est défendue par les politiques et longtemps soutenue par la communauté scientifique qui défendait la thèse d’une « japonéité » se fondant sur une explication biologique, servant de prétexte à une appartenance communautaire reposant sur le « droit du sang ».

 

Toutefois, il existe des disparités au sein même de la population de même sang, une « caste » a pendant longtemps été reléguée : les Burakumin (ou « gens des hameaux » – sous-entendu « spéciaux »). Les personnes (et leurs collatéraux) exerçant des métiers « impurs » d’un point de vue religieux, parce qu’en relation avec la chair morte ou la mort, voire pour le caractère itinérant de leur profession (forains), ont été mises au ban de la société (comme les comédiens ou les bourreaux de la société française d’Ancien Régime). La discrimination à l’encontre de ces individus est en voie de disparition. D’autres Japonais, les victimes des bombes atomiques américaines, ont aussi été considérées avec un certain mépris, comme l’attesterait des enquêtes menées sur les demandes en mariage ou les demandes d’aides sociales (travail, assurance maladie), peut-être en raison de la visibilité de leurs blessures, qui serait une sorte de rappel d’un passé que l’on souhaiterait oublier.

 

La logique des vertus de l’homogénéité ethnique a été mise à mal par l’expérience d’un retour au pays de descendants d’émigrants japonais, les « personnes de lignée japonaise » (Nikkeijin). Ces derniers ont bénéficié – pendant la phase de reconstruction et d’essor économique de l’après-guerre – d’une politique favorable d’immigration, en réalité une politique officieuse d’immigration choisie. Ils seraient, à l’heure actuelle, environ 700 000 résidents permanents. Beaucoup sont revenus d’Amérique latine (principalement du Brésil), où ils ont servi de main-d’œuvre dans les plantations de café, des États-Unis, où ils ont été victimes de sévères lois sur l’immigration et – après la déclaration de guerre avec le Japon – de persécutions et d’internement dans des camps, et des Philippines. Ces « Japonais de sang » ont également été soumis, à leur arrivée, à un statut particulier (titre de résident temporaire, logement dans des quartiers réservés) et connaissent de nos jours une crise d’identité, mais aussi des difficultés d’insertion, notamment du fait de leur acculturation et, parfois d’une maîtrise insuffisante de la langue.

 

Avec les Ainu, objet de cet article, les 1,4 million d’habitants des îles Ryûkyû (actuelle préfecture d’Okinawa, annexée en 1879, puis occupée par l’armée étatsunienne entre 1945 et 1972) ont aussi bénéficié d’un statut particulier, parce que peuple autochtone. Engagés dans la lutte pour la rétrocession de l’île au Japon, les habitants d’Okinawa ont vu leur niveau de vie nettement amélioré, bien qu’encore inférieur à celui des autres préfectures japonaises.

 

La principale minorité issue de l’immigration est d’origine coréenne (700 000 personnes en 2005), qualifiés de « Ceux qui sont au Japon » (Zainichi). Cette communauté est venue sur le sol national japonais, lors de l’annexion de leur pays (1910 – 1945). Traités avec mépris, ces travailleurs – d’abord volontaires – puis soumis au travail obligatoire vivaient dans des espaces réservés (buraku) et ont mêmes été victimes de massacres collectifs : en 1923, dans les circonstances difficiles du tremblement de terre, bon nombre ont été tués par les Tôkyôites qui les ont accusés d’avoir empoisonné l’eau de consommation courante. Pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, ils seront enrôlés de force, selon un système proche du Service du travail obligatoire allemand (S.T.O.). En 1945, plus de 2 millions de Coréens retourneront dans la péninsule, 600 000 resteront au Japon, mais privés de nationalité jusqu’en 1965 (ils deviendront « Sud-Coréens » en 1965). Le Japon compte aussi une minorité chinoise, d’immigrants venus des pays littoraux ou insulaires de l’Océan Indien et du Pacifique et un faible nombre de ressortissants des pays occidentaux, principalement nord-américains.

 

Ce tableau mérite cependant d’être nettement tempéré, car depuis l’ouverture du Japon sur le monde et la pacification de ces mœurs politiques en Asie, ce pays, doté d’une Constitution réellement démocratique, est progressivement devenu une terre d’accueil pour les étrangers (principalement asiatiques, des Chinois et des Coréens, soit 57 % des résidents étrangers au Japon), en raison du changement des mentalités et du besoin d’immigration, engendré par le vieillissement de la population : les étrangers représentent 2 % de la population totale, et leur nombre a augmenté de 50 % depuis le début du deuxième millénaire. Les nouveaux venus sans qualifications ou ne maîtrisant pas la langue sont, comme dans tous les pays économiquement développés, bien souvent réduits aux tâches les moins valorisantes ou les plus pénibles (ce sont les trois « K » : kitsui, pénible; kitanai, sale; kiken, dangereux), mais de réelles possibilités d’intégration – y compris l’adoption de la nationalité japonaise – existent pour eux. Chaque année, 42 000 nouvelles unions, soit 6 % des mariages annuels au Japon, sont le fait de couples internationaux (dans 80 % des cas, l’époux est Japonais). Dans la réalité, le regard porté par les Japonais sur les minorités asiatiques a changé, en dépit de la persistance de discriminations réelles. Le Japon paraît être en transition et s’adapter avec prudence aux réalités migratoires, corollaire de la troisième mondialisation.

 

La culture ainu : origines et principales caractéristiques

 

L’origine des populations ainu serait Préhistorique : elle remonterait à la période Jômon (voir notre article sur ce sujet), et son origine exacte reste encore incertaine. Certains individus sont parfois morphologiquement différents des hommes de la période Jômon, leurs phénotypes ayant des caractéristiques pouvant les rattacher aux populations caucasiennes. La culture Jômon sera progressivement subjuguée par une nouvelle vague de migrants venue du continent à la période Yayoi (Ve siècle av. J.-C. – IIIe siècle ap. J.-C.), importatrice de technologies (riziculture et métallurgie) et d’une culture nouvelles : leurs descendants sont les Japonais. Les populations constitutives de la culture ainu étaient implantés dans la zone septentrionale insulaire de Hokkaidô, de Tôhoku, des Kouriles, de Sakhaline et du sud de la péninsulaire du Kamtchakta. Les spécialistes penchent désormais pour la cœxistence de plusieurs groupes ethniques différents répartis dans la partie septentrionale du Japon actuel : les Emishi (voir infra) – repoussés par les Japonais – venus du Nord du Tôhoku et du Sud-Ouest de Hokkaidô- se seraient amalgamés avec les populations existantes (Ashihase).

 

Au VIIIe siècle, les ethnies ainu se répartissent sur les îles Kouriles et Sakhaline. Dans les premières annales du Japon (le Kojiki et le Nihongi ou Nihonshoki), ces derniers sont dépeints comme appartenant à une ethnie différente, farouche et sont qualifiés de différents ethnonymes (dont celui d’Emishi) faisant référence à leur pilosité corporelle abondante. Ces populations se qualifient elles-mêmes de Ainu, qui signifie  : « être humain ».

 

La langue ainu est radicalement différente du japonais (qui appartient au groupe des langues altaïques – à l’instar du turc, du mongol, du toungouse et du coréen) aussi bien d’un point de vue syntaxique, phonologique, morphologique que du vocabulaire (comme la langue basque dans le Sud-Ouest de la France et en Espagne). Enfin, la culture ainu est une tradition orale, son système d’écriture repose sur des translittérations empruntées aux langues des civilisations russes (alphabet cyrillique) et japonaises (katakana). Plusieurs dialectes la composent, mais une langue commune, véhiculaire était compréhensible par tous les membres de la communauté, parce que réservée à la transmission culturelle, notamment des mythes. La langue ainu est en voie d’extinction, peut-être une quinzaine de locuteurs l’utiliseraient de nos jours.

 

La culture ainu a hérité de nombreuses pratiques de la période protohistorique, notamment le tatouage, les fondements de la religion, la chasse, mais avec une évolution singulière dans le temps, constitutrice d’une « identité ». La société ainu est restée pendant longtemps traditionnelle et proche de la nature : ce « retard » technologique par rapport à la Russie et au Japon l’a – à terme – marginalisée.

 

Les Ainu face à la colonisation japonaise dans un contexte politique et économique d’expansion impériale (1869 – 1945)

 

Les Ainu se trouvaient, du point du vue des gouvernements successifs japonais, au-delà du « limes ». Si les clans du Tôhoku (Nord-Est de l’île d’Honshû) ont finalement adopté la culture dominante, les autres groupes ont longtemps offert une âpre résistance au front pionnier japonais. Dès la période de Heian, les marches de l’État japonais étaient administrées par un officier supérieur, chargé de soumettre les Emishi : le shôgun. Au XVe siècle, les Japonais commencent à s’implanter dans le Sud-Ouest de Hokkaidô (Ezochi, appellation ainu) et à repousser les populations locales vers le nord, mais celles-ci parviennent à faire refluer l’invasion, puis à renouer des relations économiques avec le Japon.

 

À l’époque d’Edo (1600 – 1867), la politique de fermeture adoptée par le shôgunat ne s’applique pas aux Ainu : ces derniers commercent abondamment avec les Chinois et les Russes. Mais, la progression russe d’Ouest en Est à travers l’Asie centrale vient se heurter aux intérêts japonais : les enjeux se cristallisent autour du contrôle de l’île Ezo (ancienne appellation de Hokkaidô). Le Bakufu renforce son emprise sur l’île en détruisant la résistance des populations autochtones (bataille de Knashiri-Menashi, 1789) : l’île est économiquement exploitée par le Japon, notamment pour la production d’engrais de harengs.

 

Une rupture s’opère au XVIIIe siècle, l’invasion russe du Nord des îles Kouriles et de Sakhaline (à partir de 1730) pousse le gouvernement japonais à poursuivre une politique d’assimilation des peuples indigènes pour justifier sa revendication territoriale (un traité russo-nippon fixe la frontière entre les deux États, traité de Shimoda, 1854 : la ligne de partage séparant les deux empires se situant entre les îles d’Urup et d’Etorofu, voir notre article sur le sujet).

 

La restauration impériale (1868) et l’essor économique et industriel sont accompagnés d’un accroissement de la population japonaise : bon nombre d’insulaires partent s’installer à l’étranger, notamment en Amérique du Sud. En 1869, l’île de Hokkaidô est annexée à l’Empire et la colonisation favorisée (une commission de colonisation est créée); en 1886, l’île devient une préfecture, avec un statut particulier. Les Ainu sont rapidement soumis à un régime d’exception, leur interdisant toute activité culturelle (tatouages, pratiques funéraires, etc.) et économique traditionnelle (pêche, chasse). La situation connaît une aggravation, lorsqu’un nouveau traité russo-japonais rattache toutes les îles Kouriles au Japon, en échange de l’actuelle Sakhaline (1875). Les Ainu de Sakhaline sont contraints de rejoindre Hokkaidô, où ils sont cantonnés dans des réserves.

 

La politique cœrcitive japonaise vise à transformer la population, paupérisée par l’accaparement des terres par des colons japonais, en agriculteurs. Une politique volontariste d’assimilation, oblige les enfants des familles ainu à se rendre dans des écoles spécifiques où les enseignements sont dispensés en langue japonaise, les mariages mixtes sont encouragés. Par ailleurs, la colonisation a des effets ravageurs sur les autochtones, marqués psychologiquement, d’aucuns sombrent dans l’alcool, d’autres périssent des maladies importées par les immigrants nippons.

 

Les Ainu sont peu à peu soumis à un statut particulier. La commission de Colonisation adopte officiellement le terme de kyudojin, qui signifie « anciens aborigènes » (1878). Plus tard, en 1899, une loi est votée par les représentants japonais pour « protéger » les Ainu, considérés comme une « race primitive sur le déclin ». La politique coloniale japonaise se calque ainsi sur la pensée occidentale, notamment les théories évolutionnistes alors en vogue, et mise au service d’une politique expansionniste. Les Ainu et leurs territoires sont devenus une sorte de musée, de « zoo humain » (déjà vu sous d’autres tropiques), que viennent étudier et photographier les anthropologues occidentaux : des Ainu sont mêmes présentés aux expositions internationales de Chicago (1904) et de Londres (1910)…

 

Les Ainu vivent dans une situation de grande précarité, et ce n’est pas l’exode massif de population de la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale (1,5 million de Japonais supplémentaires se rendent sur l’île d’Hokkaidô, poussés par l’avancée soviétique en extrême-Orient et dans les îles Kouriles) qui permit d’apporter une amélioration à leur sort…

 

La politique coloniale japonaise est, nous l’avons dit, une appropriation et une adaptation des politiques coloniales européennes. Les autorités japonaises, nous l’avons vu, se sont octroyés le « pouvoir de nommer » la population cible, afin de l’individualiser et d’en souligner l’altérité, voire de la « dévaloriser » (la référence à la pilosité et le statut d’aborigène, voir supra). Cette qualification (1878) a été une étape déterminante à la création d’un statut singulier (1899) justifiant les pratiques discriminatoires et répressives, processus que l’on retrouve dans toutes les colonisations. Le statut de kyudojin n’est pas sans rappeler celui de l’indigénat dans les colonies françaises d’Afrique ou celui des Indiens d’Amérique du Nord.

 

Ces mesures administratives sont à l’origine d’un mouvement de défense de la part des populations ainu, même si certains, convertis au christianisme, espèrent que l’assimilation leur permettra d’obtenir une égalité de droit avec les Japonais. En 1930, un mouvement associatif voit le jour et réclame la révision de la « loi discriminatoire » de 1899. En outre, le processus de démocratisation enclenché après la défaite du Japon (1945) créé un climat plus favorable pour le mouvement revendicatif, qui peut notamment faire référence à l’article 13 de la Constitution qui rendent illégales la discrimination et l’assimilation du peuple ainu.

 

Les nouvelles représentations du peuple ainu : l’acquisition d’une reconnaissance officielle sous regard international

(1945 à nos jours)

 

Les années 1960 marquent un tournant. Pendant cette période encore, l’image des Ainu est instrumentalisée : les guides touristiques, notamment francophone, décrivent les populations locales comme « une race frappée d’impuissance » (guide Nagel, 1964); des scientifiques japonais vont même jusqu’à leur nier toute aptitude technique propre (ce qu’invalide les découvertes archéologiques actuelles). À la fin de la décennie, en pleine phase contestataire au Japon (mouvements des habitants et mouvements contre les discriminations) et dans le monde (Mai 1968), les associations de défense de la communauté ainu donnent de la voix par des actions symboliques (protestations contre la commémoration du centenaire de la colonisation de Hokkaidô, notamment).

 

En 1968, le gouvernement japonais fait un pas en faveur de la communauté en révisant partiellement la loi de 1899 (sans en modifier le caractère discriminatoire) et en proposant des aides sociales.  S’inspirant des mouvements de revendications des peuples autochtones de par le monde et des mouvements anti-colonialistes de libération nationale, le mouvement revendicatif ainu adopte une stratégie internationale, se fondant sur la charte internationale des droits de l’Homme.

 

L’association des revendications à ces valeurs universelles oblige le gouvernement japonais, en pleine expansion économique bâtie sur une représentation pacifique du pays, à signer la Convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (1978) et le Pacte international sur les droits civils et politiques (1979) et à reconnaître les droits des minorités. Mais l’existence de ces dernières est niée, le Premier ministre Nakasone Yasuhiro ayant officiellement rappelé le caractère mono-ethnique du pays (1986). En 1987, des représentants de la communauté ainu sont admis au groupe de travail des Nations unies, ayant entamé une réflexion sur le sort des peuples autochtones : il en résulte, en 1989, que le gouvernement japonais établit un comité en charge d’examiner les différents points d’une future loi concernant le peuple ainu.

 

Placé sous les projecteurs de la communauté internationale, Tôkyô finit par attribuer le statut de minorité ethnique aux Ainu et l’image de ces derniers commence à évoluer favorablement au yeux de l’opinion japonaise : en 1994, Kayano Shigeru (1926 – 2006), un des responsables du mouvement de revendication entre au Sénat; en 1997, le gouvernement japonais abolit l’appellation de kyudojin et adopte une loi de valorisation de la culture ainu (loi sur le développement de la culture ainu et la diffusion et l’instruction de la connaissance concernant la tradition ainu). Cette loi fait suite à un contentieux administratif autour du projet de construction d’un barrage sur un site sacré ainu : le rendu de la cour de justice de Sapporo ayant reconnu le caractère sacré du lieu et rappelé les carences du gouvernement japonais en matière de protection de l’héritage culturel des Ainu, cette décision a pesé sur l’adoption de la loi de 1997. C’est le premier texte reconnaissant une minorité ethnique au Japon. La législation offre désormais la possibilité aux multiples manifestations culturelles d’être subventionnées, mais ne prend spécifiquement en charge les problèmes socio-économiques de la population cible et aucune autonomie politique n’est accordée (elle n’est d’ailleurs pas recherchée par les intéressés). Le gouvernement revendique toujours sa totale légitimité sur l’île d’Hokkaidô : le centre de promotion de la culture ainu, qui a ouvert ses portes à Sapporo en 2003 est administré par des fonctionnaires japonais et lors du classement de la péninsule de Shiretoko à l’inventaire du patrimoine naturel mondial, aucune référence n’a été faite à la culture ainu, à laquelle cette langue de terre doit le nom. Enfin, le 6 juin 2008, une résolution, approuvée par la Diète, invite le gouvernement à reconnaître le peuple ainu, comme indigènes du Japon et à hâter la fin des discriminations, la résolution reconnaît le peuple ainu comme un « peuple indigène, avec un langage, une religion et une culture différente et abroge la loi de 1899.

 

D’après des enquêtes menées par l’association de défense de la culture ainu (Tari), les Ainu seraient encore victimes de discriminations scolaires (présence moindre sur les bancs universitaires) ou sociales (mariage). Cependant les mentalités et le regard porté sur les Ainu continuent de changer, notamment par le truchement des découvertes archéologiques, qui mettent en avant les peuples de la période Jômon, replacés dans une perspective et un environnement asiatiques (voir notre article sur le sujet). Des expositions internationales, un projet de parc culturel et même des artistes d’origine ainu (l’acteur Ukaji Takashi, le musicien Kano Oki) défendent et cherchent à valoriser leur culture. Des citoyens, issus de la génération d’enfants nés de couples mixtes, essayent de découvrir (pour ceux qui le découvrent) leurs origines, occultées par les parents. Cependant,  le film d’animation Princesse Mononoké (1997), réalisé par Hayao Miyazaki, fait implicitement référence aux traditions ainu, mais sans les manifester ouvertement. Mais, depuis peu (30 octobre 2011), un mouvement de militants ainu se lance dans la vie politique institutionnelle avec à sa tête, Kayano Shiro, le fils de l’ancien responsable ainu, Kayano Shigeru, et pour objectif l’instauration d’une société multiculturelle et multi-ethnique au Japon.

 

Conclusions

 

L’idée japonaise d’une société ethniquement homogène est battue en brèche, parce que pure construction politique et idéologique. Avant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le rapport aux minorités reposait sur le rapport de force, la création d’un statut, l’assimilation et l’exploitation économique forcée. Hanté par la crainte de la dégénérescence raciale et aveuglé par le succès de l’expansion coloniale qu’ils attribuent à la supériorité de leur « race» en Asie, le Japon s’est enfermé dans une idéologie et une politique impérialiste, qui a conduit le pays à la défaite. Il est flagrant de relever qu’après un conflit multiséculaire contre les Emishi et les Ainu, c’est précisément au XIXe siècle – alors que le Japon s’ouvre aux technologies, aux économies et aux cultures de l’Occident – que ce pays en s’en appropriant certaines de ses valeurs, s’est donné les moyens d’une politique impériale à destination de l’Asie et des territoires proches revendiqués par lui (Hokkaidô, îles Ryukyu et péninsule coréenne).

 

L’objectif était ouvertement – pour les populations des îles périphériques – l’assimilation, car d’un point de vue juridique, le Japon ne reconnaissait, jusqu’à la résistance civique des Ainu, qu’une seule ethnie. Les difficultés rencontrées par les Nikkeijin dans leur intégration, a démontré que l’appartenance à un groupe sur le seul critère biologique (l’innée), est une interprétation erronée minimisant l’importance des facteurs culturels (l’acquis).

 

Même si à l’heure actuelle, les minorités ne sont toujours pas juridiquement considérées comme faisant partie intégrante de la société, car ne possédant pas les attributs de la japonité, la société japonaise change : les signes d’acceptation des minorités (officieuses et de la minorité officielle ainu) sont visibles dans les média et au quotidien. En outre, les conditions d’accès à la citoyenneté japonaise prennent les formes intelligentes, pragmatiques et prudentes d’une immigration choisie (comme remède au vieillissement programmé de la population). Enfin, émane du pays une image pacifiée et positive, que l’on retrouve dans les médias occidentaux et sur Internet (le « Cool Japan », politique internationale pacifique, etc.), qui font de ce pays, probablement un des seuls réellement démocratique en Asie, une terre d’accueil pour de nouveaux immigrants, à condition que ceux-ci fassent un effort réel d’intégration (ce qui est au demeurant la moindre des choses…).

 

Rémy Valat

 

Orientations bibliographiques :

 

• Batchelor John, Sympathetic Magic of the Ainu. The Native people of Japan, Folklore History Series, reprint 2010.

 

• Beillevaire Patrick, « Okinawa : disparition et renaissance d’un département », in Le Japon contemporain, Dir. Jean-Marie Bouissou, Fayard, C.E.R.I., 2007.

 

• Dallais Philippe, « Hokkaidô : le peuple Ainu, ou l’ambivalence de la diversité culturelle au Japon », in Le Japon contemporain, Dir. Jean-Marie Bouissou, Fayard, C.E.R.I., 2007.

 

• Ethnic groups in Japan, including Ainu people, Ryukyuan people, Emishi, foreign-born Japanese, Dekasegi, Yamato people, Gaijin, Chinese people in Japan, Brazilians in Japan, Aterui, Indians in Japan, Peruvians in Japan, Burmese people in Japan, Hephaestus Books, 2011, (Une impression des sources Wikipédia disponibles sur le sujet).

 

• Kayano Shigeru, The Ainu. A story of Japan’s Original People, Tuttle Publishing, 1989.

 

• Pelletier Philippe, Atlas du Japon. Une société face à la post-modernité, Autrement, 2008.

 

• Poutignat Philippe et Streiff-Fenart Jocelyne, Théories de l’ethnicité, Presses universitaires de France, coll. « Quadrige », avril 2008.

 

• Reischauer Edwin O., Histoire du Japon et des Japonais. Des origines à 1945, Seuil, coll. « Points Histoire », 1988.

 

• Yamamoto Hadjime, Rapport japonais. Les minorités en droit public interne au Japon, en ligne à l’adresse suivante : www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/4/1725/45.pdf

 

---

 

Article printed from Europe Maxima: http://www.europemaxima.com

 

URL to article: http://www.europemaxima.com/?p=3482

Thaïlande: une révolte contre l’emprise américaine

Bernhard TOMASCHITZ:

Thaïlande: une révolte contre l’emprise américaine

Les désordres qui secouent la Thaïlande sont une révolte contre un gouvernement inféodé aux Etats-Unis qui galvaude le patrimoine national en privatisant les ressources

La capitale thaïlandaise, Bangkok, n’est plus le lieu idyllique que s’imaginent les vacanciers occidentaux. Les batailles de rue se succèdent entre les partisans du gouvernement de la ministre-présidente Yingluck Shinawatra, reconnaissables à leurs chemises rouges, et les opposants à ce gouvernement, généralement vêtus de chemises jaunes. Cinq personnes ont trouvé la mort jusqu’ici. La situation n’est pas prête à se calmer: le chef de l’opposition, Suthep Thaugsuban est fermement décidé à renverser Yingluck Shinawatra, qu’il considère comme une marionette de son frère Thaksin Shinawatra.

Le déclencheur de cette vague de protestations a été une loi d’amnistie fabriquée pour absoudre Thaksin Shinawatra, l’ancien premier ministre thaïlandais, qui vit en exil depuis qu’il a été renversé par les militaires en septembre 2006; en 2008, il a été condamné à la prison pour corruption. L’opposition revendique également de renationaliser le consortium thaïlandais du pétrole PTT. Ce consortium avait été privatisé peu après l’accession au pouvoir de Thaksin Shinawatra en février 2001. Le “Wall Street Journal” écrivait à l’époque: “Le premier ministre thaïlandais Thaksin Shinawatra a fait du processus de privatisation, longtemps bloqué, l’un de ses premiers objectifs économiques. Au cours des trois prochaines années, le gouvernement vendra les actions de 16 entreprises et agences nationales”.

Avant d’entamer sa carrière politique, Shinawatra avait été conseiller du Groupe Carlyle, une des plus grosses entreprises américaines de participation. Il a mis à profit ses expériences professionnelles quand il a commencé sa carrière politique, comme l’écrivait le journaliste Thanong Khantong en 2001 dans le journal thaïlandais en langue anglaise “Nation”: “En avril 1998, lorsque la Thaïlande se trouvait encore dans le marasme économique le plus profond, Thaksin Shinawatra a essayé d’utilser ses liens avec l’Amérique pour peaufiner son image politique, au moment où il fondait son parti le Thai Rak Thai”. Il a notamment invité l’ancien président américain George H. W. Bush et son ministre des affaires étrangères James Baker.

Les Américains ont rapidement reconnu l’importance que pouvait revêtir Shinawatra qui, pour sa part, a su se montrer reconnaissant. En 2003, la Thaïlande a envoyé un contingent de soldats pour perpétrer l’attaque contre l’Irak, contraire au droit des gens. Il a également entamé des pourparlers pour forger un accord de libre-échange entre les Etats-Unis et la Thaïlande. Shinawatra a ensuite tenté d’imposer les conditions de cet accord au pays, en contournant le parlement. Le coup des militaires a empêché la traduction dans la réalité de cet accord.

Celui-ci aurait d’abord profité aux Etats-Unis. Dans un rapport de la Maison Blanche, on peut lire que l’accord de libre-échange “aurait essentiellement profité aux fermiers américains, confrontés aux droits de douane thaïlandais qui, en moyenne, sont de 35% plus élevés que les restrictions extra-tarifaires”. Robert Zoellick, un faucon de l’écurie des néo-conservateurs, qui, à l’époque était le principal des négociateurs américains et est devenu ultérieurement président de la Banque Mondiale, fut l’homme qui força Bangkok à éliminer dans le domaine agricole, “les limitations injustifiables à l’endroit des nouvelles technologies américaines”. Cette formule désigne surtout les organismes génétiquement modifiés. D’après Ernest Bower, le président du “US-ASEAN Business Council”, le traité entre Washington et Bangkok devait constituer “un précédent et un préliminaire” à tous les accords de libre-échange à négocier entre les Etats-Unis et les pays d’Asie du Sud-Est disposant d’un fort secteur agricole. L’“US-ASEAN Business Council” est un lobby qui veut amplifier les relations économiques entre les Etats-Unis et l’association des pays du Sud-Est asiatique. Parmi les 500 entreprises américaines qui sont parties prenantes dans ces négociations, on compte Coca-Cola et Google mais aussi des industries de l’armement comme Lockheed Martin et Northrop Grumman.

L’“US-ASEAN Business Council” est demeuré actif en Thaïlande après la chute de Shinawatra. De concert avec d’autres fondations américaines influentes, comme Freedom House, le Council a soutenu des “mouvements démocratiques” thaïlandais comme l’UDD (“United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship”). Une “Union for Thai Democracy” remercie le Council pour l’avoir soutenu dans une lettre du 26 avril 2011: “Nous avons eu l’occasion de rencontrer ‘Human Rights Watch’, le ‘National Democratic Institute’ [une officine dépendant des Démocrates américains] et l’‘US-ASEAN Business Council’. Nous avons discuté de nombreuses questions (...). Le monde sait désormais, à l’heure de la globalisation, que seule une véritable démocratie peut garantir la stabilité”.

L’intérêt des Américains était que le statu quo demeurât tel quel en Thaïlande. La re-nationalisation du géant pétrolier PTT, que réclame l’opposition actuelle, bouleverserait la situation économique: en effet, le consortium énergétique américain Chevron est l’actionnaire principal de PTT depuis la privatisation de cette entreprise du Sud-Est asiatique. Il faut aussi se rappeler que PTT dispose d’un bon réseau d’oléoducs et de gazoducs. Vu les réserves énergétiques thaïlandaises, ce réseau revêt une importance stratégique considérable. Selon un dossier établi par la CIA, la Thaïlande disposerait de réserves sûres de pétrole estimées à 442 millions de barils et des réserves de gaz équivalant à 8,8 milliards de m3”.

A tout cela s’ajoute la position géostratégique de la Thaïlande et surtout de la presqu’île de Kra, dont la largeur est d’à peine 44 km. Elle sépare l’Océan Indien du Golfe du Siam. La Chine, depuis longtemps, veut creuser un canal au beau milieu de cette presqu’île pour mettre un terme au fameux “dilemme de Malakka”: le détroit de Malakka, contrôlé par des puissances tierces, limite considérablement la marge de manoeuvre des Chinois dans cette zone maritime cruciale. Zhou Fangye, de l’Académie chinoise des sciences sociales, écrivait, fin novembre 2013, dans un journal appartenant à l’Etat chinois, “Global Times”, que le creusement d’un canal “résoudrait automatiquement le ‘dilemme de Malakka’ et permettrait d’éviter le goulot d’étranglement stratégique qui limite l’accès à l’Océan Indien de la puissance maritime chinoise”. A l’inverse, le politologue néo-conservateur américain Robert Kaplan considère que le projet d’un Canal de Kra, vu son importance géostratégique, est comparable au projet du Canal de Panama et “changerait l’équilibre en Asie au profit de la Chine”.

Bernhard TOMASCHITZ.

(article paru dans “zur Zeit”, Vienne, n°50/2013, http://www.zurzeit.at ).

Le développement de la Chine est une déclaration de guerre aux Etats-Unis

Le développement de la Chine est une déclaration de guerre aux Etats-Unis

Par Peter KUNTZE

La Chine a confiance en elle; elle ose des réformes et sa nouvelle direction veut consolider ses succès

Le contraste ne pourrait pas être beaucoup plus grand: d’un côté du Pacifique, la puissance qui est toujours l’hegemon, est confrontée à de fortes turbulences économiques et politiques; de l’autre côté, la superpuissance en devenir bat tous les records sur le plan économique, en dépit des prophètes de malheur, et a pleine confiance en son avenir.

Ce n’est pas étonnant: trois décennies et demie après le lancement de la politique de réformes et d’ouverture voulue par Deng Xiaoping, le successeur de Mao Zedong, ce changement de cap révolutionnaire a donné ses fruits en bien des domaines. Le pauvre Etat paysan, avec ses millions de “fourmis bleues” est devenu un pays moderne aux immeubles de prestige rutilants et a développé une industrie de la mode qui se révèle désormais sur les “catwalks” de Paris et de Milan.

Hollywood aussi s’énerve car, de fait, l’industrie américaine du cinéma a toutes les raisons de craindre l’avènement d’un sérieux concurrent installé en Extrême-Orient. Pourquoi? Wang Jianlin, l’homme qui serait le plus riche de la République Populaire de Chine, est en train de faire construire à Tsingtau (l’ancienne base et colonie allemande) les plus grands studios cinématographiques du monde. Ce projet gigantesque coûterait plus de huit milliards de dollars et serait achevé en 2017.

On pourrait énumérer encore beaucoup de nouvelles de ce genre, qui confirmeraient le développement exponentiel de la Chine actuelle. Pourtant, lorsque la nouvelle direction chinoise a accédé au pouvoir en novembre 2012, les voix se multipliaient pour annoncer le déclin prochain de la Chine, comme ces mêmes voix, d’ailleurs, l’avaient fait pour les directions précédentes. Comme le “New York Times” ou le “Spiegel”, les médias occidentaux étaient à l’unisson pour évoquer des scénarii catastrophiques: une bulle immobilière était sur le point d’éclater, qui aurait été suivie d’une bulle de crédit et, ensuite, le pays croulerait à cause de la corruption, tandis que la pollution le ravagerait et que le peuple ne tolèrerait plus les différences entre riches et pauvres. L’aspiration générale à la liberté ferait tomber la direction communiste, si des réformes rapides et de vaste ampleur n’étaient pas traduites dans le réel et si cette direction ne renonçait pas à son monopole de pouvoir.

Rien de tout cela ne s’est produit depuis que Xi Jinping (chef de l’Etat et du Parti) et Li Keqiang (premier ministre) ont pris leurs fonctions en novembre 2012 pour les conserver pendant dix ans. On ne voit pas pourquoi le chaos politique et la débâcle économique frapperaient la Chine au cours de la décennie à venir, décennie au bout de laquelle la République Populaire, selon l’OCDE, rattraperait les Etats-Unis, en tant que principale puissance économique de la planète. Le nouveau président de la Banque Mondiale, Jim Yong Kim, a prévu pour la Chine un développement positif à la mi-octobre: “La République Populaire croît de manière certes plus lente mais elle poursuit ses réformes. Le pays s’impose une gigantesque transformation: il passe du statut de pays exportateur et investisseur à une économie plus orientée vers la consommation. Sa direction envisage de s’en tenir à cette politique, en dépit des difficultés. C’est là un modèle pour d’autres”.

Deux nouvelles institutions contribueront à consolider la voie choisie par le gouvernement chinois: une première autorité, soumise au cabinet, a reçu, sur décision du Comité Central, la mission “d’éviter les conflits sociaux et de les résoudre de manière efficace”, afin de garantir la sécurité intérieure de l’Etat.

L’émergence de cette autorité vise, d’une part, à résoudre les problèmes qui se profilent derrière les nombreuses protestations et les manifestations parfois violentes qui se sont organisées dans le pays contre les excès de fonctionnaires locaux; d’autre part, à réagir contre d’autres dérapages comme l’attentat récent qui a frappé Pékin. Fin octobre, devant la Porte de la Paix Céleste, trois Ouïghours avaient foncé avec leur voiture bourrée d’essence sur une foule et entraîné deux passants avec eux dans la mort. On ne peut pas affirmer avec certitude qu’il s’agit d’un acte terroriste de facture islamiste, comme l’affirme le gouvernement. Une chose est sûre cependant: au Tibet comme dans la province du Xinjiang, peuplée d’Ouïghours, les incidents se multiplient car les habitants de ces vastes régions se sentent menacés par l’immigration sans cesse croissante de Chinois Han.

La deuxième autorité, qui verra le jour, s’appelle le “Groupe Central de Direction”, et sera soumis au Comité Central du PC chinois. Il supervisera le processus des réformes en cours et à planifier et veillera à leur “approfondissement général”.

Avec ces décisions, que le Comité Central du PC chinois a prises au début de novembre 2013 après quatre jours de délibérations, Xi Jinping et son camarade de combat, l’élégant Li Keqiang, ont imposé leur politique face à la résistance des forces orthodoxes de gauche. En effet, le texte de la résolution parle du marché qui ne tiendra plus un rôle “fondamental” mais bien un rôle “décisif” dans la répartition des ressources. Tant la propriété étatique que la propriété privée sont désormais des composantes essentielles de “l’économie socialiste de marché”.

D’importantes réformes sociales ont également été décidées. Ainsi, la politique d’un enfant par couple sera assouplie afin de mettre un terme au processus de vieillissement démographique qui freine le développement économique. Jusqu’ici les couples résidant en zone urbaine ne pouvaient avoir un deuxième enfant que si les deux parents n’avaient ni frères ni soeurs. Dorénavant, les couples chinois des villes pourront avoir un deuxième enfant si un seul des parents n’a ni frère ni soeur.

On annonce également la suppression des camps de travail où, depuis 1957, les petits délinquents et les adversaires du régime pouvaient être “rééduqués” pour une période allant jusqu’à quatre années, sans décision d’un tribunal.

L’échec du projet de reconstruction chinois, qui serait dû à des désordres intérieurs et devrait survenir au cours de ces prochaines années, est une chimère de plus colportée par les médias occidentaux. Beaucoup de Chinois profitent désormais de la politique gouvernementale. Tout visiteur étranger s’en aperçoit aisément en déambulant dans les rues des villes chinoises: ce ne sont plus que les seuls dirigeants politiques communistes qui circulent en automobile avec chauffeur. Aujourd’hui des millions de Chinois, fiers, sont au volant de leur voiture personnelle neuve de fabrication japonaise, américaine, allemande ou sud-coréenne.

De plus, plus de 90 millions de Chinois se sont rendus cette année à l’étranger. Ce ne sont pas seulement des amoureux du dépaysement mais des champions du “shopping” international. En 2012, les touristes chinois ont dépensé à l’étranger près de 102 milliards de dollars, plus que n’importe quelle autre nation au monde.

Quasiment à l’insu du reste du monde, Pékin vient d’entamer un combat sur le plan énergétique. Selon les médias chinois, le gouvernement prévoit, pour les cinq années à venir, la somme de 280 milliards d’euro pour financer des mesures visant des économies d’énergies et pour diminuer les effets négatifs de la pollution. Cette somme s’ajoute aux 220 milliards déjà investis dans les énergies renouvelables. Plus important encore: à moyen terme, la direction chinoise veut libérer le cours du yuan (la devise chinoise), le coupler éventuellement à l’or, et, ainsi, détrôner le dollar comme devise globale.

Peter KUNTZE.

(article paru dans “Junge Freiheit”, Berlin, n°49/2013; http://www.jungefreiheit.de ).

IL SECOLO CINESE?

IL SECOLO CINESE?

Ex: http://www.eurasi-rivista.org

È uscito il numero XXXII (4-2013) della rivista di studi geopolitici “Eurasia” intitolato:

 

IL SECOLO CINESE?

Ecco di seguito l’elenco degli articoli presenti in questo numero, con un breve riassunto di ciascuno di essi.

 

EDITORIALE

IL SECOLO CINESE? di Claudio Mutti

 

GEOFILOSOFIA

HEGEL E IL FONDAMENTO GEOGRAFICO DELLA STORIA MONDIALE di Davide Ragnolini*

All’interno delle «Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte» del grande filosofo tedesco la riflessione sulla base geografica della storia mondiale trova una significativa collocazione propedeutica alla stessa storia filosofica del mondo, la cui importanza non è stata ancora sufficientemente colta. Hegel poneva a fondamento dello svolgimento storico mondiale il rapporto tra i popoli e la condizione naturale nella quale questi hanno localizzazione. Secondo l’impostazione storico-idealistica di Hegel, tempo e spazio hanno nella storia e geografia universale il loro correlato fenomenico dal quale i popoli avviano la propria esistenza. Da un punto di vista filosofico il rapporto tra spirito e natura costituisce la struttura teoretica portante su cui Hegel basa l’emancipazione di un popolo dalla condizione di mero «ente naturale» a soggetto storico all’interno della storia mondiale. Dal geografo e collega Carl Ritter,il filosofo tedesco ha tratto i princìpi interpretativi per la comprensione delle possibilità di sviluppo che le differenze geografiche offrono ai popoli, la rappresentazione geologica della superficie terrestre, la sua divisione in continente euroafrasiatico ed aree insulari, e infine la contrapposizione tra terra e mare. Questi rappresentano solo alcuni dei molti aspetti della geografia hegeliana, forieri di sviluppi successivi per la teoria geopolitica. 

 

DOSSARIO: IL SECOLO CINESE?

LA REPUBBLICA POPOLARE CINESE: PROFILO E RISORSE a cura della Redazione

La Cina oggi: una panoramica dei dati essenziali e delle dinamiche in atto contribuisce alla comprensione della più grande realtà asiatica.

 

LA NUOVA VIA DELLA SETA di Qi Han

La signora Qi Han è incaricata d’Affari dell’Ambasciata della Repubblica Popolare Cinese in Italia. “Eurasia” la ringrazia per aver gentilmente concesso di pubblicare il testo del discorso da lei pronunciato in occasione del Forum Eurasiatico di Verona (17-18 ottobre 2013). 

RITORNO ALLA VIA DELLA SETA di Giuseppe Cappelluti

 Dal mito alla realtà. Dopo secoli di oblio la Via della Seta, storico ponte tra l’Occidente e la Cina, sta tornando ad essere una direttrice primaria del commercio internazionale. Lungo i suoi itinerari si è tuttavia prefigurata l’ennesima disputa tra eurasiatismo ed euro-atlantismo: da un lato il percorso attraverso Russia e Kazakistan, più rapido e stimolato dal rafforzamento dell’integrazione eurasiatica, dall’altro quello attraverso il Caucaso e il Mar Caspio voluto dall’Unione Europea.

LA CINA PER UN ORDINE MULTIPOLARE di Spartaco A. Puttini

 L’ascesa della Cina si è imposta come una realtà della quale tener conto, in tutte le dimensioni proprie della geopolitica. Ma per coglierne la portata e le conseguenze per la vita internazionale occorre collocarla in un contesto preciso: quello attualmente attraversato dalle relazioni internazionali e caratterizzato dal braccio di ferro in corso tra il tentativo statunitense di imporre al mondo il proprio “dominio a pieno spettro” e l’emergere di un equilibrio di potenza multipolare. Nelle righe che seguono cercheremo di dare sommariamente conto dell’azione politica della Cina popolare su diverse scacchiere (dall’America Latina all’Africa) evidenziandone finalità ed effetti. Di particolare rilievo risulta l’impulso dato allo sviluppo dei rapporti economici Sud-Sud con mutuo beneficio, che promettono di erodere il potere ricattatorio esercitato dalle centrali finanziarie legate all’Angloamerica nei confronti dei paesi in via di sviluppo. Si accennerà al complesso rapporto che viene a stabilirsi concretamente tra l’aspirazione cinese ad una crescita armonica e pacifica e il vincolo sistemico indotto dagli Stati Uniti con la corsa agli armamenti e con il susseguirsi di gravissimi crisi regionali che contribuiscono ad attizzare le tensioni tra le Potenze.                         

 

 LA SECONDA PORTAEREI CINESE di Andrea Fais

La crescita della potenza economica cinese ha avuto principalmente due ripercussioni internazionali. L’una, di carattere commerciale, sta già modificando le dinamiche dei flussi di capitale nel pianeta ed è quella più dibattuta dalla stampa europea ma troppo spesso accentuata, se non deformata da giudizi raramente in sintonia con la realtà dei fatti. L’altra, di carattere strategico, mantiene ritmi di trasformazione più lenti, non tanto per il ritardo con cui la Repubblica Popolare Cinese è giunta ad affrontare nel concreto i temi salienti della guerra informatica e della modernizzazione militare quanto piuttosto per l’enorme potenziale accumulato dal Pentagono nel decennio compreso tra il 1998 e il 2007. Eppure dal momento che le dimensioni commerciale e militare sono interdipendenti, all’inversione di tendenza nella prima potrebbe presto seguirne un’altra nella seconda. Il debutto della prima portaerei cinese, la Liaoning, nel settembre 2012 aveva lanciato un dado sul tavolo: la sfida a quello strapotere aeronavale statunitense che, assieme al primato internazionale del dollaro, costituisce l’architrave dell’egemonia nordamericana sul resto del mondo.

 

LA TRIADE NUCLEARE DELLA REPUBBLICA POPOLARE CINESE di Alessandro Lattanzio

L’arsenale strategico cinese è oggetto di varie congetture. Qui viene presentato un quadro sintetico delle varie stime relative all’arsenale nucleare, dovute ai più importanti enti occidentali di analisi strategica.

 

GLI ALTRI PARTITI NELLA CINA POPOLARE di Giovanni Armillotta

 Le origini, la storia e l’organizzazione dei partiti democratici. Le lotte comuni assieme ai comunisti nell’epopea della liberazione contro i giapponesi, e nella guerra civile nel periodo della dittatura del Guomindang. La collaborazione di essi col Partito Comunista Cinese nell’amministrazione del Paese e le rappresentanze dei partiti indipendenti nelle alte istituzioni statali. Paralleli col sistema partitico della nostra Italia 1945-1994. Nell’articolo è adottato il sistema di traslitterazione Pinyin di nomi e toponimi.

 

LA  QUINTA GENERAZIONE AL POTERE di Sara Nardi

Negli ultimi anni il problema dell’informazione e dei mezzi di comunicazione di massa si è fatto stringente anche in Cina. Come seconda potenza mondiale e come nazione pienamente inserita nel processo di globalizzazione economica e digitale, il colosso asiatico è ormai entrato sotto la lente d’ingrandimento della famigerata osservazione internazionale. Si tratta di una realtà complessa, che spesso risente delle contraddizioni o delle forzature che il punto di vista politico e geografico dell’osservatore reca necessariamente con sé. Tuttavia, è stato lo stesso Xi Jinping ad annunciare un piano di riforme che risolvano in modo più efficace le complicate questioni legate alla corruzione, agli intrecci impropri tra politica e stampa e alla regolamentazione della rete multimediale. Una sfida da cui dipende l’immagine della Cina nel mondo e, dunque, la sua capacità di guadagnare legittimazione e consenso internazionali.

 

HUKOU. LA RESIDENZA IN CINA di Maria Francesca Staiano

La RPC è caratterizzata da un sistema di registrazione permanente della residenza (Hukou) che esclude i residenti non regolari, soprattutto i lavoratori migranti, dal godimento delle prestazioni sociali, come l’accesso ai servizi di istruzione, di sanità, di previdenza sociale e di sicurezza sul lavoro. Ciò ha generato una divaricazione netta tra la popolazione urbana e i migranti che provengono dalle zone rurali. Il sistema dello Hukou deriva da una tradizione storica-culturale antica ed è stato modificato varie volte dal Governo cinese. Oggi, la questione dello Hukou è nell’agenda del terzo plenum del Partito Comunista della RPC e quanto mai attuale. La Cina si trova ad affrontare la sfida di un esercito di lavoratori migranti che, sostenendo l’economia cinese, pretendono gli stessi diritti dei cittadini urbani.

 

MYANMAR: UNA PARTITA ANCORA APERTA? di Stefano Vernole

Lo “sdoganamento” del Myanmar apparentemente favorisce l’intrusione occidentale nell’area del Sud-Est asiatico, ma la stabilizzazione dell’ex Birmania è funzionale agli interessi di sicurezza della Cina. La strategia geoeconomica del PCC appare ancora una volta vincente. Il secolo asiatico vedrà Pechino protagonista?

LA CINA IN ROMANIA di Luca Bistolfi

La Cina è vicina, e molto, anche in Romania. Da anni ormai, semplici cittadini, operai, imprenditori e multinazionali di servizi e infrastrutture provenienti dalla Città Proibita hanno adottato il Paese carpatico quale meta di investimenti a lunga durata. Nel bellum omnium contra omnes i romeni se ne vanno dal loro Paese e ad esser assunti sono i cinesi, sempre più a basso costo e non meno sfruttati. Un risultato, fra i tanti, è che anche le aziende italiane, andate per suonare, sono state suonate. Sempre dai cinesi. E la Romania, ancora una volta, piange.

 

IL TURISMO CINESE DEL XXI SECOLO di Ornella Colandrea

Negli ultimi tre decenni, la Repubblica Popolare Cinese ha adottato politiche e misure che, modificando fortemente la struttura socioeconomica del paese, hanno inaugurato una fase di costante crescita economica. La Cina rappresenta oggi un interessante mercato in  crescente espansione in cui il turismo costituisce uno dei fulcri centrali dell’industria nazionale. Il mercato turistico cinese rappresenta una grande opportunità per l’Europa e per il sistema di offerta italiano in particolare. L’articolo analizza i dati, i ritmi di sviluppo, le tendenze, i profili dei turisti cinesi, individuando criticità e opportunità.

 

IL TURISMO CINESE IN ITALIA di Elena Premoli

Affari, ma non solo: anche più tempo libero, voglia di esplorare il mondo, curiosità sempre crescente, desiderio di evasione, necessità di staccarsi dalla frenetica vita delle grandi megalopoli asiatiche. E, soprattutto, maggiore disponibilità economica. Sono questi alcuni fattori che stanno alla base di un fenomeno  sempre in crescita e che sta raggiungendo cifre davvero importanti. Si tratta del turismo cinese, dei viaggi interni alla Cina o all’estero che sempre più abitanti della Terra di Mezzo decidono di compiere per piacere.  Dove si posiziona il nostro Paese all’interno di questa filiera? Quali passi sono stati già compiuti, da quali sbagli è bene trarre insegnamento e quali piccole accortezze sono richieste agli operatori del settore per accogliere al meglio gli ospiti in arrivo dalla Repubblica Popolare? L’articolo offre un breve excursus sull’evoluzione del fenomeno turistico, andando alle radici della pratica del viaggiare per poi arrivare velocemente ai giorni nostri. Espone alcune cifre che definiscono un’idea generale del fenomeno e si chiude con uno sguardo particolare su quanto è possibile fare per trarre maggiori guadagni da tale tendenza, impossibile da trascurare.

LA RICEZIONE DI CARL SCHMITT IN CINA di Davide Ragnolini

La recente traduzione in cinese delle opere del giurista tedesco e la crescita delle pubblicazioni dedicategli in Cina rappresentano un elemento di novità sotto un duplice punto di vista. Da un lato contribuiscono sul piano ermeneutico ad arricchire la storia della ricezione della filosofia schmittiana del diritto sotto un più generale aspetto teoretico-dottrinale nel dibattito scientifico mondiale; dall’altro, queste pubblicazioni sono rilevanti come inedita introduzione di un autore europeo ormai classico all’interno della specificità politico-culturale della più grande nazione asiatica. Un recente saggio di Qi Zheng fornisce una panoramica su questo dibattito scientifico in Cina e al contempo ci dà la possibilità di intravedere i limiti attuali della ricezione cinese di un pensatore che, come spiega la stessa Qi Zheng, come nessun altro ha causato tante controversie in Cina.

CONTINENTI

GLOBALIZZAZIONE: DEFINIZIONE E CONSEGUENZE di Cristiano Procentese

La globalizzazione costituisce il fenomeno più rilevante degli ultimi decenni: ingrediente ormai irrinunciabile di ogni riflessione, rimane, ciononostante, un concetto ancora generico e impreciso. Tuttavia, dopo le apologetiche profezie dei sostenitori della globalizzazione, il risultato degli ultimi anni è  stato un modello di sviluppo che ha come componente intrinseca l’accentuazione delle diseguaglianze, la precarizzazione del lavoro ed il senso d’insicurezza dei cittadini. La crescita incontrollata della speculazione finanziaria, la delocalizzazione delle imprese, che diventano multinazionali o transnazionali, e l’impotenza dei governi nazionali nel gestire un fenomeno così complesso, sono le priorità cui la politica, riappropriandosi delle proprie prerogative, dovrebbe cercare di dare una risposta.

LA LETTONIA VERSO L’EURO di Giuseppe Cappelluti

Il 1 gennaio 2014 sarà una data storica per la Lettonia: il Paese baltico, infatti, diventerà il diciottesimo membro di Eurolandia. Per ragioni sia economiche sia geopolitiche (la volontà di sancire l’appartenenza all’Occidente in funzione antirussa) l’adozione dell’euro è stata uno dei principali obiettivi del governo di centrodestra, ma il Paese è tutt’altro che entusiasta. L’accettazione della Lettonia nell’Eurozona, dopo tutto, è stata vincolata all’adozione di rigide misure di austerità, e non manca chi, memori dei cinquant’anni di occupazione sovietica, teme per la propria sovranità nazionale. Alcuni economisti, d’altro canto, non vedono di buon occhio alcuni provvedimenti recentemente approvati in materia fiscale e temono che il Paese si trasformi in un ponte verso i paradisi fiscali, o peggio che diventi esso stesso un paradiso fiscale.

LE MANI SULL’ASIA CENTRALE di Giuseppe Cappelluti

La Cina è oggi uno dei maggiori interlocutori commerciali degli “stan” dell’Asia Centrale, e i suoi interessi nell’area sono in forte crescita. Emblematici delle strategie geopolitiche di Pechino verso il Centrasia sono i rapporti con Kazakhstan e Kirghizistan. Se fino a poco più di vent’anni fa la Cina era totalmente assente dagli orizzonti kazachi, la sempre più massiccia presenza cinese nell’economia dell’Aquila della Steppa, non più limitata al tradizionale settore degli idrocarburi, ne ha fatto uno dei più importanti partner commerciali e strategici. Inoltre, pur non mancando timori per un possibile boom dell’immigrazione cinese, gli interessi tra i due Paesi sono reciproci, a partire dalle questioni legate alla sicurezza e dalle nuove infrastrutture che collegheranno Cina e Russia attraverso il Kazakhstan. Il Kirghizistan, al contrario, interessa essenzialmente per la sua posizione geografica, mentre la sua futura adesione all’Unione Doganale non è propriamente una buona notizia per quello che un tempo fu il Celeste Impero. Ma nei due Paesi le mosse cinesi suscitano non pochi sospetti: legittimi interessi o espansionismo geoeconomico?

LA GUERRA CIVILE DEL TAGIKISTAN (1992-1997) di Andrea Forti

Nonostante la durata, cinque anni, e l’elevato numero di vittime (dai cinquanta ai centomila morti) la guerra civile del Tagikistan rimane, agli occhi del grande pubblico occidentale (e non solo), uno dei conflitti meno conosciuti del convulso periodo immediatamente successivo alla fine della Guerra Fredda, oscurato dai contemporanei ma ben più mediatici conflitti nella ex-Jugoslavia, in Algeria o in Somalia. La guerra civile tagica, nonostante l’oblio che ormai circonda questa drammatica pagina di storia, è di grande interesse sia per lo studio dei conflitti nati dal dissolvimento dell’Unione Sovietica che per eventuali comparazioni con conflitti attualmente in corso, come quello in Siria che oppone le forze governative alla ribellione islamista.

COMUNITÀ RELIGIOSE IN SIRIA di Vittoria Squillacioti

La Siria odierna è un paese complesso dal punto di vista etnico e religioso. Per comprendere quali siano effettivamente le differenze che caratterizzano la sua popolazione è necessario tenere presente le variabili della lingua, della confessione religiosa e dell’eventuale collocazione geografica delle diverse comunità, tre variabili che agiscono profondamente nella definizione delle diverse identità e appartenenze. Nel variegato mosaico siriano riscontriamo così la presenza dominante dei musulmani, ancorché suddivisi tra sunniti, sciiti, ismailiti, alawiti, drusi e yazidi, ma anche diverse varietà del cristianesimo ed una comunità ebraica.

ARABIA SAUDITA: ALLEANZE ESTERE E DINAMICHE INTERNE di Sara Brzuszkiewicz

In seguito al deciso rifiuto da parte dell’Arabia Saudita del seggio nel Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite, per il quale era stata eletta come membro non permanente, ci si interroga sugli attuali rapporti del Regno dei Saud con storici alleati, rivali di sempre e timido dissenso interno, per scoprire che, nonostante a prima vista possa sembrare il contrario, il vento del cambiamento è ancora lontano dalla Culla dell’Islam.

IL TAGLIO DELL’ISTMO DI SUEZ di Lorenzo Salimbeni

Nel novembre del 1869 venne inaugurato il Canale di Suez. Ci era voluto quasi un decennio di massacranti lavori per portare a compimento quest’opera ciclopica, dopo che già in fase di progettazione non erano mancate le polemiche. La necessità di mettere in collegamento il Mar Mediterraneo ed il Mar Rosso era chiara a tutti, ma la modalità con cui conseguire tale obiettivo era oggetto di discussione. Vi fu chi propose di aprire un canale fra il Mar Rosso ed il delta del Nilo (come era già stato fatto all’epoca dei Faraoni e della dominazione araba dell’Egitto), chi insistette per un collegamento ferroviario Alessandria-Il Cairo-Mar Rosso e chi spinse per tagliare l’istmo di Suez, anche se si riteneva che fra i due mari vi fosse un dislivello di alcuni metri che avrebbe richiesto la costruzione di complesse chiuse. La Compagnia Universale del Canale di Suez presieduta dallo spregiudicato Ferdinand de Lesseps, il genio ingegneristico di Luigi Negrelli e l’iniziale opposizione britannica furono i soggetti più importanti nella fase iniziale dell’ambiziosa opera di scavo.

INTERVISTE

TUCCI IN ORIENTE. L’AVVENTURA DI UNA VITA. INTERVISTA A ENRICA GARZILLI (a cura di Andrea Fais)

Enrica Garzilli è, dal 1995, direttrice delle riviste accademiche “International Journal of Sanskrit Studies” e “Journal of South Asia Women Studies”. È stata quindi Research Affiliate al P.G.D.A.V. College, una delle più antiche istituzioni dell’Università di Delhi. Dal 1991 al 2011 ha vinto la Senior Fellowship presso il Center for the Study of World Religions dell’Università di Harvard (1992–94), ha compiuto quattro anni di studi post-laurea in storia, informatica e giurisprudenza, ha insegnato come Lecturer di sanscrito all’università di Harvard e servito come direttore editoriale della Harvard Oriental Series-Opera Minora, è stata Visiting Researcher alla Harvard Law School (1994–96) e docente presso le università di Macerata, Perugia e Torino. Collabora in qualità di esperta alla RSI – Radiotelevisione Svizzera e a riviste e giornali italiani.

“GLOBAL TIMES”: UNO STRUMENTO DI DIALOGO. INTERVISTA A LI HONGWEI (a cura di Andrea Fais)

Li Hongwei è caporedattore dell’edizione in lingua inglese del quotidiano di approfondimento cinese “Global Times”. Fondato nel 1993 dall’editore del “Quotidiano del Popolo”, il “Global Times” ha raggiunto una popolarità internazionale a partire dal 2009, quando fu lanciata l’edizione in lingua inglese che ha raggiunto i lettori di tutto il mondo, accreditandosi come riferimento imprescindibile per conoscere analisi e opinioni della società cinese. La presente intervista è stata rilasciata ad Andrea Fais, collaboratore di “Eurasia” e di “Global Times”.

RECENSIONI

Luciano Pignataro, La Cina contemporanea da Mao Zedong a Deng Xiaoping (1949-1980) (Andrea Fais)

Tiziano Terzani, Tutte le opere (Stefano Vernole)

Carlo Terracciano, L’Impero del Cuore del Mondo (Andrea Fais)

Massimo Cacciari, Il potere che freno (Claudio Mutti)

La geostrategia dell’India e la Cina

La geostrategia dell’India e la Cina

Mackinder contro Mahan?

Zorawar Daulet Singh

 

Ex: http://www.geopolitica-rivista.org

 

Due eventi recenti esemplificano il dilemma geopolitico dell’India. Durante i primi giorni di aprile 2013 è stato riferito che alcuni sottomarini cinesi avevano condotto incursioni nell’Oceano Indiano, ovviamente avvertite dai sonar della marina statunitense¹. Un paio di settimane dopo c’è stata l’intrusione di un plotone di truppe cinesi nella zona della valle di Depsang, nel Ladakh orientale². Anche se lo status precedente all’incursione è stato raggiunto pacificamente, l’incidente del Ladakh ricorda chiaramente le durevoli implicazioni dell’irrisolta controversia himalayana. Insieme, ciò a cui entrambi questi eventi fanno pensare è anche la profonda controversia nella geostrategia dell’India nei confronti della Cina. Questa è contesa tra le rappresentazioni di Mackinder e di Mahan, e parte della sua ambivalenza strategica può essere ricondotta proprio alla mancanza di una rappresentazione geopolitica ben definita su cui basare il dibattito.

L’illusione mahaniana

Una soluzione mahaniana alla sfida posta dalla Cina riguarda il fatto che l’India può superare alcuni dei suoi svantaggi continentali disturbando le linee di comunicazione marittime (SLOC – sea lines of communications) cinesi, o prendendo parte alle dispute dell’Asia Orientale. La logica di fondo deriva dal concetto di escalation orizzontale, secondo cui si può tentare di superare l’asimmetria in un teatro facendo salire il conflitto ad un dominio geografico più ampio. Riassumendo, se la Cina dovesse continuare ad avventurarsi nelle montagne, l’India potrebbe rispondere in mare aperto.

Anche se concettualmente intuitivo, questo collegamento richiede che Pechino valuti l’integrità delle sue linee di comunicazioni marittime in una maniera sufficiente a spingerla a modificare i suoi piani sulle montagne. I blocchi navali sono inoltre operazioni complesse, e l’orizzonte temporale necessario al successo, che corrisponderebbe al porre una seria minaccia alla sicurezza delle risorse cinesi, sarebbe significativamente più lungo di quello richiesto da una rapida e limitata operazione continentale volta a modificare permanentemente la linea di controllo effettiva (Line of Actual Control – LAC) o avente scopi punitivi. La crescente riserva strategica di petrolio della Cina inoltre, anche se destinata a compensare turbative di mercato, rappresenterebbe una risorsa in una situazione del genere. Infine, la ricerca cinese di nuove linee di comunicazione eurasiatiche, sia mediante i sempre più importanti legami energetici con la Russia che con le interconnessioni attraverso l’Asia Centrale, indicano una potenziale riduzione della dipendenza dalle linee di comunicazioni marittime dell’Oceano Indiano, almeno per alcune delle risorse strategiche³. Chiaramente la Cina percepirà il gioco allo stesso modo, e nulla suggerisce che la predilezione dello statega marittimo indiano per questo tipo di gioco rappresenti un’eccezione. In parole povere un interesse centrale non può essere difeso attraverso azioni orizzontali periferiche.

Affrontare la pressione continentale

Come può l’India impedire che venga esercitata una pressione pesante sulle sue frontiere? Non ci sono alternative alla deterrenza in ambito continentale, dove suoi interessi fondamentali, in questo caso l’integrità territoriale, possono essere minacciati. Forse il metodo più sistematico per sviluppare opzioni di deterrenza è con un doppio processo.

In primo luogo il rafforzamento dei sistemi di allerta delle frontiere nei passaggi chiave di tutta la linea di controllo effettiva, attraverso il potenziamento della logistica, le capacità di spostamento pesante, e le capacità di intelligence, sorveglianza e ricognizione (ISR), per migliorare l’abilità a muovere le forze in avanti verso passi montani vulnerabili. Questo aumenterebbe un po’ i costi per la Cina. A dire il vero esistono intrinseci limiti geografici a quanto la catena logistica può diventare flessibile ed efficiente, e l’India non riuscirà mai a pareggiare i vantaggi della Cina, che prevedono un approccio decisamente flessibile alla gestione delle frontiere, permesso dalla comodità dell’uniforme territorio tibetano. Ma l’India non si avvicina neanche lontanamente a un briciolo di quelle che sono la moderna logistica e la rete ISR in una topografia vincolata.

Un rapporto, basato su valutazioni ufficiali, afferma che “sul versante indiano molte delle strade si fermano tra i 60 e gli 80 km prima della LAC, compromettendo così il dispiegamento delle truppe e la loro presenza in avanti”⁴. Nonostante la decisione ufficiale di migliorare l’interconnessione delle regioni di confine in tutte e tre le sezioni della frontiera indo-cinese “a partire dal 2010, solo nove delle 72 strade pianificate sono state completate”⁵. Alcune delle motivazioni, legate principalmente all’inerzia burocratica e ai gravi limiti nel coordinamento e nelle capacità dell’Organizzazione delle strade di confine, sono note, ma non sono state affrontate⁶.

Si può affermare che la mancanza di una logistica moderna e di una rete di connessione può aver involontariamente enfatizzato in modo eccessivo il pattugliamento dei punti controversi lungo la LAC. In altre parole, l’approccio prevalente per la gestione delle frontiere è una soluzione tampone per compensare problemi strutturali decennali sul retro, come quelli infrastrutturali, della catena logistica, delle ISR basate sulla tecnologia, ecc. Se alcuni di questi aspetti, compresa la capacità di monitoraggio, fossero rafforzati, la gestione delle frontiere verrebbe trasformata. In assenza di seri mutamenti nella rete logistica retrostante che conduce alle montagne, l’India potrebbe restare per sempre ostaggio di una situazione in cui un’azione cinese in una zona controversa lungo la LAC lascia a Nuova Delhi solamente opzioni costose.

In secondo luogo, anziché in ambiti periferici, la capacità di aumentare i livelli della violenza orizzontalmente e verticalmente costituisce un elemento importante per il rafforzamento della deterrenza. La Cina è logisticamente in grado di ammassare un grande volume di forze e potenza di fuoco in ogni settore in breve tempo⁷. Per scoraggiare tale scenario da “guerra lampo”, l’India può dimostrare di avere le capacità e la disciplina per dirigere gli obiettivi a un grado più basso, nel cuore del Tibet e in un dominio cui la Cina assegna un importante valore, il suo heartland continentale nella parte orientale.
Questo implica che l’India ha bisogno di sistemi di deterrenza a distanza come missili a lunga gittata e una forza aerea avente un ampio raggio d’azione. Alcune di queste capacità esistono già, ma non sono state dirette verso obiettivi di deterrenza dalla politica centrale. Di conseguenza le forze armate, esercito e aviazione in questo caso, vengono lasciati a soddisfare le loro limitate preferenze, precludendo una dottrina congiunta terra-aria. L’esercito è legato a una concezione di deterrenza che prevede un uso intensivo delle risorse umane, mentre le forze aeree si accontentano di accumulare funzionalità ad hoc senza contribuire a una condizione di deterrenza stabile. È sconcertante, ad esempio, che l’India stia cercando di conquistare capacità di proiezione fuori area senza prima considerare le esigenze di trasporto dei carichi pesanti per le sue necessità di sicurezza o l’assenza di una rete di difesa aerea moderna.

Forse è stato a partire da una valutazione così frammentaria che un documento programmatico ampiamente letto nel 2012 parlava di promuovere la deterrenza asimmetrica, preparandosi “a innescare una vera e propria rivolta nelle zone occupate dalle forze cinesi” in caso d’invasione⁸! La Cina non è neanche lontanamente in procinto di impegnare i piani dello stratega indiano in una lunga guerra vicino alle colline. In effetti, si può affermare che un approccio di modernizzazione della difesa delle frontiere dominato dalle risorse umane, piuttosto che rafforzare la deterrenza, potrebbe involontariamente minarla, inviando a Pechino un messaggio sbagliato, e, allo stesso tempo, illudere la leadership politica e militare che stia per essere posto in essere un atteggiamento di “difesa attiva”⁹.

Sfide in tempo di pace e guerra limitata

La sfida cinese lungo le frontiere deve essere analizzata chiaramente in ogni sua parte. In assenza di un confine ben definito, una delle sfide consiste nel garantire che la zona contestata della LAC non si ampli a causa dell’abilità logistica della Cina nel perseguire un atteggiamento attivista di perlustrazione in tempo di pace. Questo può essere affrontato solo, come già accennato, concentrando l’attenzione sulla logistica e sulle capacità di monitoraggio, insieme a un approccio dinamico alla gestione delle frontiere. Inoltre, dato che l’India possiede un territorio più basso, deve anche fare leva sulle misure di confidence-building (CBM) e intanto negoziare nuove norme per vincolare le capacità superiori della Cina in termini di flessibilità e pattugliamento. Se sfruttate prudentemente, le CBM possono aiutare nel mantenimento di uno status quo stabile.

C’è poi il classico scenario di un conflitto limitato derivante da un deterioramento delle relazioni bilaterali. Questo conduce direttamente al cuore di una valida strategia di deterrenza basata sulla natura geopolitica del campo di battaglia himalayano. Una strategia di deterrenza fondata sulla negazione è un approccio sbagliato in un mondo nucleare. L’asimmetria può in effetti essere volta a favore dell’India. Anziché affidarsi a una strategia di risposta flessibile, che vede la Cina in una posizione migliore grazie alla sua logistica superiore e ai vantaggi geostrategici del suo territorio più alto, la dottrina indiana dovrebbe basarsi sulla deterrenza attraverso la punizione. È inutile e costoso prepararsi ad attaccare la Cina a tutti i livelli con ogni tipo di aggressione. Se c’è una lezione da imparare dalla coppia India-Pakistan è proprio questa. L’attore convenzionalmente più debole può annullare l’asimmetria sfruttando politicamente le sue capacità strategiche e la sua dottrina. Una dottrina nucleare credibile e ponderatamente segnalata, correlata a una dottrina convenzionale congiunta ad ampio raggio d’azione, consentirà all’India di allontanare lo scenario dell’avventurismo cinese.

Di chi è la dottrina?

Il punto cruciale è che l’appropriata dottrina militare sta emergendo a partire dall’inerzia istituzionale piuttosto che attraverso un piano accuratamente dibattuto. Se l’obiettivo è creare deterrenza in condizioni di alta tecnologia convenzionale e nucleare, allora investire nelle risorse umane per intraprendere un’ipotetica battaglia in Tibet è una strategia non ottimale che potrebbe esacerbare il dilemma della sicurezza tra India e Cina, senza aumentare la tranquillità dell’India sulla frontiera. Dati i vantaggi geostrategici e logistici della Cina, un atteggiamento di difesa attiva da parte dell’India è semplicemente non credibile.

Una strategia di deterrenza mediante punizione, combinata a solide capacità di mantenimento, è preferibile all’illusione di poter perseguire una dottrina di difesa attiva. Una strategia di questo tipo richiede sistemi di precisione a lungo raggio, la conoscenza del settore spaziale, capacità aeree di quarta e quinta generazione e una moderna rete di difesa aerea, oggi quasi interamente garantita dall’Indian Air Force (IAF). Anche in questo caso, alcuni degli ingredienti di base esistono già, sparsi all’interno delle forze armate, ma non sono stati orientati verso obiettivi dottrinali comuni.

Il cuore del problema non è la mancanza di pensiero strategico, ma la diversità delle percezioni strategiche e delle dottrine che sono in competizione per la validità individuale e il primato. Mentre i mahaniani sminuiscono i continentalisti per il loro attaccamento a rappresentazioni geopolitiche obsolete, questi ultimi si sono sforzati di interiorizzare le implicazioni di un ambiente ad alta tecnologia post nucleare, dove la deterrenza deve essere la finalità principale della strategia militare. La dimensione militare della grande strategia non può essere di tipo additivo, in cui le diverse parti interessate, in questo caso le forze armate, suggeriscono mezzi autonomi per affrontare le stesse minacce o addirittura ricostruiscono delle minacce per adattarsi ai mezzi, mentre il compito dello stratega è di far quadrare insieme queste dottrine!

La strategia non consiste nel gettare soldi in un pozzo senza fondo, ma nell’orientare in modo dinamico e creativo gli strumenti più appropriati verso le minacce in modo che possano apparire basati sugli obiettivi politici e sulla dottrina militare degli avversari, e non come e dove dovrebbero apparire. L’elite politica dell’India deve accettare di riconoscere la sua parte di responsabilità, dato che è stata l’apatia a quel livello a permettere un’impostazione dal basso e un approccio frammentario alla strategia, senza un pianificatore centrale disposto a fissare i termini dell’agenda.

La priorità dell’India: Cina continentale o Cina marittima?

L’India dovrebbe focalizzarsi più sulla Cina continentale che su quella marittima, ed è l’equilibrio di potere e d’influenza sulla periferia subcontinentale che richiede costante attenzione strategica. Le linee di comunicazione cinesi verso l’Asia Meridionale partono dalla Cina continentale. Il corridoio verso l’Asia Centrale, i collegamenti che attraversano il Karakorum tramite il Pakistan e il corridoio attraverso il Myanmar sono tutti parte della geostrategia continentale di Pechino per garantire la sicurezza delle sue regioni periferiche e integrarsi con i vicini. L’estensione e l’ulteriore potenziale di queste linee di comunicazione nel nord dell’Oceano Indiano, nel Golfo del Bengala o nel Mar Arabico, non possono essere sfruttati senza l’acquiescenza strategica e la cooperazione dell’India.

Il regno marittimo non è, contrariamente a quanto osservano alcuni analisti¹⁰, il teatro di un gioco a somma zero tra India e Cina, in cui sono in ballo gli interessi vitali di entrambi i Paesi. La realtà geopolitica è che le linee di comunicazioni marittime cinesi passano vicino a schieramenti navali indiani, e oltre l’85% delle importazioni di petrolio cinesi attraversano le rotte marittime dell’Oceano Indiano. Allo stesso modo, più del 50% del commercio indiano attraversa oggi gli stretti di Malacca e Singapore. Anziché rappresentare una fonte di conflitto questo dovrebbe essere la base di un rapporto marittimo accomodante.
Nell’ambito di un’economia politica internazionale interdipendente l’idea di sicurezza unilaterale lungo le linee di comunicazione marittima è illogica.

I territori dell’Indo-Pacifico sono caduti sotto il dominio di una sola superpotenza in condizioni storiche uniche che non possono prevalere a tempo indeterminato. Anche se è prematuro valutare a priori l’evoluzione del sistema marittimo dell’Indo-Pacifico, sicuramente questa vedrà uno sforzo collettivo in cui nessuna singola potenza può essere esclusa dalla gestione degli spazi comuni. All’interno di questa logica è probabile che diverse potenze regionali prendano in carico oneri maggiori nelle loro periferie geopolitiche. Ma finché il commercio interregionale e lo scambio di risorse sostengono l’economia globale, gli spazi comuni non possono diventare un sistema di sicurezza chiuso. La rivalità marittima anglo-tedesca testimonia l’inutilità di un gioco a somma zero. Quella rivalità ha prodotto un’incontrollabile corsa agli armamenti che ha frantumato il predominio marittimo britannico e, in ultima analisi, le pretese della Germania di avere un’egemonia europea.

In effetti, l’evoluzione della tecnologia militare evidenzia come le idee di Mahan siano pressoché obsolete. La storica logica mahaniana di controllo offensivo del mare attraverso le grandi flotte di superficie, “definita come la capacità di utilizzare i mari sfidando la volontà degli altri”¹¹, è superata. Le prescrizioni originali di Mahan sul controllo del mare derivavano da uno specifico contesto storico, industriale e tecnologico che non prevale più, vista l’evoluzione dell’ambiente tecnologico-militare. Forze missilistiche continentali a lungo raggio; capacità aerospaziali di quarta e quinta generazione; funzionalità subacquee come i sottomarini d’attacco; ISR e abilità nell’individuazione degli obiettivi su terra, aria e spazio; armi anti-satellite (ASAT) e capacità informatiche rendono l’idea del controllo del mare, un concetto altamente controverso. In realtà, la negazione del mare, insieme a limitate capacità di proiezione di potenza, è forse il massimo a cui le potenze emergenti contemporanee possono aspirare. È probabile che la struttura della forza marittima di domani assumerà la forma di piattaforme disaggregate e meno vulnerabili, piuttosto che di potenza di fuoco concentrata in grandi flotte trasportatrici di mezzi.

Sarebbe più appropriato descrivere la strategia militare cinese come un approccio regionale “antinavale” di negazione del mare che come una ricerca di potere marittimo globale¹². I sistemi terrestri sono parte integrante della modernizzazione navale della Cina, che non compete con le grandi flotte di superficie della tradizione anglo-americana. Come sottolinea una valutazione occidentale, “l’obiettivo principale della marina cinese è ancora quello di proteggere il Paese dal potere di attacco in mare statunitense”¹³. Un autorevole studio americano afferma che “la nuova marina della Cina conta più su viaggi senza equipaggio e missili balistici che su velivoli con equipaggio, e più su sottomarini che su navi di superficie”¹⁴. Ciò considerato, è ironico che, nel dibattito strategico indiano, qualcuno chiami in causa l’immagine mahaniana della Liaoning, la sola portaerei cinese, come simbolo e guida della strategia marittima cinese¹⁵. La proiezione in mare aperto, al di là dei mari regionali, è di secondaria importanza per Pechino. L’obiettivo principale della strategia cinese per l’immediato futuro è la negazione del mare, focalizzata nel Pacifico Occidentale e sulla marina statunitense.

La marina degli Stati Uniti riconosce di non poter più agire indisturbata nelle periferie marittime delle varie potenze regionali, e gran parte del suo dibattito strategico è animato dalla sfida asimmetrica antiaccesso che si estende nelle regioni dall’Asia Occidentale alla penisola coreana¹⁶. Queste tecnologie perturbatrici sono resistenti e, dal momento che vengono messe in campo dalle potenze del Rimland eurasiatico, il discorso mahaniano sarà profondamente modificato nei prossimi anni.
In sintesi, anche se Stati continentali come India e Cina possono far aumentare i costi operativi delle altre potenze marittime, incluse l’un l’altra, nelle loro rispettive regioni, non possono acquisire unilateralmente il controllo del mare necessario ad assicurare le linee di comunicazione marittima in mare aperto, linee vitali delle loro economie. In ciò consiste la logica della competizione e della cooperazione. Strategie di autotutela possono coesistere con regole cooperative di ripartizione degli oneri per consentire una più ampia stabilità degli spazi comuni.

Ammansire i mahaniani per sviluppare una geostrategia principalmente continentale

L’influenza cinese sulle coste dell’Oceano Indiano paradossalmente è emersa non perché la marina dell’Esercito popolare di liberazione fosse percepita come garante della sicurezza, ma perché l’assistenza economica e tecnico-militare ha assicurato alla Cina uno spazio politico. Le possibilità marittime dell’India si riducono a un insieme di mezzi per recuperare influenza. Per quanto riguarda l’influenza indiana in Asia Orientale, l’emulazione delle pratiche cinesi è una strada maggiormente percorribile rispetto all’eventualità di premature incursioni marittime in teatri dove l’India dovrebbe confrontarsi con il peso della potenza di fuoco cinese. Ad esempio, l’influenza indiana è avanzata di più sostenendo la capacità propria del Vietnam di bilanciare asimmetricamente una Cina assertiva, piuttosto che con la presenza diretta nel Mar Cinese Meridionale.

I mahaniani hanno raccomandato all’India di disfarsi delle sue rappresentazioni continentali e prospettano per essa il ruolo marittimo di “garante della sicurezza” in altre regioni. Quest’analisi fin qui suggerisce che non è una strategia prudente. Considerati gli straordinari investimenti e il tempo richiesto da una modernizzazione della marina, è indispensabile che gli strateghi indiani raggiungano questa consapevolezza.
I mahaniani per certi aspetti riflettono i più ampi cambiamenti nel profilo economico e diplomatico dell’India, che hanno diffuso i suoi interessi in tutto il mondo. È vero che l’India globalizzata ha un impatto economico e culturale in molti continenti, e che le sue istituzioni dovrebbero riflettere ciò, ma non è affatto detto che la strategia marittima, spesso considerata come il potenziale mezzo di espansione degli interessi globali indiani, dovrebbe guidare questo processo. E non è sicuramente detto che l’India debba ricercare un ruolo extra-regionale prima ancora di aver raggiunto un minimo di sicurezza e influenza nella propria regione, in cui le sue aspirazioni locali restano fortemente contestate.

Per il futuro imminente gli interessi fondamentali dell’India dovrebbero restare nel continente ed essere perseguiti attraverso una geostrategia principalmente continentale. Un ruolo marittimo strettamente legato al rafforzamento della deterrenza e dell’influenza nel Subcontinente sembra più in sintonia non solo con le sfide nazionali dell’India, ma anche con la direzione geostrategica delle pressioni che continuano a ricorrere.

(Traduzione dall’inglese di Chiara Macci)

NOTE:

Zorawar Daulet Singh è ricercatore presso il Center for Policy Alternatives, Nuova Delhi e dottorando presso l’India Institute, King’s College, Londra.

1. Singh, Rahul, China Submarines in Indian Ocean Worry Indian Navy, “Hindustan Times”, 7 April 2013.
2. Singh, Rahul, China Ends Ladakh Standoff, Troops Pull Back, “Hindustan Times”, 5 May 2013.
3. Downs, Erica S., Money Talks: China-Russia Energy Relations after Xi Jinping’s Visit to Moscow, 1 April 2013; Alexandros Petersen, China Latest Piece of the New Silk Road, “Eurasia Daily Monitor”, Vol. 10, No. 4, 10 January 2013; Li Yingqing e Guo Anfei, Third Land Link to Europe Envisioned, “China Daily”, 2 July 2009.
4. Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai e Rahul Prakash, Sino-Indian Border Infrastructure: An Update, ORF Occasional Paper No. 42, May 2013, p. 11.
5. Ibid., p. 14.
6. Ibid. Si veda anche Shishir Gupta, 45 Years After China Conflict, Delhi to Build Roads Linking Ladakh Outposts, “Indian Express”, 21 May 2007.
7. Chansoria, Monika, China’s Infrastructure Development in Tibet: Evaluating Trendlines, Manekshaw Paper No. 32, New Delhi: Claws, 2011.
8. Khilnani, Sunil, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Prakash Menon, Nandan Nilekani, Srinath Raghavan, Shyam Saran e Siddharth Varadarajan, Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century, New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 2012, p. 41.
9. Samanta, Pranab Dhal, Incursion Effect: Strike Corps on China Border Gets Nod, “Indian Express”, 26 May 2013; Ajai Shukla, New Strike Corps for China Border, “Business Standard”, 24 August 2011.
10. Raja Mohan, C., Beijing at Sea, “Indian Express”, 26 April 2013.
11. Gompert, David C., Sea Power and American Interests in the Western Pacific, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2013, p. 186.
12. Ibid., p. 14.
13. Ibid., p. 113.
14. Saunders, Phillip, Christopher Yung, Michael Swaine, e Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang (eds), The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles, Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 2011, p. 12.
15. Raja Mohan, Beijing at Sea, n. 10.
16. Gertz, Bill, Threat in Asia is Anti-ship Missiles, “Washington Times”, 23 March 2010; Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, Kevin L. Pollpeter, Entering the Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States Dragon’s Lair, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2007.

Les États-Unis reformatent le Moyen-Orient

Les États-Unis reformatent le Moyen-Orient

 

Ils veulent imposer les valeurs occidentales

Actualidad.rt *
Ex: http://metamag.fr

 

"Les États-Unis sont en train de reformater le Grand Moyen-Orient pour lui imposer les standards nord-américains”, affirme le Directeur du Centre de Géopolitique de Russie, Valeri Korovin. 

Aux dires de ce géopolitologue, Washington a mis en œuvre un plan de réorganisation du « Grand Moyen-Orient » dès 2004, bien avant le début du Printemps Arabe. L’expression « Greater Middle East » est un terme utilisé par le président George W. Bush et son administration pour désigner un espace s'étendant du Maghreb et de la Mauritanie au Pakistan et à l'Afghanistan, en passant par la Turquie, le Machrek et l'ensemble de la péninsule Arabique.

Le processus de reformatage consiste, selon cet expert, à désorganiser la structure sociale traditionnelle de la région. « Y est conduit un processus de désorganisation qui vise à imposer les valeurs libérales occidentales, fondées sur l'individu, c'est-à-dire sur un être atomisé ». Pour y parvenir, il convient au préalable de détruire la subjectivité collective, comme facteur constitutif de la base de l’ordre social des États et peuples traditionnels », explique Korovin, cité par le journal « Vzgliad ». 

Selon lui, pour atteindre leur objectif, les États-Unis utilisent la théorie du « chaos contrôlé », tel que théorisé par Stephen Mann. “Certains processus, qui ne semblent réglés que par leur propre mouvement et se mouvoir de façon purement chaotique, finissent  par atteindre des objectifs dûment prédéterminés », précise le Directeur du Centre de Géopolitique de Russie.  

« Par conséquent, le chaos introduit de l'extérieur provoque un résultat prédéterminé. Le Moyen-Orient est ainsi entré dans un processus de désorganisation de son espace social propre à établir la démocratie étasunienne dans la région », affirme cet expert. 

Celui-ci ajoute que Washington, après avoir engagé ses manœuvres de désorganisation, commence à fragmenter l'espace social pour y favoriser la pénétration des valeurs libérales nord-américaines. L'expert russe souligne que ces menées sont bien connues de la Russie, pays qui a subi le même processus à la fin des années 90, après la chute de l'URSS. 

Korovin pense que c'est ce plan « Grand Moyen-Orient » qui est appliqué en Syrie, « où se répète le scénario libyen », ainsi que dans d'autres pays du Moyen-Orient. « Mais l'objectif principal dans la région est l'Iran », conclut cet expert. 

Source: actualidad.rt.com

*Traduit de l'espagnol par Lucas Navarro

Les Japonais et la Guerre de l'Asie-Pacifique

Les Japonais et la Guerre de l'Asie-Pacifique

 

De la tragédie au mythe

Rémy Valat
Ex: http://metamag.fr

Le livre de Michael Lucken, Les Japonais et la guerre (1937-1952), est un ouvrage qui fera date dans l'historiographie du Japon contemporain autant par l'originalité et la pertinence de l'approche méthodologique que par l'acuité des idées exprimées par son auteur. 

Michael Lucken est professeur des université près l'Institut des langues et des civilisations orientales, spécialiste de l'art japonais, spécialité qui est une des pièces maîtresse du dispositif analytique et des sources exploitées par l’auteur pour saisir notamment les mécanismes psychologiques ayant animé les Japonais pendant la guerre de l'Asie-pacifique et l'immédiat après-guerre (fin de l'occupation américaine). Rien de plus précieux en effet, en une période où la parole publique n'est pas nécessairement libre, que de recourir aux sources littéraires, graphiques et visuelles pour saisir l'ampleur affective du drame, son appropriation par les Japonais et son instrumentalisation par les pouvoirs politiques nippons et américains. 

Il suffit de garder en mémoire les passages poignants de Shûsako Endô, notamment dans son roman Le fleuve sacré, pour apprécier l'impact sur cet auteur lorsqu'il fût informé a posteriori des actes de cannibalisme commis par des soldats affamés, harcelés et en déroute en pleine jungle de Birmanie. L'ombre de la guerre se pose aussi implicitement ou explicitement dans les réalisations cinématographiques et la bande dessinée contemporaines (films, anime, manga). Surtout, Michael Lucken, qui a exploité une importante quantité de sources japonaises, nous démontre comment la Seconde Guerre mondiale est devenue « une figure mythique » au Japon. Il nous explique comment la fin du conflit, et en particulier le drame des bombes atomiques, a été exploitée par l'empereur et sa chancellerie pour assurer, avec le consentement des autorités américaines d'occupation (SCAP), la survie et la permanence de l'institution impériale au prix du sacrifices de nombreuses vies humaines, d'une interprétation et d'une manipulation de la réalité historique. Ce thème est abordé dans la seconde partie de l’ouvrage et apporte un éclairage sur les enjeux mémoriels et politiques actuellement en jeu en Asie.

L’auteur relate peu les crimes commis par l'armée japonaise en guerre. Cela a déjà été traité par Jean-Louis Margolin (Violences et crimes du Japon en guerre, 1937-1945, Grand Pluriel, 2009) et les campagnes militaires, ce n'est pas l'objet principal de son livre. Il a surtout étudié le vécu de l'arrière, l'impact de la guerre sur le quotidien : une guerre d'abord coloniale et lointaine, et qui devient de plus en plus présente en raison d'un plus grand embrigadement du corps social, de l'accroissement du nombre des tués et des bombardements alliés. Le lecteur pourra être choqué par le mépris des autorités pour leurs soldats, et en particulier du problème du rapatriement des ossements des morts au combat : pour les Japonais, le respect aux défunts et le deuil des familles est conditionné par le retour des cendres, de restes ou d'effets personnels du défunt ; or, la réalité des engagements armés ne le permettant pas toujours, les autorités militaires japonaises ont multipliés les expédients, et même préconisé le prélèvement in vivo et anticipé de reliques, principalement les phanères (à l'instar des pilotes de kamikaze qui avaient la tête rasée, à l'exception d'une mèche de cheveux destinée à être envoyée aux proches du héros). Ce mépris a ouvert très tôt les portes à toutes les sollicitations au sacrifice : si la valorisation et la pratique d’offrir héroïquement sa vie au combat est ancienne au Japon (et pas uniquement japonaise, l'auteur explique brillamment l'influence de la pensée occidentale au Japon, et en particulier Romain Rolland), c’est surtout l’exemple des trois soldats qui se seraient délibérément sacrifiés à Shangai le 22 février 1932 en transportant un tube de Bangalore (explosif servant à faire des brèches dans les fortifications ou lignes de barbelées adverses) que les contemporains de la guerre ont en mémoire : ces « trois bombes humaines » ou « projectiles de chair » sont à l’origine du terme « nikudan », largement employé dans la presse pour désigner les soldats prêts à mourir dans une mission sans retour. L'épisode des kamikaze se situe dans cette continuité, mais avec une intensité supérieure, car le Japon se trouve devant le gouffre de la défaite...

Enfin, Michael Lucken nous éclaire sur la dimension romantique de l'engagement patriotique de la population japonaise qui pensait sincèrement que l'occupation nippone en Asie serait temporaire, le temps nécessaire d' « éclairer spirituellement » les populations des pays conquis... Malgré la brièveté de la présence des armées impériales, le message d'émancipation véhiculé à l'époque a porté ses fruits, comme en témoigne la vague de décolonisation asiatique. Nous est révélée l'irrationalité et le romantisme du peuple et des élites nippons dans le déclenchement et la poursuite d'une guerre avec de faibles, voire aucune, perspectives de victoire. « Le Japon enfermé dans la modernité occidentale (…) n'avait d'autres solutions (…) que de se lancer dans la guerre, pour que les individus puissent ainsi une dernière fois sentir et prolonger la pureté du souffle national. Il n'y avait à l'horizon ni paix ni après-guerre, seul importait un engagement immédiat, complet et sans retour. La lumière se trouverait dans la ruine. » 

Michael Lucken, Les Japonais et la guerre (1937-1952), Fayard, 2013, 399 p.

Flanker diplomacy: Win-win for India in Asia

Rakesh Krishnan Simha

Ex: http://indrus.in

 

India’s expertise in maintaining Russian aircraft and its vaunted pilot training skills are helping New Delhi win friends and influence nations in Asia.

The induction of advanced Flanker aircraft in Asian air forces is proving to be an unexpected windfall for India. As a maintenance hub for Sukhoi-27/30 Flanker series aircraft and by training foreign fighter pilots, the country earns a substantial amount of money. But more importantly, it strengthens New Delhi’s ties with the region.

Neutralising Indonesia

In October 2013, India agreed to train and support the Indonesian Air Force in operating its fleet of Sukhoi fighters. The Indonesians currently operate both Su-27 and Su-30 jets, with the latest batch of Flankers arriving last month.

According to the agreement, which was arrived at during the Indian defence minister’s trip to Jakarta, India and Indonesia will cooperate in the areas of training, technical help and spares support.

Read section:
Defence and Security

In the past Jakarta had a pact with China to train its pilots and provide technical support for its Flanker fleet. But Jakarta has now veered round to the view that the Indian Air Force (IAF) is an ideal mentor. For, the IAF has earned a worldwide reputation as a dogfight duke after beating the powerful US Air Force in a series of Cope India air exercises. Plus, in three wars – in 1965, 1971 and 1999 – it has routed the Pakistan Air Force, which is no chump.

Given that India will have one of the largest Flanker fleets in the world once all the planned 272 Sukhoi jets enter service, Indonesia’s decision to change fighter gurus is understandable. Indonesian officials will hold talks with a high-level IAF team to finalise details of the training and spares support package.

Besides Flanker servicing and training of pilots, India and Indonesia will significantly enhance their defence cooperation. “The two sides exchanged views on issues relating to regional and global security, bilateral exercises involving services, training, co-production of defence equipment and ammunition and visits at high levels,” said an Indian Defence Ministry spokesman.

Joint synergies

Defense Industry Daily explains the significance of the India-Indonesia Flanker deal: “The move will have an importance that goes far beyond its dollar value, as it’s part of a wider set of enhanced defence cooperation agreements the two countries are reportedly pursuing.”

Sukhois shift the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific

DID adds: “Indonesia isn’t looking to antagonise China, but China’s aggressive claims in the South China Sea are contrasting poorly with India’s support for freedom of navigation, and for multilateral resolution of the disputes under international law. The result is an important Indonesian tilt toward more cooperation with India, which fits very well with India’s own strategic priorities.”

Malaysian fleet

India also plays a role in helping the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) to maintain its fleet. While Sukhoi is the main contractor for supplying Su-30s MKMs, the aircraft’s canards, stabilisers and fins are manufactured by India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited at Nasik under a $25-30 million value subcontract.

In 2008 India accepted Malaysia’s request to train the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) personnel on the operation and maintenance of its Su-30 MKM fighters. “The initial training for the RMAF personnel was conducted in India by HAL and IAF,” says the website of the Indian diplomatic mission in Kuala Lumpur.

“Subsequently, a composite team of flying and technical training instructors was deployed at Gong Kedah Base as part of Indian Air Force Training Team (IAFTT) for two and a half years to impart the training. The training successfully concluded in Sep 2010. The IAFTT team personnel were felicitated in a special ceremony prior to their departure by General Dato Sri Rodzali bin Daud, Chief of the RMAF.

Vietnam spinoffs

Vietnam looking to purchase BrahMos cruise missiles

Flanker cooperation has had another spinoff. India’s success in mating the BrahMos cruise missile with its Sukhois has Vietnam showing interest in buying the missile. If the deal goes through, it would mark the first overseas sale of the much talked about missile jointly developed by India and Russia.

A senior Vietnamese delegation that visited New Delhi this month requested India to provide submarine training and conversion training for Vietnamese pilots to fly Sukhoi-30 aircraft.

Strategic moves

Indonesia and Malaysia are both Muslims nations and despite their historic Indic roots, their current religious affiliation makes them lean towards other Muslim nations.

Why is this a concern? Well, in the 1965 India Pakistan War, Indonesia dispatched naval warships to Pakistan to fight against India. Prior to that, when the Communist Party of Indonesia came to power, it sided with communist China. Indonesian leaders soon started voicing claims to the Andaman & Nicobar Islands, and demanded that the Indian Ocean be renamed the “Indonesian Ocean”.

Although Indian military power today is of an order of magnitude higher compared with the 1950s and 60s, and the Indonesians are unlikely to repeat their reckless gunboat diplomacy, the fact is India wouldn’t want Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur to support Pakistan in any way.

Flanker diplomacy is thus an excellent way to boost defence ties with these two countries. Indonesian and Malaysian military officers working in sync with the IAF will most likely be in India’s corner in an India-Pakistan or India-China conflict.

La Thaïlande tournera-t-elle la page de la démocratie « à l’occidentale » ?

La Thaïlande tournera-t-elle la page de la démocratie «à l’occidentale»?

Eric Miné

Ex: http://synthesenationale.hautetfort.com

La Thaïlande tournera-t-elle la page de la démocratie « à l’occidentale » ? C’est la question qui se pose au regard des récents développements de l’épreuve de force engagée depuis plusieurs semaines déjà dans le royaume par l’ancien vice-premier ministre Suthep Thaugsuban et ses alliés – les « jaunes » – contre le gouvernement de Yingluck Shinawatra, sœur du milliardaire en exil Thaksin, déposé lui-même par un coup d’État militaire en 2006. La radicalisation des dernières heures, qui ont vu les opposants prendre le contrôle à Bangkok de plusieurs ministères et de la télévision publique, ainsi que les premiers morts et les heurts violents qui ont eu lieu entre les affidés de la famille Shinawatra – les « rouges » – et les étudiants de l’université Ramkhamhaeng qui n’ont dû leur salut qu’à l’intervention de l’armée, pourraient bien faire basculer celle-ci en faveur d’un mouvement qui tourne à l’insurrection générale. La porte serait dès lors ouverte à une modification substantielle du régime. Là est le véritable enjeu.

Du complexe gouvernemental de Changwathana qu’occupent les chefs de la rébellion réunis sous la bannière du « Comité du Peuple pour la démocratie absolue thaïlandaise sous la monarchie constitutionnelle », Suthep Thaugsuban, avec le soutien du principal parti d’opposition parlementaire, a en effet clairement indiqué son objectif. Constatant que les élections étaient de plus en plus biaisées par les pratiques corruptives d’un capitalisme international sans scrupules abusant de populations naïves – les Shinawatra en étant l’avatar local –, il entend suspendre la démocratie électorale au profit d’institutions plus représentatives de la nation, reprenant en cela pour partie les revendications insatisfaites des ultra-royalistes du Pad qui avaient bloqué en 2010 les aéroports de la capitale et provoqué la chute d’un précédent gouvernement pro-Thaksin. Si ceux-ci voulaient alors tempérer le pouvoir des députés issus du vote par l’instauration à la chambre de corps désignés pérennes – aristocratique, militaire et religieux –, il semble que Suthep inclinerait davantage vers une expression plus corporatiste des volontés du peuple, mais dégagée tout autant d’une contrainte des urnes jugée aujourd’hui sous ces cieux fauteuse de troubles.

Si l’on en juge par l’élan général et l’enthousiasme suscité, nonobstant les médias occidentaux qui ne voudraient voir dans ces événements que la répétition d’une crise sociale récurrente qui verrait s’opposer des « élites citadines gravitant autour du palais » à des « masses rurales défavorisées du nord-est », il s’agit bien là d’une révolte populaire visant à sauver les intérêts vitaux et les valeurs fondatrices d’un pays qui a su jusque là s’accommoder de la mondialisation tout en préservant ses traditions et ses règles. Ce qui est condamné là-bas, c’est précisément notre modèle démocratique prétendument universel, mais de fait idéologique, daté et occidental.

Si l’entreprise de Suthep Thaugsuban devait être couronnée de succès, elle pourrait ainsi donner des idées à d’autres qui souffrent tout autant ailleurs d’un système n’engendrant plus qu’une représentation collective erronée des peuples pour mieux les soumettre à ses dérives financières, consuméristes et totalitaires.

La portée de ce qui se joue aujourd’hui à Bangkok va donc bien au-delà des frontières d’un royaume tropical prisé des touristes pour ses cocotiers et son sourire.

Article publié sur Breizh info cliquez ici

Le blog d'Eric Miné cliquez là

Dollar survival behind US-China tensions

Dollar survival behind US-China tensions

 

By Finian Cunningham

 

Ex: http://www.presstv.ir

The escalation of military tensions between Washington and Beijing in the East China Sea is superficially over China’s unilateral declaration of an air defense zone. But the real reason for Washington’s ire is the recent Chinese announcement that it is planning to reduce its holdings of the US dollar.

That move to offload some of its 3.5 trillion in US dollar reserves combined with China’s increasing global trade in oil based on national currencies presents a mortal threat to the American petrodollar and the entire American economy.

This threat to US viability - already teetering on bankruptcy, record debt and social meltdown - would explain why Washington has responded with such belligerence to China setting up an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) last week extending some 400 miles from its coast into the East China Sea.

Beijing said the zone was aimed at halting intrusive military maneuvers by US spy planes over its territory. The US has been conducting military flights over Chinese territory for decades without giving Beijing the slightest notification.

Back in April 2001, a Chinese fighter pilot was killed when his aircraft collided with a US spy plane. The American crew survived, but the incident sparked a diplomatic furor, with Beijing saying that it illustrated Washington’s unlawful and systematic violation of Chinese sovereignty.

Within days of China’s announcement of its new ADIZ last week, the US sent two B52 bombers into the air space without giving the notification of flight paths required by Beijing.

American allies Japan and South Korea also sent military aircraft in defiance of China. Washington dismissed the Chinese declared zone and asserted that the area was international air space.

A second intrusion of China’s claimed air territory involved US surveillance planes and up to 10 Japanese American-made F-15 fighter jets. On that occasion, Beijing has responded more forcefully by scrambling SU-30 and J-10 warplanes, which tailed the offending foreign aircraft.

Many analysts see the latest tensions as part of the ongoing dispute between China and Japan over the islands known, respectively, as the Diaoyu and Senkaku, located in the East China Sea. Both countries claim ownership. The islands are uninhabited but the surrounding sea is a rich fishing ground and the seabed is believed to contain huge reserves of oil and gas.

By claiming the skies over the islands, China appears to be adding to its territorial rights to the contested islands.

In a provocative warning to Beijing, American defense secretary Chuck Hagel this week reiterated that the decades-old US-Japan military pact covers any infringement by China of Japan’s claim on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.

It is hard to justify Washington and Tokyo’s stance on the issue. The islands are much nearer to China’s mainland (250 miles) compared with Japan’s (600 miles). China claims that the islands were part of its territory for centuries until Japan annexed them in 1895 during its imperialist expansion, which eventually led to an all-out invasion and war of aggression on China.

Also, as Beijing points out, the US and its postwar Japanese ally both have declared their own air defense zones. It is indeed inconceivable that Chinese spy planes and bombers could encroach unannounced on the US West Coast without the Pentagon ordering fierce retaliation.

Furthermore, maps show that the American-backed air defense zone extending from Japan’s southern territory is way beyond any reasonable halfway limit between China and Japan. This American-backed arbitrary imposition on Chinese territorial sovereignty is thus seen as an arrogant convention, set up and maintained by Washington for decades.

The US and its controlled news media are absurdly presenting Beijing’s newly declared air defense zone as China “flexing its muscles and stoking tensions.” And Washington is claiming that it is nobly defending its Japanese and South Korea allies from Chinese expansionism.

However, it is the background move by China to ditch the US dollar that is most likely the real cause for Washington’s militarism towards Beijing. The apparent row over the air and sea territory, which China has sound rights to, is but the pretext for the US to mobilize its military and in effect threaten China with aggression.

In recent years, China has been incrementally moving away from US financial hegemony. This hegemony is predicated on the US dollar being the world reserve currency and, by convention, the standard means of payment for international trade and in particular trade in oil. That arrangement is obsolete given the bankrupt state of the US economy. But it allows the US to continue bingeing on credit.

China - the second biggest economy in the world and a top importer of oil - has or is seeking oil trading arrangements with its major suppliers, including Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Venezuela, which will involve the exchange of national currencies. That development presents a grave threat to the petrodollar and its global reserve status.

The latest move by Beijing on November 20 giving notice that it intends to shift its risky foreign exchange holdings of US Treasury notes for a mixture of other currencies is a harbinger that the
American economy’s days are numbered, as Paul Craig Roberts noted last week.

This is of course China’s lawful right to do so, as are its territorial claims. But, in the imperialist, megalomaniac mindset of Washington, the “threat” to the US economy and indebted way of life is perceived as a tacit act of war. That is why Washington is reacting so furiously and desperately to China’s newly declared air corridor. It is a pretext for the US to clench an iron fist.

FC/HJL

 

Finian Cunningham (born 1963) has written extensively on international affairs, with articles published in several languages. He is a Master’s graduate in Agricultural Chemistry and worked as a scientific editor for the Royal Society of Chemistry, Cambridge, England, before pursuing a career in journalism. He is also a musician and songwriter. For nearly 20 years, he worked as an editor and writer in major news media organisations, including The Mirror, Irish Times and Independent. Originally from Belfast, Ireland, he is now located in East Africa as a freelance journalist, where he is writing a book on Bahrain and the Arab Spring, based on eyewitness experience working in the Persian Gulf as an editor of a business magazine and subsequently as a freelance news correspondent. The author was deported from Bahrain in June 2011 because of his critical journalism in which he highlighted systematic human rights violations by regime forces. He is now a columnist on international politics for Press TV and the Strategic Culture Foundation.

More articles by Finian Cunningham

QUAND LA CHINE VACILLERA, LE MONDE TREMBLERA

QUAND LA CHINE VACILLERA, LE MONDE TREMBLERA

Le cauchemar écologique

Rémy Valat
Ex: http://metamag.fr

Chine : le cauchemar écologique est le titre du dernier ouvrage de Sébastien le Belzic, correspondant de presse en Chine et romancier (Le lotus et le dragon, éditions Zinedi, 2003). Ce livre a été écrit à partir des données et des enquêtes de terrain qu'il a pu effectuer sur place en contact des acteurs du drame écologique (militants d'ONG, victimes des pollutions).  Sur la forme, ce  livre de 109 pages est très agréable à lire et bien documenté, mais une bibliographie, même sommaire aurait été la bienvenue. L'auteur a pris soin d'intégrer des petits encarts récapitulant les points ou les chiffres clefs des phénomènes observés. Sébastien Le Belzic souhaite informer, alerter à partir des informations qu'il a pu collecter pour ses reportages.

Sur le fond, oui, la Chine, deuxième économie mondiale, est bien le premier pollueur de la planète. Ceci, on le savait déjà, mais Sébastien Le Belzic nous apporte des précisions, des faits concrets et des informations, souvent de première main, très inquiétantes sur les conditions sanitaires en Chine, mais aussi sur la résistance des populations aux abus des autorités. Les mouvements de contestation populaire sont importants, 500 manifestations quotidiennes, et ceci en dépit de la censure et des risques sur la personne. Les informations circulent via le réseau Twitter chinois, Weibo, facilitant ainsi l'organisation d'actes revendicatifs et l'information des ONG, chargée de la défense de l'environnement... ONG, qui nous paraissent, selon notre point de vue, remplir une mission ambiguë de protection de l'environnement et d'outils de dépréciation de l'image de la Chine au service des Ėtats-Unis, car la guerre économique fait rage entre les deux supers-grands : Ma Jun, d'abord journaliste d'investigation (donc un « opposant »), a été officiellement promu directeur de l'Institut des Affaires publiques et Environnementales, puis classé par la « voix de l'Amérique », The Times, parmi les 100 personnes les plus influentes du monde...  

Une résistance des plus légitime

On ne compte plus les villages aux populations ravagées par des épidémies de cancer (plus de 450) : statistiquement, les cancers du poumon ont augmenté de 645% ; une hausse de 98% des accidents industriels depuis 2010 dans une économie en surchauffe, au sein d'entreprises peu intéressées par les conditions de travail de ses ouvriers. 

L'auteur nous présente le cas des « ateliers de la sueur d'Apple » dans les maquiladoras chinois où règnent le travail des mineurs, les discriminations à l'embauche, les heures supplémentaires imposées et non payées, un taux de suicide record, les expositions aux produits chimiques... Sébastien le Belzic nous expose d'autres affaires, comme celles du lait contaminé et autres gourmandises empoisonnées qui ont mis un coup de projecteur sur la mauvaise qualité de certains produits chinois. Les « contrôles qualités » se sont renforcés, mais beaucoup de produits destinés à l'export ne quittent pas les usines ou restent à quai : 51% des aliments chinois ayant fait l'objet d'audits sont impropres à la consommation ou facteurs de risques sanitaires... Parmi les sujets les plus préoccupants : les biotechnologies. Outre les OGM, qui sont censées résoudre en partie les problèmes alimentaires du pays, les scientifiques chinois lorgnent du côté du clonage des embryons humains pour s'emparer du juteux marché des transplantations d'organes : le professeur de philosophie près l'Académie des Sciences sociales de Chine, Qiu Renzong aurait déclaré : « Selon la pensée confucianiste, une personne n'est considérée comme un être humain qu'après sa naissance. Les embryons et les fœtus ne sont donc pas des êtres humains (…) C'est la raison pour laquelle, il n'y a pas de problème pour les Chinois à détruire des embryons humains pour conduire les recherches sur les cellules souches ». Si Confucius l'a dit... La lecture de cet ouvrage ouvre de nombreuses pistes de réflexions dépassant le cadre, déjà catastrophique des problèmes sanitaires et environnementaux. J'en retiendrai deux. Tout d'abord, la montée d'une résistance citoyenne qui tôt ou tard va finir par prendre dessus : et, à ce moment-là, si la crise économique et sociale chinoise ne peut être canalisée, le vacillement chinois aura une répercussion planétaire (pensons aux risques de conflits avec les voisins asiatiques de la Chine, la fuite des bons du trésor chinois investis aux Ėtats-Unis, etc.). Enfin, si dans une perspective « plus heureuse » pour les Chinois, leur pays venait à se hisser à la tête des premières puissances économiques du monde, on peut s'interroger sur les valeurs offertes par ce nouveau modèle.... Un capitalisme pragmatique et sauvage, certes. Un idéal ? Une projet de société ? Probablement aucun.

Chine : le cauchemar écologique, de Sébastien Le Belzic, Editions SEPIA

Tajikistan remains of highest strategic value for Russia and India

Tajikistan remains of highest strategic value for Russia and India

Victoria Panfilova, specially for RIR

Ex: http://indrus.in

 

The re-election of Emomali Rahmon will ensure that the Central Asian country keeps a balancing act when dealing with regional and world powers. New Delhi, Moscow and Washington each eye the Ayni base.

 

Related

• Concern Agat looks at increased cooperation with Indian Navy
• Russian diplomats take part in Delhi International Bazaar
• Beyond the Indo-Soviet Legacy: Cooperation in a globalised world

 

Relations with Russia are of a dual nature, although it is believed that Tajikistan is one of the main allies in the region. Photo: Tajik President Emomali Rahmon (L) and Vladimir Putin. Source: Olesya Kurlyaeva/RG

Few were surprised that acting head of the state President Emomali Rahmon won the Tajikistan presidential elections with 83.6 percent of the votes. Experts believe that the courses taken by Emomali Rahmon in the last ten years will continue. This means that the coming years will be very difficult for both the president and his country.

A complete economic collapse in Tajikistan and instability in the neighboring Afghanistan, which the U.S. military will partially vacate next year, may lead to internal disturbances in the republic. To keep the situation under control Rahmon is trying to follow a multi-vector foreign policy, relying, in extreme cases, for outside help.

Newly elected Tajik President faces Afghan problem

Relations with Russia are of a dual nature, although it is believed that Tajikistan is one of the main allies in the region. The republic accommodates the 201st Russian military base, which will remain there until 2042 according to the agreement. However, the ratification of the relevant treaty was delayed by the parliament, controlled by Rahmon for a whole year. All this time, Tajikistan extracted various concessions out of Russia.

The Ayni conondrum

Rahmon promised to rent out the Ayni military airfield near the Tajik capital to India, Russia and the US. All three countries are interested in obtaining the lease of the site. However, the president’s "multi-vector" policy complicated the situation so much that now the potential tenants are unclear about the status of the base.

India spent a significant amount of money over the last decade developing Ayni, hoping that it would be a major base for the strategically important region. New Delhi is very serious on the Ayni air base project to gain a strategic foothold in Central Asia and improve its C3I (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) network to fortify its operations in Afghanistan and keep a close eye on Pakistan. India has however met with Russian resistance as Moscow has been unrelenting in its stand that it doesn’t want foreign powers to deploy fighter aircraft in its backyard and a former territory.

Ayni Air Force Base, also known as Gissar Air Base, is a military air base in Tajikistan, just 10 km west of the capital Dushanbe, which served as a major military base of the Soviet Union in the Cold War era.

The situation with Ayni shows that Tajikistan is not really in position to sign a consistent and binding agreement and that Dushanbe may be left with nothing.  “Rahmon will seek preferences in the supply of arms in lieu of renting out the base,” says Azhdar Kurtov, an expert of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies.

Dushanbe’s bargaining chips

In exchange for the ratification of the agreement on the 201^st Russian military base, Moscow promised to expand a free education program in Russian military academies for citizens of Tajikistan and to provide $200 million worth of arms to the republic. In addition, Moscow has modified work permit laws for citizens of Tajikistan, allowing them to work in Russia for up to 3 years. This is relevant for Dushanbe - according to the Russian Federal Migration Service there are more than 1.2 million citizens of Tajikistan in Russia, who this year alone remitted $3.5 billion to their home country.

However, even such a dangerous dependence on Moscow does not discourage Dushanbe from demonstrating its activity in relation to other countries. For example, until recently it seemed that the US was paying considerable attention to Tajikistan. For a while, the United States and NATO were sizing the option to withdraw troops from Afghanistan via Tajikistan, but Pakistan’s conditions regarding this issue were far more suitable for the West.

Related:

Russia to modernise Tajikistan’s army

Russian and Tajikistani Presidents to discuss law enforcement cooperation

1,900 gangs smuggling Afghan drugs to Russia – anti-narcotics agency

Such behaviour periodically makes experts say that Tajikistan is slipping away from Russia’s influence to China, India, Iran, or even the United States. Elena Kuzmina, Manager of the Sector for Economic Development at the Institute of the economy of post-Soviet states recognizes that in the past two years, in fact, it was China that has become a major trading partner and investor in Tajikistan. Russia is only in the second place. Chinese investment accounted for 40 percent of total investments in the Tajik economy. In addition, China provides grants for the construction of infrastructure projects. With the support of the Celestial Empire, Tajikistan was able to implement large-scale projects in the energy and communication sectors.

“It would still be improper to say that Tajikistan is moving away from Russia,” says Kuzmina. There is cooperation between Moscow and Dushanbe in many areas. According to Kuzmina, it would be more accurate to say that Tajikistan has expanded the scope of its economic interests, and will continue to try to expand and diversify its cooperation with various countries.

Azhdar Kurtov also believes that there will be no sharp geopolitical fluctuations, not to mention a change of Dushanbe’s main external partner. “The republic has no oil or gas and because of the high-altitude terrain, production of other resources is more expensive.  Its geographical location does not allow the deployment of a large-scale construction, including, for example, transport communications, which Tajikistan has pinned high hopes on. Attempts to refocus on Iran by creating a union of three Persian-speaking countries (Tajikistan, Iran and Afghanistan), were not successful, “Kurtov said.

L’Océan Pacifique est-il devenu radioactif ?

APRES FUKUSHIMA…

L’Océan Pacifique est-il devenu radioactif ?

Michel Lhomme
Ex: http://metamag.fr

Il faut de l’abnégation et chercher l’information pour entendre parler de Fukushima. Or on apprend assez vite que de l’eau hautement radioactive en provenance des ruines de la centrale de Fukushima se déverserait toujours dans l’océan Pacifique, créant un état d’urgence sanitaire difficilement maîtrisable selon les propres dires d’un responsable de l’agence industrielle Tepco, en charge de la gestion des équipements nucléaires japonais. 

Le problème aurait deux sources : l’eau souterraine contaminée et l’eau stockée dans des réservoirs dont une partie s’écoulerait, suite à des fuites. 300 tonnes d’eau contaminée aurait ainsi déjà atteint la mer, a reconnu Tepco au mois d’Août dernier. Mais les autorités japonaises continuent de nier et affirment que l’Océan Pacifique n’a jamais été atteint ou que le total cumulé d’éléments radioactifs s’écoulant en mer s’inscrirait dans des limites légales et autorisées pour la santé. Qui croire ? Les déclarations ou les cartes de radioactivité des chercheurs indépendants ?

 

Des mesures de contention ont été prises, tel qu’un système de décontamination prévu pour traiter 500 tonnes d’eau par jour ou encore le pompage de l’eau avant qu’elle n’atteigne la mer et enfin, la construction d’une barrière sous-marine qui a débutée en mai 2012 et qui sera achevée en septembre 2014. 

Toutes ces mesures reconnaissent donc bien que le système de décontamination existant n’est pas complètement opérationnel et qu’en tout cas, il est nécessaire. En outre, le chef de l’Autorité de sûreté nucléaire japonaise a déclaré en octobre qu’une brèche avait été détectée dans une barrière souterraine laissant émerger de l’eau contaminée dans des quantités supérieures à la radioactivité légalement admise. 

 

Tepco a répliqué aussitôt en indiquant : “Nous ne savons toujours pas pourquoi le niveau de radiation a bondi, mais nous poursuivons les efforts pour éviter une nouvelle expansion de la contamination”. S’il a souvent été reproché aux autorités japonaises une certaine opacité sur la question, des chercheurs indépendants souvent américains ou canadiens se penchent régulièrement sur le sujet et leurs estimations sont alarmantes. Ce seraient des quantités extrêmement dangereuses de strontium, tritium et césium qui se seraient échappés de Fukushima pour se déverser dans tout l’Hémisphère Nord portés par les courants, la pluie et le vent. 

Face aux derniers aveux de Tepco, les risques semblent bien tangibles et s’étendraient, selon les spécialistes, sur toute la côte ouest des Etats-Unis et cette pollution radioactive pourrait potentiellement affecter la vie marine et la santé de millions de personnes vivant dans l’hémisphère nord au bord des côtes du Pacifique. 

Ce que craignent surtout les spécialistes, c’est un nouveau séisme, un de ces tremblements de terre dévastateurs dont le Japon est coutumier. La revue “The New Scientist” a tenu à préciser que la centrale nucléaire de Fukushima contenait à l’origine 1760 tonnes de matières nucléaires alors que Tchernobyl en contenait 180. Mais vous l’aurez noté, on parle beaucoup moins de Fukushima en France malgré la Polynésie française toute proche. 

B52 EN ASIE : UNE PENTE DANGEREUSE

 

B52 EN ASIE : UNE PENTE DANGEREUSE

Les stratèges américains en plein chambardement

Michel Lhomme
Ex: http://metamag.fr

Nous l’avions écrit: le prochain théâtre de guerre sera asiatique et en partie maritime (l’Océan Pacifique). Deux bombardiers américains B-52 ont pénétré dans la très controversée « zone aérienne d'identification » (ZAI) mise en place par la Chine.  Cette zone est récente et même très récente puisque elle date tout simplement de samedi dernier ! On nous dit que les Etats-Unis n’en auraient pas référé à Pékin mais heureusement puisque cette ZAI n’existe pas dans les textes ! Les avions US, qui n'embarquaient aucune arme mais sans doute de bons outils de renseignements, ont décollé de l'île de Guam dans le Pacifique lundi soit à peine deux jours après l’annonce unilatérale chinoise. Le soutien des Américains à leur allié japonais est donc total.

Aucun plan de vol n'avait été déposé au préalable auprès de la Chine et la mission s'est déroulée "sans incident". Les deux avions sont restés "moins d'une heure", - ce qui est assez long - dans la dite "zone aérienne d'identification". Ils attendaient sans doute les avions de chasse chinois que Pékin s’est bien gardé d’envoyer. Cette "zone aérienne d'identification" a suscité l'opposition ferme et justifiée du gouvernement japonais car elle englobe les îles Senkaku, îles fermement revendiquées par Pékin sous le nom de Diaoyu. Mais la ZAI chinoise de samedi va aussi plus loin : elle englobe des eaux revendiquées par Taïwan et la Corée du Sud, ces derniers ayant également manifesté leur mécontentement après la décision de Pékin.

Dans sa déclaration de samedi, la Chine exigeait que tout appareil s'aventurant dans cette ZAI fournisse désormais au préalable son plan de vol précis, affiche sa nationalité et maintienne des communications radio permettant de "répondre de façon rapide et appropriée aux requêtes d'identification" des autorités chinoises, sous peine d'intervention des forces armées. Le ton est monté lundi entre Tokyo et Pékin à la suite de la décision chinoise d'imposer cette zone de contrôle aérien. Le même jour et en solidarité avec son allié japonais, le colonel Warren, porte-parole de la Défense américaine a qualifié la mesure chinoise d'"incendiaire". Des responsables du Pentagone ont alors précisé que les avions de l'armée américaine continueraient de voler dans cette région comme avant, sans soumettre de plans de vol à Pékin au préalable.

Le différend territorial entre les deux puissances asiatiques s'est aggravé depuis septembre 2012, lorsque le Japon a nationalisé trois des cinq îles qui appartenaient à un propriétaire privé nippon. Cette décision avait entraîné une semaine de manifestations anti-japonaises violentes en Chine, et une forte contestation de Pékin. Le Japon fit de son côté patrouiller ses garde-côtes dans les mêmes eaux et ce chassé-croisé avait suscité les craintes d'un éventuel incident armé entre les deux puissances.

B52 dans le Pacifique mais lâchage en Afghanistan

Par ailleurs, poursuivant leur politique de « changement de pivot stratégique », la conseillère de sécurité nationale américaine Susan Rice en visite à Kaboul a prévenu le président afghan Hamid Karzaï qu’il ne serait « pas viable » de retarder la signature de l’accord de sécurité entre leurs deux pays. Elle a haussé le ton en affirmant que sans signature rapide d’un accord réciproque, les Etats-Unis n’auraient d’autre choix que de prévoir un après-2014 où les troupes américaines et de l’Otan ne seraient plus présentes .Le gouvernement de Karzaï se retrouverait seul et sans appui financier. Sans le dire ouvertement, les USA affirment qu’ils sont prêts à lâcher l’Afghanistan, quitte à  entériner un retour taliban dans le secteur. Un peu déroutant tout de même pour nos défunts soldats : pour qui, pourquoi sont-ils morts finalement ?

La relation entre les Etats-Unis et l’Afghanistan est extrêmement tendue. L’enjeu est la signature du traité bilatéral de sécurité (BSA) que Washington et Kaboul négocient actuellement depuis plusieurs mois. Kharzaï ne cesse de faire monter les enchères. La Loya Jirga, grande assemblée traditionnelle afghane, a pourtant approuvé dimanche le Traité, qui doit définir les modalités d’une présence militaire américaine en Afghanistan après le départ des 75 000 soldats de l’Otan. En fait, d’ores et déjà, ce retrait fait craindre une recrudescence des violences dans le pays et même une offensive taliban au printemps prochain entraînant une déstabilisation de la partie indienne ou pakistanaise.

Pour précipiter cette signature, la Maison Blanche tente de jouer des divisions locales et s’est donc vivement félicitée de l’approbation du Traité bilatéral de Sécurité par la Loya Jirga pachtoune. Elle demande des comptes à Kharzaï ! Or, ce dernier aurait énoncé de nouvelles conditions pour signer l’accord et aurait même indiqué qu’il n’était pas prêt à signer rapidement.

Hamid Karzaï est aux abois 

Il souhaite que la promulgation de l’accord ait lieu après l’élection présidentielle d’avril 2014, à laquelle cependant la Constitution lui interdit de se présenter. Les Etats-Unis ont refusé catégoriquement les nouvelles exigences de Karzaï et répondu que « retarder la signature jusqu’aux élections de l’année prochaine n’était pas viable, car cela ne donnerait pas la clarté nécessaire aux Etats-Unis et à l’Otan pour planifier leur présence après 2014. L'absence d’un BSA signé mettrait en danger les promesses d’aides faites par l’Otan et d’autres pays aux conférences de Chicago et Tokyo en 2012 ».

La diplomatie a aussi des perspectives économiques. En Iran, les entreprises automobiles américaines s’apprêtent à revenir dans le pays, satisfaites au passage d’avoir pu, avec l’aval du blocus occidental, éliminé les compagnies françaises concurrentes, Renault et Peugeot ! En fait, on n’est pas vraiment sûr que la diplomatie française ait compris les changements d’alliances en cours, qu’elle ait réellement pris la mesure de la rapidité avec lequel les Etats-Unis, très bien informés sur l’état réel de la défense chinoise sont aujourd’hui déterminés à pivoter à cent quatre vingt degrés. Ils ont accéléré l’accord sur le Sahara occidental et renforcé l’alliance militaire avec le Maroc. Ils sont en train  d’éclaircir leurs positions en Amérique latine tout cela pour se concentrer ensuite sur le Pacifique et l’endiguement de la Chine. Il serait peut-être temps que le Quai d’Orsay se réveille. Mais après tant de décisions irrationnelles, le peut-il encore vraiment sans se désavouer totalement ?

Afghanistan occupato fino al 2024

Immunità giudiziaria e libertà totale operativa per 15 mila militari Usa

Lorenzo Moore

Secondo la bozza di accordo tra governo di Washington e governo insediato a Kabul dagli occupanti, oggetto di discussione nei cinque giorni che dal 21 novembre vedranno riunita l’assemblea tribale afghana (Loya Jirga), le truppe Usa sono destinate a restare in Afghanistan fino al 2024. Nel documento di “security agreement”, che consta di 25 pagine, è chiaramente esposta la volontà Usa di restare con le proprie forze militari nei territori afghani occupati “in sostegno delle forze afghane di sicurezza”. Una volta firmato l’accordo, ben 15 mila militari, secondo quanto reso noto dalla Nbc, oltre a godere di “immunità” giudiziaria nei tribunali afghani, saranno chiamati di “assicurare la protezione” dell’Afghanistan fino al 2024, per 23 anni cioè dall’aggressione angloamericana del 2001, contro “le forze di al Qaida e i loro affiliati”, anche con interventi operativi “in zone civili e residenziali”, come già verbalmente richiesto dal segretario di Stato Usa John Kerry al presidente afghano Hamid Karzai. Il trattato potrà essere annullato soltanto con un preavviso di due anni. Sia la richiesta di immunità e la libera operatività contro i civili sono state dichiarate dagli Usa “condizioni essenziali”. In poche parole gli Usa hanno richiesto “mani totalmente libere” per il loro ruolo militare di occupazione. Come noto Obama aveva “promesso” il totale ritiro militare Usa dall’Afghanistan entro il 2014.


20 Novembre 2013 12:00:00 - http://www.rinascita.eu/index.php?action=news&id=22681

NATO’s Terror Campaign in Central Asia

 

NATO’s Terror Campaign in Central Asia

 

By James Corbett, Rick Rozoff, and Sibel Edmonds

Global Research, October 17, 2013

Ex: http://www.globalresearch.ca

In this age of manufactured terror, one of the most vital regions on the global chessboard is also an area that few in the West know anything about: Central Asia.

This geostrategic and resource-rich area on the doorstep of China and Russia finds itself in the middle of an all out terror campaign. But, as key national intelligence whistleblowers are pointing out, these terrorists are working hand-in-glove with NATO.

This important GRTV Backgrounder was originally aired on Global Research TV on March 14, 2013.

Ever since the staged false flag attacks of 9/11, the US government and its complicit corporate media have focused their attention on fighting the shadowy, all-pervasive, all-powerful, ill-defined and undefeatable “Al Qaeda” enemy that is supposedly menacing the US and its allies at home and abroad. The term “Al Qaeda” of course is merely a cipher for “excuse to invade.” In the case of Afghanistan, for instance, the US used the threat of Al Qaeda as the excuse for their 12 year long invasion and occupation of the country. In Libya and Syria, the US and its allies are supporting those same self-described Al Qaeda-affiliated fighters. The ruse has long since become obvious.

Less obvious, then, because it has been taking place completely under the radar of media attention, is another front in the so-called war on terror: Central Asia and the Caucasus region. Encompassing the region surrounding the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, this area has long been identified as perhaps the most geostrategically vital part of the globe. It provides access to the exceptionally rich Caspian oil and gas deposits, hosts the “New Silk Road,” a vital trade route between China and Europe, and sits on the doorstep of China and Russia. And it just so happens to have a terrorist problem.

At first blush, it may seem odd that in this “age of terror” the American population has been told so little about the growing terrorist insurgency in Central Asia and the Caucasus. But when examined in the light of regional geopolitics, this deafening silence makes perfect sense.

Indications of how and why this region is so important come from numerous geostrategists, including Zbigniew Brzezinski, Obama’s acknowledged mentor and a key advisor to his administration. In his 1997 book, The Grand Chessboard, Brzezinski identified the Central Asian / Caucasus region as part of a larger area he called “The Eurasian Balkans.”

The countries in this region, he wrote, are “of importance from the standpoint of security and historical ambitions to at least three of their most immediate and more powerful neighbors, namely, Russia, Turkey, and Iran, with China also signaling an increasing political interest in the region. But,” he continued, “the Eurasian Balkans are infinitely more important as a potential economic prize: an enormous concentration of natural gas and oil reserves is located in the region, in addition to important minerals, including gold.”

Brzezinski knew very well what he was writing about. As National Security Advisor under President Carter, he had overseenOperation Cyclone, the US government’s since-declassified plan to arm, train and fund Islamic radicals in Pakistan and Afghanistan to draw the Soviet Union into a protracted war in the region. This, famously, led to the foundation of what became known as Al Qaeda in the 1980s, a point that Brzezinski has since admitted and even bragged about, claiming that the creation of a “few stirred up Muslims” helped to bring down the Soviet Union.

It is no surprise, then, that Brzezinski went on to predict in his 1997 book that the first major war of the 21st century would take place in this region, which is exactly what happened with the NATO invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. And it is also no surprise that even NATO’s hand-picked Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, is now openly accusing the US of supporting the Taliban in the country to convince the public that they will need US protection after the planned troop withdrawal date in 2014.

Global Research contributor and Stop NATO International Director Rick Rozoff appeared on the Boiling Frogs Post podcast in 2011 to discuss this region and the overlap between NATO’s strategic interests and Islamic extremism.

It has long been understood that the terror operations in Chechnya and other key parts of the Central Asia and Caucasus region have been supported, funded and protected by NATO to help destabilize the region surrounding their main geopolitical rivals, Russia and China, in an operation very similar to Operation Cyclone in the 70s and 80s. This has, until now, remained mostly within the realm of speculation. But in a recent groundbreaking series of interviews on The Corbett Report, FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds has confirmed that this is, in fact, exactly what is happening.

If it is true that the people perish for lack of knowledge, perhaps it is nowhere more true than in the phoney, NATO-created war of terror. Without the understanding provided by Edmonds and others in identifying the Central Asia / Caucasus terror campaign as a NATO proxy war, the entire concept of Islamic terrorism becomes inscrutable to geopolitical analysis.

As this information will never be disseminated by the complicit corporate media, it is vitally important that the people take this task into their own hands by sharing this information with others and contributing to the analysis of the terror campaign being waged in the region.

The seeds of the next great world conflict are being sowed in Central Asia, on the doorstep of Russia and China, and regardless of whether or not this conflict, too, is being manipulated and managed behind the scenes, the lives of countless millions hang in the balance of the specter of that all-out war. Only an understanding of NATO’s active complicity in fostering and protecting these Muslim extremists can help break the tool of propaganda by which they will try to convince their population to acquiesce to such a war.

US-China Relations and the Geopolitics of the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA)

By Jane Kelsey

 

Url of this article:
http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-china-relations-and-the-geopolitics-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement-tppa/5357504

In criticising the leaders of her native New Zealand for their myopia in treating the TPPA as a depoliticised international agreement, Jane Kelsey argues that China is the ultimate target of every major US proposal in this ‘new-generation, twenty-first-century agreement.’

The term ‘competitive imperialism’ applies where ‘free trade is subservient to the goal of projecting influence to another country or throughout a region, and checking actual or perceived reciprocal efforts by another power’. Last decade, it was used to describe the contest between the US and the European Union (EU) as they competed to secure new-generation free trade agreements (FTAs) for strategic reasons. Today, ‘competitive imperialism’ is more appropriately used to describe the growing desperation of the US to neutralise the ascent of the ‘BRICS’ – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. China is preeminent among them, to the point that, even though it is not a party to the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA), it is the elephant that is constantly in the room and the ultimate target of the US’s most aggressive proposals.

The strategic and foreign policy dimension of the TPPA has especially serious implications for a country like New Zealand which wants to remain best friends with both sides. On the one hand, Trade Minister Tim Groser warned in February 2012 that New Zealand would pull out of the negotiations if politicians in the United States used them as a vehicle to try to contain the rise of China. Senior government representatives from New Zealand and Australia are believed to have been very uncomfortable with some of Washington’s anti-China rhetoric. As detailed below, that rhetoric continues unabated, but predictably Groser has not walked away.

At other times, political leaders and journalists resort to that happy place where New Zealand can claim neutrality as an independent small power and play on both teams. In late 2012 Prime Minister John Key welcomed the talks for a mega-deal involving China and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), ‘but TPP is the big game for us at the moment’.

New Zealand’s approach is to treat the TPPA as a depoliticised international economic arrangement and float above the geopolitics. That may be achievable in the early stages, but if this becomes a Cold War by proxy each side will expect friends to become allies. A similar studied myopia informs the grand plan for all members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and their other agreements to ‘dock’ onto this US-centred treaty and form one regional APEC free trade agreement. Repeated attempts to achieve that goal have foundered since it was first proposed in the early 1990s because there are divergent economic models and strategic relationships among APEC’s 23 members. It is true that all the TPPA countries have their own reasons for being in this game, and some, such as Vietnam, see it as constructing their own bulwark against China. But there is no evidence to suggest those decades of resistance to a binding and enforceable US template for the Asia-Pacific will simply melt away.

The US Pacific century

US President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton left no doubts at the APEC meeting they hosted in Honolulu in November 2011 about the drivers behind the TPPA. The US aims to revive its geopolitical, strategic and economic influence in the Asian region to counter the ascent of China, in part through constructing a region-wide legal regime that serves the interests of, and is enforceable by, the US and its corporations. In the TPPA context, what the US wants is ultimately what counts.

Expanding on her article entitled ‘America’s Pacific Century’ in the November 2011 issue of Foreign Policy magazine, Clinton said the security and economic challenges that currently confront the Asia-Pacific ‘demand America’s leadership’. Officials described the US role as ‘the anchor of stability in the region’, committed to ‘managing the relationship with China, economically and militarily’.

According to Obama’s advisers, he made it ‘very clear’ during his bilateral discussions with China’s President Hu Jintao ‘that the American people and the American business community were growing increasingly impatient and frustrated with the state of change in the China economic policy and the evolution of the US-China economic relationship’. China had failed to show the same sense of ‘responsible leadership’ as the US had tried to do.

At the TPPA leaders’ meeting Obama had talked about establishing international norms that would ‘be good for the United States, good for Asia, good for the international trading system – good for any country in dealing with issues like innovation and the discipline of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), creating a competitive and level playing field’. Above all, the TPPA would create international norms that would be good for resurrecting US strategic and economic hegemony.

The bellicose tone intensified during the 2012 US presidential election campaign. Republican candidate Mitt Romney complained that Obama had not been tough enough with China and then endorsed the TPPA as a ‘dramatic geopolitical and economic bulwark against China’. Obama was equally belligerent. While China could be a partner, America was ‘sending a very clear signal’ that it is a Pacific power and intended to have a presence there. In a coded reference to the TPPA he said ‘we’re organising trade relations with countries other than China so that China starts feeling more pressure about meeting basic international standards. That’s the kind of leadership we’ve shown in the region. That’s the kind of leadership that we’ll continue to show’.

There is some tension between the antagonistic foreign policy position of the State Department and the commercial drivers of the TPPA. China is the ultimate target of every US major proposal in this ‘new generation, twenty-first century agreement’, in particular stricter protection for intellectual property rights, disciplines on ‘anti-competitive’ state-owned enterprises, and processes and rules to stop ‘unjustified and overly burdensome’ regulation. It is unclear how they intend to get China to adopt these rules. Sometimes it sounds like an encirclement strategy, creating a model that dominates the Asia-Pacific and forces China first to adjust, and ultimately to accede to the TPPA. At other times, the target seems to be China’s alliances and operations in third countries to undercut its economic foothold and strategic influence.

The US’s potential leverage over China stepped up a notch with the announcement in February 2013 of negotiations for a Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA) between the US and the EU bloc of 27 countries. There is a synergy between the EU’s Global Europe strategy to externalise its internal regulatory regime and the US goal for the TPPA to provide a seamless regulatory environment for capital, goods, services, data and elite personnel throughout the Asia-Pacific. But there is the sticky question of whose regime would rule, given their longstanding conflicts in areas such as agriculture, food safety, telecommunications and intellectual property. The commercial and strategic attractions of a trans-Atlantic pact are obvious, especially for the US. If they were able to pull it off, America would span the powerful TPPA and TAFTA blocs, massively boosting its power in the face of the BRICS.

China’s diplomatic counter

China’s public response has been measured. In late September 2011, China’s Ambassador to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) said diplomatically that they had ‘no objections to the TPP’ and were waiting to see whether there was a possibility that China might be involved in the discussions. Speaking immediately before the APEC Summit in 2011, a senior Chinese official more sharply criticised US goals as ‘too ambitious’ and called for a balance between the TPPA and ‘other paths to achieve multilateral and regional trade liberalisation’. The TPPA negotiations should be ‘open’; China had not been invited to participate. The US replied that any country must apply to join and demonstrate that it is prepared to operate by the TPPA’s gold-standard 21st-century rules.

China has a number of options. Ignoring the TPPA in the hope that it stalls and goes the way of the Doha Round of WTO negotiations and the moribund Free Trade Area of the Americas carries too high a risk. China could seek to join the talks indirectly through its Hong Kong proxy, but that would bring the extensive holdings of China’s SOEs in Hong Kong under the TPPA disciplines. It would also expose Hong Kong’s governance processes to unpalatable obligations on process, disclosure and external participation.

China could make a direct request to participate in the TPPA. That would set off a feeding frenzy among the TPPA negotiating countries that do not have a free trade agreement with China: the US, plus Canada, Japan, Mexico and Australia. But accession involves a lengthy and demeaning process of bilateral discussions and endorsement by each existing participant, then a collective decision to allow them entry, followed by a 90-day notification to the US Congress. The process for Canada and Mexico took a year. They were told they had to accept everything that had been agreed by the time they formally joined the negotiations, but they were not permitted to see the text itself before then. Even though the US ensured that Japan’s accession was expedited, it will come to the table in late July 2013 on the same terms: Japan will not have had access to the formal texts and will not be able to reopen anything that has already been agreed in negotiations. In reality, many of the chapters of greatest interest to Japan will not have been concluded, which guarantees that an October deadline is unachievable.

It seems inconceivable that China would agree to a process of bilateral discussions and arduous preconditions simply to get to the table, and accept a raft of US-drafted rules that are designed to cripple China’s principal sources of commercial advantage.

The most realistic option is for China to grow its own mega-group. That is already in play. China has a free trade agreement with ASEAN whose scope has progressively expanded from goods to services to investment. It is in bilateral negotiations with South Korea, and the first talks for a China-Japan-Korea FTA were held in March 2013. These relationships are crucial for China. There are ongoing foreign policy tensions with Japan over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and this was clearly a factor in Japan joining the TPPA talks, despite vigorous domestic opposition. However, South Korea has said it will not follow suit at this stage because it is focusing on the China negotiations and the three-way deal with Japan.

China’s other major counter-play is the 16-country Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which brings China and the 10 ASEAN countries together with India, South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand – but not the US. The talks were launched in November 2012. The rhetoric is similar to the TPPA, with supporters describing it as ‘a framework within which business can use the region’s resources to best effect in generating higher living standards and welfare for the region’s people’. There are similar expectations around services and investment liberalisation, supply chains and connectivity, but they are weaker in relation to intellectual property, domestic regulatory reforms, environment, labour, government procurement and non-tariff measures such as consumer protection laws.

Whereas the US sees the TPPA as a vehicle for American leadership in the Asia-Pacific, ASEAN researchers assert ‘it is in the interests of East Asia and the world as a whole that East Asia should be the engine of growth for the world economy’, while being open to the rest of the world. The RCEP negotiations and agreement itself should follow the precedent set by the ASEAN Economic Community and should be guided by the ‘ASEAN way’.

The ethos of the China and ASEAN-led project is fundamentally different from the US-led TPPA. Rather than a uniform commitment to a ‘gold-standard twenty-first century agreement’, the RCEP will recognise ‘the individual and diverse circumstances of the participating countries’. Whereas the TPPA has rejected any special and differential treatment for poorer countries beyond longer phase-in periods and some technical assistance, the RCEP promises to ‘include appropriate forms of flexibility including provision for special and differential treatment’, especially for least developed countries.

Seven countries currently span both sets of negotiations: Australia, Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Vietnam. The timeframe is to conclude an RCEP agreement by the end of 2015. The US clearly does not want these negotiations to advance until it has locked the crossover countries into the orbit of its own TPPA rules, especially those with which it does not already have a free trade agreement. That will become more difficult with Japan at the table.

If both agreements were eventually concluded, countries like New Zealand that are party to both would face some hard decisions further down the line. The two agreements will reflect divergent paradigms, as well as geopolitical allegiances. Parties would be required to implement quite different sets of obligations, and compliance with them both would be enforceable by state parties and foreign firms.

Jane Kelsey is Professor of Law at the University of Auckland in New Zealand. For several decades her work has centred on the interface between globalisation and domestic neoliberalism, with particular reference to free trade and investment agreements. Since 2008 she has played a central role in the international and national campaign to raise awareness of, and opposition to, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. The above is extracted from her new book Hidden Agendas: What We Need to Know About the TPPA (Bridget Williams Books, May 2013).

Copyright © 2013 Global Research

Bielorussia e Cina resistono alle pretese occidentali sui diritti umani

Bielorussia e Cina resistono alle pretese occidentali sui diritti umani

Minsk, 1 novembre (BelTA)

Ex: http://www.statopotenza.eu

Bielorussia e Cina resistono agli assalti delle forze occidentali sui diritti umani. Il presidente della Bielorussia Aleksandr Lukashenko ha dichiarato incontrando Meng Jianzhu, membro dell’Ufficio Politico del Comitato Centrale del Partito Comunista Cinese, segretario della Commissione per gli affari politici e legali del Comitato centrale del PCC, membro del Consiglio di Stato della Cina, a Minsk il 1° novembre. Aleksandr Lukashenko ha detto: “Credo che la vostra visita come rappresentante del presidente cinese aprirà una nuova pagina nelle nostre intense consultazioni e relazioni“. Il Presidente ha osservato che non vi è alcuna necessità di analizzare la situazione nei rapporti bielorusso-cinesi e d’indicare l’importanza e l’intensità di queste relazioni per le nazioni bielorussa e cinese.

“La Cina è un alleato strategico della Bielorussia. I nostri rapporti sono stati costruiti fin dal primo giorno dell’indipendenza, mentre le basi furono gettate ai tempi dell’Unione Sovietica“, ha detto il leader bielorusso. Secondo lui non vi sono assolutamente problemi tra la Bielorussia e la Cina dal punto di vista dei futuri sviluppi della situazione globale. “Oggi abbiamo le stesse idee sull’agenda internazionale“, ha sottolineato Aleksandr Lukashenko. Secondo il capo di Stato bielorusso, la Cina è in prima linea nel tentativo volto a realizzare un mondo multipolare. “Sosteniamo anche la stessa visione“, ha detto Aleksandr Lukashenko. “Abbiamo sempre sostenuto e sosterremo la Cina sull’integrità territoriale. Agiremo insieme anche nel contrastare gli assalti attuati da certe forze occidentali sui diritti umani e altre cose che conosciamo bene“. Aleksandr Lukashenko ha anche detto che i buoni rapporti e la visione comune sulle questioni politiche evolvono tra la Bielorussia e la Cina.

Traduzione di Alessandro Lattanzio

Al Qaeda in China, Islamic Insurgency in Uighur-Xinjiang, China and the US-Saudi-Israeli Plan for the Middle East

By Andrew McKillop

 

Global Research, October 30, 2013

Url of this article:
http://www.globalresearch.ca/china-and-the-us-saudi-israeli-plan-for-the-middle-east/5348325

THE YINON PLAN LIVES ON

Named after Israel’s minister of foreign affairs at the time of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and occupation of Beirut, with about 25 000 dead, this divide-and-rule geostrategy plan for the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) lives on.

Already victims of this strategy since 2011 – operated by Israel, the US and Saudi Arabia – we have the divided and weakened states of Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Syria. Egypt and even Tunisia can also possibly be added to the list. Others can be identified as likely short-term target victim countries.

In February 1982 the foreign minister Oded Yinon wrote and published ‘A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties‘, which outlined strategies for Israel to become the major regional power in the Middle East. High up the list of his recommendations was to decapitate and dissolve surrounding Arab states into sub-nations, warring between themselves. Called the peace-in-the-feud or simply divide and rule, this was part of Yinon’s strategy for achieving the long-term Zionist goal of extending the borders of Israel, not saying where but potentially a vast region. His strategy was warmly and publicly supported by leading US policy makers with close ties to Israel, like Richard Perle, by the 1990s.

This regional balkanization plan is centred on the exploitation of ethnic, religious, tribal and national divisions within the Arab world. Yinon noted the regional landscape of the MENA was “carved up” mainly by the US, Britain and France after the defeat and collapse of the Ottoman empire in 1917. The hastily traced and arbitrary borders are not faithful to ethnic, religious, and tribal differences between the different peoples in the region – a problem exactly reproduced in Africa, when decolonization started in the 1950s and 1960s. Yinon went on to argue this makes the Arab world a house of cards ready to be pushed over and broken apart into tiny warring states or “chefferies” based on sectarian, ethnic, national, tribal or other divisions.

Central governments would be decapitated and disappear. Power would be held by the warlord chiefs in the new sub-nations or ‘mini-states’. To be sure, this would certainly remove any real opposition to Israel’s coming regional dominance. Yinon said little or nothing about economic “collateral damage”.

To be sure, US and Saudi strategy in the MENA region is claimed to be entirely different, or in the Saudi case similar concerning the means – decapitating central governments – but different concerning the Saudi goal of creating a huge new Caliphate similar to the Ottoman empire. Under the Ottomans nations did not exist, nor their national frontiers, and local governments were weak or very weak.

ISLAMIC INSURGENCY IS WELL KNOWN IN CHINA

China knows plenty about Islamic insurgency and its potential to destroy the nation state. Even in the 1980s and 1990s, some 25 years ago, China had an “Islamic insurgency” threat concentrated in its eastern resource-rich and low population Xinjiang region. Before that, since the early days of the Peoples’ Republic in the 1950s, China has addressed Islamic insurgency with mostly failed policies and strategies but more recently a double strategy of domestic or local repression, but aid and support to Islamic powers thought able to work against djihadi insurgents – outside China – has produced results.

The Chinese strategy runs completely against the drift of Western policy and favours Iran.

A report in ‘Asia Times’, 27 February 2007, said this: “Despite al-Qaeda’s efforts to support Muslim insurgents in China, Beijing has succeeded in limiting (its) popular support….. The latest evidence came when China raided a terrorist facility in the country’s Xinjiang region, near the borders with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan. According to reports, 18 terrorists were killed and 17 were captured”.

Chinese reporting, even official white papers on defence against terror are notoriously imprecise or simply fabricated. The official line is there is no remaining Islamic insurgency and – if there are isolated incidents – China’s ability to kill or capture militants without social blowback demonstrates the State’s “hearts and minds” policy in Xinjiang, the hearth area for Chinese Muslims, is working.

Chinese official attitudes to Islamic insurgency are mired with veils of propaganda stretching back to the liberation war against anti-communist forces. These featured the Kuomintang which had a large Muslim contingent in its Kuomintang National Revolutionary Army. The Muslim contingent operated against Mao Zedong’s central government forces – and fought the USSR. Its military insurgency against the central government was focused on the provinces of Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang and continued for as long as 9 years after Mao took power in Beijing, in 1949.

Adding complexity however, the Muslim armed forces had been especially active against the Soviet Union in the north and west – and by 1959 the Sino-Soviet split was sealed. Armed hostilities by Mao’s PLA against the Red Army of the USSR broke out in several border regions, with PLA forces aided by former Muslim insurgents in some theatres. Outside China, and especially for Arab opinion, Mao was confirmed as a revolutionary nationalist similar to non-aligned Arab leaders of the period, like Colonel Husni al-Zaim of Syria and Colonel Nasser of Egypt.

CHINA’S THREAT TO WESTERN STRATEGY IN THE MENA

Especially today, some Western observers feign “surprise” at China’s total hostility towards UN Security Council approval for “surgical war” strikes against Syria. The reasons for this overlap with Russia’s adamant refusal to go along with US, Saudi Arabian, Turkish and French demands for a UNSC rubber stamp to trigger “regime change” in Syria but are not the same. For China the concept of “regime change” with no clear idea – officially – of what comes next is anathema.

As we know, when or if al Assad falls, only chaos can ensue as the country breaks apart, but this nightmare scenario for China is brushed aside by Western politicians as a subject for “later decision”.

China’s successful efforts to keep the global jihad from spreading into its territory is surely and certainly taken as a real challenge by Saudi-backed insurgents in western China. Various reports indicate the al-Qaeda organization trains about 1 000 mostly Xinjiang-origin Uighurs and other Chinese Muslims every year. Located in camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kirgizstan and elsewhere, this terror training has continued since at least the mid-1990s, for a total of more than 15 years.

The focus on Xinjiang, formerly called Turkestan is no accident. The region’s Russian influence is still strong, reinforced by Muslim migration from Russia in the 19th century, accelerated by the Russian Civil War and 1917 revolution. During China’s warlord era preceding Mao’s rule, the USSR armed and supported the Muslim separatist East Turkestan Republic which only accepted Mao’s rule when the PRC under the Chinese communists was fully established in 1949. The longstanding East Turkestan jihadi movement (ETIM) is highly active today after being relaunched in the early 2000′s, especially since the Iraq war of 2003. It however mainly acts in “external theatres” such as Pakistan’s Baluchistan province. The Baluchi of Pakistan have long-term rebellious relations with the central government in Islamabad, and are allied with Kurd nationalists in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Turkey.

The US Council on Foreign Relations in a 29 May 2012 briefing on Xinjiang noted that since the Chinese Qing dynasty collapse of 1912, the region has experienced various types of semi-autonomy and on several occasions declared full independence from China. The Council for example notes that in 1944, factions within Xinjiang declared independence with full support from the USSR, but then cites US State Dept. documents claiming that Uighur-related terrorism has “declined considerably” since the end of the 1990s and China “overreacts to and exaggerates” Islamic insurgency in Xinjiang.

Notably, the US has declassified the ETIM Islamic movement – despite its terror attacks – as a terrorist organization. The ETIM was defined as such during the Bush administration years, but is no longer listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in the State Dept. FTO list as from January 2012.

China has fully recognized the Islamic insurgency threat, with its potential for drawing in hostile foreign powers seeking to destroy national unity and break the national government. Its concern, shared by Indian strategists and policy makers is to “stop the rot” in the MENA.

THE CHINESE STRATEGY

Unofficially, China regards the US and Saudi strategy in the MENA and Central Asia as “devil’s work” sowing the seeds of long-term insurgency, the collapse of the nation state and with it the economy. The US link with and support to Israel is in no way ignored, notably Israel’s Yinon plan for weakening central governments and dissolving the nation state right across the MENA.

China’s main concern is that Central Asian states will be affected, or infected by radical Islamic jihadi fighters and insurgents drifting in from the West, from the Middle East and North Africa. These will back the existing Islamic insurgent and separatist movement in resource-rich Xinjiang. To keep Central Asian states from fomenting trouble in Xinjiang, China has cultivated close diplomatic ties with its neighbors, notably through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which has a secretariat concerned with counter-insurgency issues.

US analysts however conclude, very hastily, that China “instinctively supports the status quo” and therefore does not have an active international strategy to combat djihadi violence and anarchy outside China. US analysts say, without any logic, that China will respond to and obediently follow initiatives from Washington and other Western powers – as it has starkly not done in the UN Security Council when it concerns the Western powers’ long drawn out attempt to repeat, for Syria, their success in 2011 for getting UNSC approval to the NATO war in Libya!

China was enraged, and regarded it as betrayal when its support for limited action by NATO in Libya – a rare instance of China compromising on nonintervention – turned into an all-out “turkey shoot” to destroy the Gaddafi clan. Libya was handed over to djihadi militants, who subsequently declared war against central government, an accelerating process resulting in Libya, today, having no central government with any real authority. That experience certainly hardened Beijing’s responses on Syria.

Post-Mao China has restored the concept of Chinese cultural continuity, with a blend of Confucian, Taoist and Buddhist strands which had been been weakened but not completely destroyed in the years of ideologically-driven Communism. For the Communists of Mao’s era “history was bunk”, not even a mixed bag but an unqualified evil that must be smashed. The Chinese attitude to radical Islam as embodied in the ideologies of Wahabism and Salafism is the same – they are treated as a denial of world history and its varied cultures, with immediate and real dangers for China. Its counter-insurgency strategy against Islamic radicals is the logical result.

This strategy ensures closer Tehran-Beijing relations, usually described by Western analysts as a “balancing act” between ties to Washington and growing relations with Iran. China and Iran have developed a broad and deep partnership centered on China’s oil needs, to be sure, but also including significant non-energy economic ties, arms sales, defense cooperation, and Asian and MENA geostrategic balancing as a counterweight to the policies and strategies of the United States and its local allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Chinese attention now focuses the Washington-Riyadh axis and its confused and dangerous MENA region geostrategy, resulting in a de facto proliferation of Islamic djihadi insurgents and the attack on the basic concept of the nation state across the region. The Chinese view is that Iran’s version of “Peoples’ Islam” is less violent and anarchic, than the Saudi version.

OPPOSING THE WASHINGTON-RIYADH AXIS

Both Chinese and Indian strategists’ perceptions of the US-Saudi strategy in the MENA, and other Muslim-majority regions and countries is that it is dangerous and irresponsible. Why the Western democracies led by the US would support or even tolerate the Saudi geostrategy and ignore Israel’s Yinon Plan – as presently shown in Syria – is treated by them as almost incomprehensible.

China is Tehran’s largest trading partner and customer for oil exports, taking about 20% of Iran’s total oil exports, but China’s co-operation is seen as critical to the Western, Israeli and Arab Gulf State plan to force Iran to stop uranium enrichment and disable the capacity of its nuclear program to produce nuclear weapons. Repeated high-level attempts to “persuade Beijing” to go along with this plan, such as then-US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s 2012 visit to Beijing, however result each time in Chinese hosts politely but firmly saying no. This is not only motivated by oil supply issues.

Flashpoints revealing the Chinese-US divide on Iran crop up in world news, for example the US unilateral decision in January 2012 to impose sanction on Chinese refiner Zhuhai Zenrong for refining Iranian oil and supplying refined products back to Iran. This US action was described by China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman as “totally unreasonable”. He went on to say that “China (has) expressed its strong dissatisfaction and adamant opposition”.

At the same time, China’s Xinhua Agency gave prominence to the statement made by Iran’s OPEC delegate Mohamed Ali Khatibi: “If the oil producing nations of the (Arab) Gulf decide to substitute Iran’s oil, then they will be held responsible for what happens”. Chinese analysts explained that China like India was irritated that Iranian oil sanctions opened the way for further de facto dominance of Saudi Arabia in world export supplies of oil, as well as higher prices.

Iran is however only the third-largest supplier of oil to China, after Angola and Saudi Arabia, with Russia its fourth-largest supplier, using EIA data. This makes it necessary for China to run sustainable relations with the Wahabite Kingdom, which are made sustainable by actions like China’s Sinopec in 2012 part-funding the $8.5 billion 400 000 barrels-per-day refinery under construction in the Saudi Red Sea port city of Yanbu.

The Saudi news and propaganda outlet Al Arabiya repeatedly criticises China and India for their purchase of Iranian oil and refusal to fully apply US-inspired sanctions. A typical broadside of February 2013 was titled “Why is China still dealing with Iran?”, and notably cited US analysts operating in Saudi-funded or aided policy institutes, such as Washington’s Institute for Near East Policy as saying: “It’s time we wised up to this dangerous game. From Beijing’s perspective, Iran serves as an important strategic partner and point of leverage against the United States”. US analysts favourable to the Saudi strategy in the MENA – described with approval by President Eisenhower in the 1950s as able to establish a Hollywood style Saudi royal “Islamic Pope” for Muslim lands from Spain to Indonesia – say that Iran is also seen by China as a geopolitical partner able to help China countering US-Saudi and Israeli strategic action in the Middle East.

A 2012 study by US think tank RAND put it bluntly: “Isolated Iran locked in conflict with the United States provides China with a unique opportunity to expand its influence in the Middle East and could pull down the US military in the Gulf.” The RAND study noted that in the past two decades, Chinese engineers have built housing, bridges, dams, tunnels, railroads, pipelines, steelworks and power plants throughout Iran. The Tehran metro system completed between 2000 and 2006 was a major Chinese engineering project.

THE BIG PICTURE

China’s Iran policy and strategy can be called “big picture”. Iranian aid and support to mostly but not exclusively Shia political movements, and insurgents stretches from SE Asia and South Asia, to West and Central Asia, Afghanistan, the Caspian region, and SE Europe to the MENA. It is however focused on the Arabian peninsula and is inevitably opposed to Saudi geostrategy. This is a known flashpoint and is able to literally trigger a third world war. Avoiding this is the big picture – for China.

Li Weijian, the director of the Research Center of Asian and African Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies puts it so: “China’s stance on the Iranian nuclear issue is not subject to Beijing’s demand for Iranian oil imports, but based on judgment of the whole picture.” China is guided in foreign relations by two basic principles, both of them reflecting domestic priorities. First, China wants a stable international environment so it can pursue domestic economic development without external shocks. Second, China is very sensitive to international policies that ‘interfere in or hamper sovereign decisions”, ultimately tracing to its experience in the 19th and 20th centuries at the hands of Western powers, and the USSR, before and after the emergence of the PRC. It adamantly opposes foreign interference in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang.

This includes radical Islamist or djihadi interference, backed by any foreign power. While China has on occasions suspected Tehran of stirring Islamic insurgency inside its borders it sees the US-Saudi geostrategy of employing djihadists to do their dirty work as a critical danger, and as wanton interference. Indian attitudes although not yet so firm, are evolving in the same general direction. Both are nuclear weapons powers with massive land armies and more than able to defend themselves.

Claims by Western, mostly US analysts that China views Iran as exhibiting “unpredictable behaviour” in response to US-led sanctions and that Iran is “challenging China’s relations with its regional partners” can be dismissed. In particular and concerning oil, China is well aware that Iran will need many years of oil-sector development to return to anything like pre-Islamic revolution output of more than 5 million barrels a day. Unless oil sanctions are lifted, Iran’s oil output will go on declining, further increasing the power of the Gulf States led by Saudi Arabia, and Shia-governed but insurgency threatened Iraq to dictate export prices.

China dismisses the claim that its policies have hampered US and other Western political effort to dissuade Iran from developing nuclear weapons capability.

China’s distaste for toppling almost any central government, even those run by dictatorial strongmen springs from a deep sense of history – marked by insecurity about the uncertain political legitimacy of governments arising from civil war and revolution – like the PRC. At its extreme, this Chinese nightmare extends to fears that if the US-Saudi geostrategy can topple governments in the Middle East almost overnight, what will stop them from working to bring down China’s government one day? Unlike almost all MENA countries minus the oil exporters, China has scored impressive victories in the fight against poverty. Its economy although slowing creates abundant jobs and opportunity.

For China, this is the only way to progress.

HARDENING POLICIES AND POSITIONS

The emerging Chinese anti-Islamist strategy also underlines a menacing reality for the US and other Western powers. China rejects the belief there is still only one superpower in today’s world—the USA. The USA’s weakened economy and uncontrollable national debt, its confused and cowardly drone war, its slavish support to Israeli and Saudi whims do not impress China – or India.

To be sure China’s classic-conventional weapons development programs lag far behind the US. The Chinese military strategy for pushing back US dominance focuses global reach ballistic missiles, tactical nuclear weapons, drones, submarines, and military space and cyberwarfare capabilities.

With the PLA it possesses the biggest land army in the world. No US warmonger, at least saner versions would “take on China”.

China has invested heavily in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, as well as Iran. It does not want to see its investment effort destroyed by deliberately promoted Islamic anarchy. Also, its Middle Eastern presence will continue due to the fact that while US dependence on oil imports is declining, China overtook the US as the world’s largest oil importer on a daily basis, this year, several years ahead of analysts’ consensus forecasts.

The likely result is that China is now poised and almost certain to strengthen relations with Iran. The intensifying Syrian crisis as well as the dangerously out of control US-Saudi-Israeli djihadi strategy, of fomenting sectarian conflict and destroying the nation state in the MENA, will likely prompt China to soon take major initiatives.

Copyright © 2013 Global Research

Eurasian Union: Substance and the Subtext

Gulshan Dietl

Ph.D., Professor of the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

 

Ex: http://www.geopolitica.ru

 

The Eurasian Union has come to the present stage in its evolution within a remarkably compressed time-frame. Although the idea was first mooted by the Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbaev in 1994, it hibernated for long years.[1] It was only in late 2011 that Vladimir Putin revived the idea; visualised it as one of the major centres of economic power alongside the EU, the US, China and APEC; and initiated the process of its implementation. In November 2011, the presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus signed an agreement to establish the Eurasian Economic Space (EES) that would graduate towards the Eurasian Union. The EES came into existence on 1 January 2012. The paper proposes to examine the origin of the idea and assess its implementation todate with an analysis of the substance and subtext of the organization.

Eurasian Union: The Origins

On 3 October 2011, Vladimir Putin published a signed article in the daily newspaper Izvestia titled “New Integration Project in Eurasia: Making the Future Today.” Putin was the Russian Prime Minister at that time and set to take over the Russian Presidency. The article can thus be interpreted as the assignment he set for himself in his second tenure. On the ground, the “Treaty on the Creation of a Union State of Russia and Belarus” already existed. The Treaty envisaged a federation between the two countries with a common constitution, flag, national anthem, citizenship, currency, president, parliament and army. On 26 January 2000, the Treaty came into effect after the due ratifications by the Russian Duma and the Belarus Assembly. It provided for political union of the two, creating a single political entity. Whether the Treaty laid down a proto Eurasian Union remains to be seen.

The European Union (EU) announcement in 2008 of its Eastern Partnership Programme (EPP) may also have inspired the Russian drive towards reintegration of the Eurasian space. The EPP was initiated to improve political and economic relations between the EU and six "strategic" post-Soviet states -- Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine -- in the core areas of democracy, the rule of law, human rights, the promotion of a market economy, and sustainable development.[2]  There was much debate over whether to include Belarus, whose authoritarian dictatorship disqualified it. The eventual invitation to Belarus was the concern over an excessive Russian influence in that country.

The US plan to deploy the NATO missile defence system in Poland and Czech Republic was already a source of concern for the Russians. China was emerging as a serious player in the region through its heavy investments in energy and infrastructure. The Russian determination to keep the post-Soviet states away from the US, the EU and China made the Eurasian project a priority in its foreign policy. The Treaty between Russia and Belarus intended to keep the latter into the Russian fold.[3]

 Eurasianism: The Idea

Eurasianism as an idea predates the Soviet Union. The Russian identity has been contested by the Occidentalists, the Slavophils and the Eurasianists. The latter claim Russia as the core of the Eurasian civilization. Today, the former Soviet states accept the Russian centrality but not the core-periphery division bet Russia and the rest.

Within Russia itself, the Eurasianists always considered the Soviet Union to be a Greater Russia. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Eurasian political project is to reunite the Russians from the former Soviet territories and ultimately to establish a Russian state for all the Russians. Aleksander Dugin is an ideologue and activist for neo-Eurasianism in Russia. His political activities are directed at restoring the Soviet space and unification of the Russian-speaking people. The South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity is a sworn Eurasianist himself and eager to make his country a part of Russia.

Organization and Accomplishments

The Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), the governing body of the EES is set up in Moscow for the time being. Kazakhstan has already staked its claim to host its permanent headquarters. The formula under which the 350-member body would be filled allots Russians 84 percent of staff, the Kazakhs 10 percent and the Belarusians a mere 6 percent. The formula has been worked out on the basis of the population in the three countries. The expenses towards accommodation and infrastructure would be borne by Russia.

The EEC will be eligible to make decisions with regard to customs policies, as also the issues relating to macroeconomics, regulation of economic competition, energy policy, and financial policy. The Commission will also be involved in government procurement and labour migration control.[4] The right of the EEC to sign contracts on behalf of all of them is contested.

The Supreme Eurasian Union Council will be the apex body of the group. The vice- premiers of the three countries would be leading their countries’ delegations in this body. There are differing opinions on the powers of its apex body.

Eurasian Union is an economic grouping. Its objective is to expand markets and rebuild some of the manufacturing chains destroyed by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus had set the process toward this goal and the Eurasian Union is a continuation of the same process.[5]

The EEC has made some progress, in the meantime. It has simplified the trade rules, eliminated border customs and facilitated free movement of goods, services and capital. It has also encouraged migration of labour among its signatories. The trade among the three is estimated to have gone up by forty percent last year alone. Russia has benefitted from cheaper products and labour force from the rest of the two and several hundred Russian enterprises have re-registered in Kazakhstan to avail cheaper tax rates. Kazakhs and Belarusians have found a large market for their products in Russia.

Major hurdles still remain. A common currency has not been agreed to. The pace of economic integration is yet another point of debate among the three. Belarus would not be comfortable with market integration, which would require economic reforms. Eventually, the economic reforms could lead to political reforms and even changes in political system. Belarus is least prepared for such an eventuality.

Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan         

Within Russia, the Eurasianism still holds an appeal; and not just among the marginal groups. The Eurasian Union is perceived as an expression of Eurasianism that would lead to the state of Russia for all Russians. There are calls to invite countries like Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Finland and even China and Mongolia to join the Eurasian Union. At the leadership level, Putin may also prefer ruling over an expanded space encompassing the entire or most of the former Soviet territory.

The Russian raison d’état for the Eurasian Union cannot be traced to such feelings alone. The missionary zeal to reach out to the neighbours involves subsidizing them. As a general rule, economic integration must necessarily involve mutual benefits for all the parties - even when the benefits are not in equal measure. An economic arrangement does not only eliminate tariffs and other restrictive trade barriers among the signatories, it also formulates and implements tariffs and trade barriers against the non-signatories. Facilitating trade among themselves and restricting trade with the outsiders is the dual track of any economic group. 

As regional integration proceeds in much of the world (not just through the EU but also via NAFTA, ASEAN and Washington’s proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership, among others), the post-Soviet space remains largely on the sidelines. A lack of horizontal trading links and isolation from global markets contribute to the region’s persistent underdevelopment. By reorienting members’ economies to focus on the post-Soviet space, a Eurasian Union would create new barriers between member states and the outside world.[6] Russia is particularly worried about the Chinese forays into its neighbourhood. And the EU Eastern Partnership Programme threatens to encroach into the space that Moscow considers its own sphere of influence.

A second powerful reason for Russia to reach out to its neighbours is that the neighbours are steadily making Russia their home. The influx of migrants from the former Soviet territories has generated a lot of resentment and will soon become a serious political issue. In the circumstances, helping to improve the economic situation beyond the Russian borders and assimilate the new arrivals in a common citizenship is being considered. The then president Dmitry Medvedev explicitly linked the issue of immigrants to the expansion of the state borders. He spoke of the time when the giant state had to comprise different nationalities that created “Soviet People”. "We should not be shy when bringing back the ideas of ethnic unity. Yes, we are all different but we have common values and a desire to live in a single big state," he said.[7]

Russia is not single-mindedly committed to the Eurasian Union. It has initiated and nurtured several other multi-lateral organizations and become a member of scores of others initiated by others. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) consisting of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan[8] is one such. So is the Commonwealth of Independent States comprising most of the post-Soviet countries. It is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that is clearly a China-led group. The Quadrilateral Forum comprising Russia, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan is a Russian project.

It has not shied away from making deals with the EU, either. In 2003, it entered into an agreement with the EU to create four common spaces: 1. of freedom, security and justice; 2. cooperation in the field of external security; 3. economy; and 4. research, education and cultural exchange. Since the formalisation of the Customs Union, Putin has insisted that the EU formalise its relations with the Customs Union before a new basic treaty between the EU and Russia could be formalised. At the EU-Russia Summit in June 2012, he also sought the EU support for the Kazakh and Belarusian bids to join the WTO.[9]

Kazakhstan has formulated and pursued a “multivector” foreign policy since independence. It seeks good relations with its two large neighbours as also with the West. Its operational idiom, therefore, is “diversify, diversify and diversify”.

Its relations with the US are centred on counter-terrorism. In Central Asia, it is now the most favoured US partner in the war on terror. It has welcomed the US-sponsored New Silk Road. The Aktau Sea port is expected to emerge as the capital city on this cross-Caspian Road as the central point for transportation, regional educational cooperation and tourism. The Transportation and Logistics Centre is being developed in the city. Aktau hopes to play a role within the New Silk Road that Samarkand played in the Old Silk Road.[10]

Its relations with Europe are as good. Its bilateral cooperation with the EU dates back to 1999, when it entered into the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with it. The European Commission has agreed to support its application for membership of the WTO. On 1 January 2010, Kazakhstan became the first post-Soviet state to assume the chairmanship of the 56-member Vienna-based Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Its trade with the EU accounts for as much as the trade of all the Central Asian countries put together. France has a trade agreement with it that is worth $2 billion under which France would help build a space station and cooperate on nuclear development.

It is its close ties – in fact, too close ties – with China that explains its active membership of the Eurasian Union. China’s presence in the country is pervasive. In 2005, the Asatu-Alashanku oil pipeline between the two countries went into use. The second stage of the same from Kenkyiak to Kumkol is already in works. A gas pipeline is being discussed. In the same year, China bought Petrokazakhstan that was the former Soviet Union’s largest independent oil company. At $4.18 billion, it was the largest foreign purchase ever by a Chinese company. In 2009, it gained a stake in the MangistauMunaiGas, a subsidiary of the KazMunaiGas, which is the Kazakh national upstream and downstream operator representing the interests of the state in the petroleum sector. Even as economic ties get stronger, there could be a point of friction between the two regarding the Uighur-based East Turkestan Islamic Movement in the Xinjiang province of China. There are 180,000 Kazakhs of Uighur descent, which is a source of discomfort to China.

Belarus is a landlocked country and dependent on Russia for import of raw materials and export to the foreign markets. Its dependence on Russia is aggravated by the fact that the US has passed the “Belarus Democracy Act”, which authorizes funding for pro-democracy Belarusian NGOs and prevents loans to the government. The EU has imposed a visa ban on its president Alexander Lukashenko. Even as the Belarus’s dependence on Russia is overwhelming, their bilateral relations have gone through severe frictions. In 2004, there was a gas dispute as Russia stopped the gas supply for six months before a compromise on the price was worked out.

In 2009, the two fought what has come to be called “milk wars”. Moscow banned import of Belarusian dairy products, claiming that they did not meet Russian packaging standards, a non-tariff measure allowed under the common customs code. The disagreement cost Belarus approximately $1 billion. The real problem was that Belarusian farmers were heavily subsidized, meaning that the cost of milk production in Belarus was substantially lower than that in Russia. As a result, Russian dairy producers were on the verge of bankruptcy and looked to their government for support. In response to Russian action, Belarus introduced a ban on the purchase of Russian agricultural machinery, accusing Russia of not providing leasing for Belarusian tractors (a major source of income for Belarus).[11]

Destination Ukraine?

Ukraine is the raison d’être for the entire Eurasian project, according to many. “Once past the verbal hype, it becomes clear that in fact it [Eurasian Union] has nothing to do with Eurasia and has everything to do with a single country, which, incidentally, is situated in Europe of all places: Ukraine,” according to an analyst.[12] Its key task is to draw Kiev into the integration project.

The primary reason for Russian stake in Ukraine is the Ukraine-Russia-Turkmen gas pipeline. Till the break-up of the Soviet Union, it was a domestic grid. Today, the gas trade between Turkmenistan, Russia and Ukraine is not just a commercial proposition, but an illustration of triangular dependencies of the three countries. The key issues in terms of transit are that all Turkmenistan’s gas exports outside Central Asia pass through Russia, which puts the latter in complete control of around three-quarters of Turkmenistan’s exports. Russia’s position vis-à-vis Ukraine is extremely vulnerable in that more than ninety percent of its gas exports to Europe pass through that country.

Thus, Ukraine is the transit point as well as the choke point of the Turkmen and Russian exports. It has also been a leaking point of the deliveries. In early 1990s, there were serious disruptions as Ukraine pilfered the gas for its own domestic use. Since then the gas deliveries have become an important issue in the political and security relationship between Russia and Ukraine, having featured in the package of agreements which have included issues such as the future of the Black Sea Fleet and Ukrainian nuclear weapons. There was a serious stand-off between the two in 2009, when the Russians cut off natural gas supplies to Ukraine over price dispute. A compromise was reached only after Ukraine agreed to pay more for the gas that was, till then, subsidised.[13]

The second most important Russian stake in Ukraine is that Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula hosts a Russian navy base whose lease term was extended for twenty-five years in 2010 by a special agreement between Presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Viktor Yanukovych, despite an unresolved gas dispute. This facility provides Moscow with strategic military capabilities in an area that Russia once considered crucial for the security of its southwestern borders and its geopolitical influence near the “warm seas.”[14] In return for the extension of the lease, Russia agreed to a thirty percent drop in the price of natural gas it sold to Ukraine.

A third reason for Russian interest in Ukraine could be that the latter represents a promising market of 45 million potential consumers, in the context where Russia seeks to diversify its own economy and export destinations.

Russian diplomacy to retain control over Ukraine and the US diplomacy to extend its control over the same have repeatedly to come to a clash. Till recently, Ukraine was pointedly excluded from both the EU and the NATO expansions[15]; as also from the list of possible invitees. Since the “Orange Revolution”, the situation has radically changed. How the energy pipeline politics plays out in the changed circumstances remains to be seen.

For its part, Ukraine has not closed its options between the EU and the Eurasian Union. Its prime minister Mykola Azarov, speaking at a meeting to discuss “Ukraine at the Crossroads: The EU and/or the Eurasian Union: Benefits and Challenges” said, “Ukraine has never contrasted one economic organization with the other and we cannot do that from many points of view. We are in ‘between’ and we must have friends both here and there.”[16]

Conclusions

There is no Eurasian Union todate. And yet, it has been the subject of intense scholarly scrutiny as also of prescriptive analysis. Its future membership, the direction of its evolution and the gamut of its activities must remain speculative in the meanwhile.

In lieu of the final conclusions, some tentative recapitulation of the above is in order. The Russians aim to retain the former Soviet space within their own sphere of influence, seeking to diminish the US, Chinese and the EU presence out of it to the extent possible. The Kazakhs are keeping all their options open: seeking a central role in the US-sponsored war on terror and the New Silk Road, permitting pervasive Chinese presence in their economy, promoting bilateral and institutional ties with the EU, and becoming a member of the Eurasian Union. “Diversify” is the name of the Kazakh game. Belarus is landlocked and dependent on Russia for its trade exports and imports, and the Belarus president is persona non grata in much of the West. Under the circumstances, the Eurasian Union is a solution to much of its problems.

Ukraine has signed a Memorandum of Understanding on trade cooperation with Eurasian Economic Commission. Much will depend on whether and when Ukraine decides to join the Eurasian Union.

Published in Journal of Eurasian Affairs

---

[1] The Kazakh people like to point out that Kazakhstan’s president Nursultan Nazabaev was the first leader to propose the Eurasian Union in 1994. Chinara Esengul, “Regional Cooperation”, March 27, 2012. http://www.asiapathways-adbi.org/2012/03/does-the-eurasian-union-have-a-future/

[2] Kambiz Behi and Daniel Wagner, “Russia’s Growing Economic Influence in Europe and beyond”,  23 July 2012. 

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kambiz-behi/russias-growing-economic-influence_b_1696304.html

[3]  On 30 September 2011, Belarus withdrew from the EU initiative citing discrimination and substitution of the founding principles. Three days thereafter, it refuted its decision to withdraw. The EU-Russia competition was obviously at work in quick turnarounds in Belarusian position.

[4] Retrieved from news.mail.ru and kremlin.ru in Russian. Quoted in Wikipedia, “Eurasian Union”.

[5] The Customs Union came into existence on 1 January 2010. Removing the customs barriers among them, the countries took the first step towards economic integration.

[6]Jeffrey Mankoff, “What a Eurasian Union Means for Washington”, National Interest  http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/what-eurasian-union-means-washington-6821

[7] Gleb Bryanski, “Putin, Medvedev Praise Values of the Soviet Union”, Reuters, 17 November 2011,  http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/11/17/idINIndia-60590820111117   

[8] In June 2012, Uzbekistan decided to suspend its membership of the CSTO.

[9] http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/putin-promotes-eurasian-union-eu-news-513123 “Putin Promotes Eurasian Union at the EU Summit”, 5 June 2012

[10] “Kazakhstan: U S Interest in Global Hub on the Caspian”, http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/kazakhstan-aktau-united-states-caspian-sea-caucasus-trade-afghanistan-silk-road-strategy

[11] Behi and Wagner, n. 2

[12] Fyodor Lukyanov, gazeta.ru. 17 September 2012. Quoted in http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/opinion/9548428/eurasian-union-explanation.html   

[13] The Ukrainian prime minister at that time, Yulia Tomashenko, has since been sentenced to seven years in prison for abusing the authority and signing the deal.

[14]  Georgiy Voloshin, “Russia’s Eurasian Union: A Bid for Hegemony?”, http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/russias-eurasian-union-a-bid-for-hegemony-4730

[15] Putin was reported to have declared at the NATO-Russian Summit in 2008 that if Ukraine were to join the NATO, he would consider annexing the Eastern Ukraine and Crimea in retaliation.

[16] http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/azarov-ukraine-never-contrasted-eu-with-eurasian-u-1-127756.html  Kyivpost, 17 May 2012.

 

Раздел: 

Евразия

Регион: 

Россия

Теги: 

Eurasian Union

geopolitics

Russia

Eurasia

Il Tibet e il problema idrico cinese

“L’Islam Politico alla prova del potere”, Vol. II, no. 4 L’ipotesi dell’Unione Transatlantica: breve analisi G-20 Russia: dopo il Summit di S. Pietroburgo. Il 16 ottobre a Roma Il Tibet e il problema idrico cinese nel contesto dell’Asia Meridionale Dopo Margaret Thatcher, l’Irlanda Alta velocità in Brasile: una grande occasione per le imprese italiane Il riequilibrio dell’Asia-Pacifico e il sistema di alleanze nel sud-est asiatico

Il Tibet e il problema idrico cinese nel contesto dell’Asia Meridionale

Francesco Bellomia 

 

Ex: http://www.geopolitica-rivista.org

Si discute spesso del crescente fabbisogno energetico cinese e dunque delle problematiche relative al reperimento di materie prime come petrolio, gas naturale e carbone, ma, nell’ambito delle risorse naturali, ciò non rappresenta l’unica esigenza a cui la classe dirigente a Pechino deve far fronte. La mancanza di acqua, unita all’inquinamento di una parte delle risorse idriche disponibili, sta divenendo infatti una questione sempre più pressante, un problema che finisce per ripercuotersi sulla stessa crescita economica del paese, oltreché sulla stabilità sociale e sui rapporti della Cina con gli stati limitrofi nell’area dell’Asia Meridionale.

La Cina detiene il 7% delle risorse mondiali di acqua, stante però una popolazione equivalente al 20% del totale, Pechino si classifica al centesimo posto su centosettantacinque paesi nel ranking relativo alle risorse idriche mondiali pro capite (con un ammontare di 2.093 m³ di acqua a persona)¹.Essendo quella cinese un’economia ancora in espansione, il fabbisogno idrico ne risulterà certamente crescente in maniera esponenziale, soprattutto dal punto di vista industriale e abitativo. Sei regioni nel paese registrano già consumi di acqua superiori alle risorse disponibili, mentre altre cinque vengono considerate al di sotto della soglia di criticità (fissata a 1000 m³ di acqua pro capite)².

Vi è poi un problema di distribuzione tra nord e sud. Il 77% delle risorse idriche è infatti concentrato nel sud del paese, mentre si trovano invece al nord il 64% delle terre arabili e il 40% della produzione industriale. Una parte delle risorse di acqua inoltre, non può essere utilizzata a causa degli elevati livelli di inquinamento. Il 34% dell’acqua dei sette maggiori fiumi cinesi è classificata come inquinata, di questa il 14% come altamente inquinata, il che la rende inservibile anche per gli usi industriali o agricoli. Secondo la FAO, intorno alle aree urbane, soprattutto quelle industrializzate del nord, il 90% dei fiumi può essere considerato come altamente inquinato³. Come è noto, alla base di tali dati vi è la priorità data da Pechino allo sviluppo industriale rispetto alle problematiche relative alla tutela ambientale, che però stanno finendo per ripercuotersi in maniera indiretta sullo stesso sviluppo economico del paese.

Per tentare di attenuare le carenze idriche e favorire un riequilibrio delle risorse tra nord e sud, il governo centrale cinese ha posto in essere alcuni imponenti progetti, sia in termini ingegneristici che economici, tra i quali spicca il South-North Water Diversion Project. Dai costi stimati di 62 miliardi di dollari, il progetto prevede la costruzione di tre sezioni di canali e dighe che, in diversi punti lungo il fiume Yangtze, dovrebbero convogliare l’acqua verso la parte nord del paese. L’obiettivo è di deviare annualmente, verso le pianure settentrionali, 45 miliardi di metri cubi di acqua.

I progetti di costruzione di dighe e di deviazione dei corsi d’acqua, oltreché rappresentare ulteriori minacce dal punto di vista ambientale, rischiano di esacerbare le relazioni di Pechino con i paesi confinanti. Centrale da questo punto di vista è la regione tibetana. Le abbondanti risorse idriche del Tibet sono un’ulteriore ragione per cui l’area ha un un’importanza fondamentale per la Cina, non solo dal punto di vista economico, ma anche strategico.

Nascono infatti in Tibet o nell’area dell’Altopiano tibetano, fiumi di importanza vitale non solo per la parte nord-orientale della Cina, come lo Yangtze o il Fiume Giallo, ma anche per gli altri paesi dell’Asia sud-orientale. È il caso dello Yarlung Tsangpo, che dal Tibet scorre verso l’India (dove prende il nome di Brahmaputra) e il Bangladesh; del fiume Saluen che raggiunge invece Myanmar e Thailandia; del fiume Mekong, che, partendo dalla regione tibetana, attraversa Myanmar, Laos, Thailandia, Cambogia e Vietnam; e del fiume Indo che dal Tibet confluisce poi in India e Pakistan, rappresentando per quest’ultimo la più importante fonte idrica del paese. Si tratta di corsi d’acqua che sono già stati oggetto della costruzione di dighe o altre infrastrutture di deviazione dei flussi, o che sono al centro di progetti in tal senso, pianificati dalle autorità cinesi.

In particolare, i piani riguardanti lo Yarlung Tsangpo, come la costruzione della diga di Zangmu o la sezione occidentale del South-North Water Diversion Project, diffondono una certa apprensione in India. Quest’ultima risulta dipendente dalla Cina non soltanto per la parte settentrionale del fiume Brahmaputra, ma anche per altri corsi d’acqua, come il già citato Indo e un suo importante affluente il Sutej, entrambi i quali sorgono all’interno della regione tibetana. L’India, come la Cina, deve essa stessa fare i conti con i problemi derivanti dalla cronica mancanza d’acqua, per cui la salute e la reperibilità delle proprie risorse idriche diventa vitale per Nuova Delhi. Per questi motivi, in più di un’occasione, gli indiani hanno chiesto alla Cina di essere trasparente, riguardo alla condivisione dei dati idrogeologici relativi al proprio tratto dei fiumi transfrontalieri. Le questioni riguardanti il Tibet restano dunque ancora una volta centrali nell’ambito dei rapporti sino-indiani. Relazioni segnate in larga parte da diffidenza, e che in passato hanno conosciuto significative tensioni collegate proprio allo status della regione tibetana.

Nei conflitti che possono derivare dal possesso delle risorse idriche di un fiume, è evidente il vantaggio di essere paesi “a monte” rispetto che “a valle”. In questo senso, rinunciare al Tibet significherebbe per la Cina perdere il controllo, non solo delle risorse idriche presenti nella regione, ma anche delle sorgenti di fiumi d’importanza fondamentale per il fabbisogno di molti paesi in tutta l’Asia Meridionale, corsi d’acqua che assicurano dunque a Pechino un potere strategico vitale.

Ultimamente, l’economia cinese sta subendo significativi rallentamenti e, secondo diversi analisti, la fase delle crescite a due cifre si è ormai ampiamente conclusa. Tutto ciò può avere significative conseguenza sulla tenuta del sistema. Al momento, i rischi maggiori per Pechino, più che dalle tensioni indipendentiste in Tibet o nello Xinjiang (seppur ancora ampiamente presenti), sembrerebbero nascere soprattutto dalle tensioni sociali che possono derivare dai problemi economici, oltreché dalla richiesta di maggiori diritti. Per anni, la solidità del sistema è stata garantita non solo dalla repressione, ma anche dalle opportunità che una crescita economica impetuosa sembrava offrire.

Da questo punto di vista, il Tibet, visti gli ulteriori margini di crescita economica, la ricchezza di minerali e altre risorse naturali, le possibilità di trasferimenti aggiuntivi di popolazione da aree sovrappopolate, continuerà a giocare un ruolo fondamentale. La regione è cambiata molto negli ultimi anni, la classe dirigente a Pechino infatti, non vi ha portato solo repressione e censura (o popolazioni di etnia Han), ma anche un certo sviluppo economico, particolarmente visibile soprattutto a Lhasa. Uno sviluppo percepito però da una buona parte dei tibetani come “colonialismo”, e dunque come una minaccia alla propria identità. Per decenni, a farla da padrone in Tibet sono stati la geografia e la natura, oggi lo sviluppo tecnologico ha reso la regione un po’ meno inospitale. Chi ha avuto la possibilità di visitarla testimonia di come appaia per certi versi come un “cantiere a cielo aperto”.

Tornando al problema idrico, secondo il 2030 Water Resources Group la domanda cinese di acqua nel 2030 supererà l’offerta di 201 miliardi di metri cubi⁴. Seppur le previsioni in questi ambiti sono sempre azzardate, la questione non può certo essere negata. Diventa fondamentale per Pechino un utilizzo più efficiente delle proprie risorse e una maggiore sensibilità riguardo ai problemi ambientali. Ulteriori progetti di deviazione e sfruttamento dei fiumi presenti nell’area sud-occidentale sembrerebbero inevitabili. L’acqua ha un’importanza vitale non solo dal punto di vista industriale o agricolo, ma anche da quelli della produzione di cibo, della salute, degli usi abitativi. Non bisogna dimenticare poi, che i vari corsi d’acqua fungono anche da fonti di produzione di energia idroelettrica, consentendo alla Cina di diversificare le sue fonti, attenuando la dipendenza dai combustibili fossili. La tenuta del sistema è quindi in buona parte legata alla disponibilità futura di una risorsa vitale e insostituibile.

L’acqua del Tibet dunque, sembrerebbe destinata a divenire sempre più un ulteriore terreno di attrito tra la Cina e i paesi limitrofi, i quali già accusano Pechino di scarsa trasparenza sui piani di gestione dei propri tratti dei corsi d’acqua transfrontalieri. In definitiva, nel contesto dell’Asia Meridionale, il rischio maggiore è che l’enorme fabbisogno cinese di acqua lasci a bocca asciutta tutti gli altri.

NOTE:

Francesco Bellomia, dottore magistrale in Relazioni Internazionali (Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza"), è ricercatore associato del programma "Asia Meridionale" dell'IsAG.

1. Dato relativo al 2011. The World Bank.
2. Le suddivisioni amministrative in deficit idrico sono: Ningxia, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Tianjin, Pechino e Hebei. Le aree invece considerate in condizione di “carenza idrica” sono: Henan, Shandong, Shanxi, Liaoning e Gansu. Si tratta di 11 regioni che da sole forniscono il 45% del totale del PIL cinese, Chinawaterrisk.org.
3. Aquastat - FAO's global water information system.
4. Charting Our Water Future, "2030 Water Resources Group", 2009.

The Western Challenge to Eurasian Integration

by Nikolai Malishevski

Ex: http://www.strategic-culture.org

Recently, official Warsaw and not-so-official Stockholm have taken a number of steps to reinforce their successes in the East in order to gain new bargaining chips for the upcoming Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in November 2013, which will be devoted to developing a unified policy on the East for European countries. According to a statement by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton, this summit will be «an opportunity to deepen the relations» between the EU and the member countries of the Eastern Partnership. The fact that the heads of all the EU member states plan to attend also speaks to that.

The Eastern Partnership, initiated by Washington and Brussels, was formed at the suggestion of Warsaw and Stockholm after the failure of the Georgian aggression in Ossetia. Essentially it has become a kind of continuation of GUAM, which demonstrated its military and political inadequacy in August 2008. The participation of Belarus and Armenia (which are not members of GUAM) is an attempt at a kind of «revenge» for the military and political defeat of Georgia. You could call the Eastern Partnership a tool for energy colonialism, turning Russia into a mere supplier of raw materials to the West, «pushing» it into the northeast of the Eurasian continent and creating a «sanitary» energy collection zone along its borders from the Black Sea to the Baltic. It's not for nothing that many in Russia consider the Eastern Partnership a kind of 'calque' from Adolf Hitler's concept of gaining Lebensraum in the East.

The main players in the project are Sweden in the north, Poland in the west, and NATO member Turkey in the south… Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova have been assigned to Poland, with its neosarmatism and the sympathies of Catholics. To Turkey with its neoturanism, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia have been assigned (and to some extent the Central Asian republics - unofficially, through the personal business interests of their leaders in Ankara, as in Kyrgyzstan, for example). The Scandinavians, with the support of international structures like the Soros Foundation, are taking an avid interest in Karelia, the Kola Peninsula, the islands of the Gulf of Finland and their mineral and forest resource, as well as opposing Russia’s plans in the Arctic.

North. Overseen by Sweden, acting through Finland, which is conveniently located close to the «northern capital»« St. Petersburg. Operations are conducted using the following tools: 

a) Swedish-speaking citizens of Finland who have close ties with the Finnish political elite, the public servants, and who openly express anti-Russian revanchist views, such as Mikael Storsjo, the publisher of the terrorist site Caucasus Center and chairman of the Pro-Caucasus Association, who was convicted of illegally dispatching dozens of terrorists, including relatives of Basayev; 

b) media structures such as the Sweden-based Web center of the site Caucasus Center (the site itself, which has been declared a terrorist resource by the UN, was operating there as well until it was moved to Finland in 2004) and anti-Russian Finnish media activists (Kerkko Paananen, Ville Ropponen, Esa Makinen, Jukka Malonen, etc.) who support the «white ribbon opposition» in Russia; 

c) public structures such as the Pro-Caucasus Association, which is registered in Sweden, the Finnish-Russian Civil Forum (Finrosforum, Suomalais-venalainen kansalaisfoorumi), and U.S-oriented human rights organizations like the Helsinki Group, Amnesty International, etc..

Financing comes from the north, which borders directly on Russia via Finland (from which, in a similar calque, the «export of revolution» and money for it from American and European bankers came even before 1917), and there is an attempt to unite all anti-Russian forces in Europe and Russia itself - from Chechen terrorists, for whom «Turkish transit» is organized to the motley «white ribbon» opposition (supporters of Nemtsov, Navalny, Limonov, Kasparov, etc.).

West. Poland, which does not share a border with Russia (except for the Kaliningrad enclave), operates along the perimeter of a broad geopolitical «arc». From Kaliningrad in the north (already called «Królewiec» by Warsaw diplomats on the official site of the Consulate General of Poland), through Belarus and Ukraine, which are being considered as potential «friendly» territories in the east, to the Crimea in the south. 

With regard to Ukraine and Moldova, the ambitions of Warsaw, which has taken a course toward the creation of a fourth Rzeczpospolita and has its own vision of the future of the lands on Ukraine's right bank, to a great extent coincide with those of Romania and Hungary. Catholic Poland is essentially coordinating its policy with coreligionist Hungary, as their points of view on a number of issues coincide and complement one another, allowing them to develop a common strategy. With regard to Belarus, something similar (with some reservations) is happening with the Latvians and Lithuania, including support via Scandinavia for the pro-Western opposition in Minsk, which has found understanding from the «white ribbonists» and public servants who sympathize with them in Russia.

In the first half of 2013 the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), the «thought factory for the European Union» which conducts analyses on foreign policy and security, distinguished Poland in five areas of foreign policy. Poland was recognized as a leader in implementing joint projects in the framework of NATO and the Common Foreign and Security Policy and was praised for its (visa) policy with regard to Russia, Ukraine and Moldova and for its foreign policy for «the most activity for the democratization» of Belarus. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, after a discussion of the implementation of «Eastern Partnership» programs at a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels, reported (18.02.2013) that his country's eastern policy has met with numerous successes, saying, «Note that we are talking with our Eastern partners about association agreements and not about war. At present, the East is a place where Europe is conducting successful policy. In only remains to formalize these successes in the form of bilateral agreements».

South. In the south Warsaw operates in unison with Ankara, since the sympathy of the Tatar population of the Crimea toward NATO member Turkey facilitates the mutual understanding of local Turks and NATO member Poland. In 2013 several events took place, such as a press conference for the protection of the rights of Crimean Tatars, in which not only the chairman of the Union of Polish Tatars, Selim Chazbiewicz; the head of the communications department of the Crimean Tatar Majlis, Ali Khamzin; and others took part, but also influential Polish politicians such as Lech Wałęsa and former Minister of Internal Affairs Jadwiga Chmielowska. Previously in Simferopol a visa application center and a Consulate General of the Republic of Poland were opened which today demonstrate noticeable activity in the public and cultural life of the autonomous region and Sevastopol, especially in the area of collaborating with the Crimean Tatar Majlis and discrediting the Russian movement. And Poland became the second country after Russia whose consulate in the Crimea received the status of a consulate general. 

From Turkey, via Finland and its citizens of Swedish origin, transit has been organized for extremists who kindle the flame of separatist jihad in the «southern underbelly» of Russia (including the terrorists of Shamil Basayev's battalion of Chechen suicide attackers «Riyad-us Saliheen»).  The Scandinavians coordinate activities with the Turks in the media sphere as well. For example, the Web administrator of the terrorist site Caucasus Center, Islam Matsiev, came to Finland from Turkey. On the Turkish side, Basayev's IHH foundation is collecting funds in Turkey, Dubai, the U.S., England and France to finance the international terrorist network called the «Caucasus Emirate», whose mouthpiece is Caucasus Center (the official representative in Turkey is Musa Itayev, and in Finland it is Islam Makhauri, the brother of Rustam Makhauri - the «Minister of Defense of the Caucasus Emirate», Doku Umarov's personal bodyguard and the representative of terrorist Ali Taziev («Magas».). 

The level of an event held in Washington in late June 2013 at one of the oldest and most authoritative «think tanks» in the U.S., the Heritage Foundation, dedicated to the future of the Eurasian Union and «protecting vitally important interests of the U.S. and its allies in this sphere» with the participation of diplomats, scholars and analysts, goes to show that Western strategists are no longer hiding the fact that they are wary of and closely observing events in the former Soviet Union. And they are not idle in doing so, but are actively building their own toolkit for resisting the rebirth and integration of Eurasia.

Brazil and China's Unstoppable March through Latin America

by Nil Nikandrov

Ex: http://www.strategic-culture.org

The conflict situation which has arisen between Brazil and the United States due to espionage by the NSA, the CIA and other intelligence agencies has highlighted the existence of deep crisis tendencies in the relations between the «only superpower» and Latin America. The provocation of wars in Africa and Asia in order to establish control over hydrocarbon-rich countries, the early successes of this aggressive strategy and the illusion that they can get away with anything has made the U.S. ruling elite rather giddy with success.  Washington's emphasis on brute force has led to a noticeable «dumbing down» (there's no other word for it!) of its foreign policy, using threats instead of constructive dialog and reasoned arguments. Even outward political correctness has become a useless anachronism for American diplomats.

This explains the hard-line response of Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff to the Obama administration's virtual refusal to apologize for its espionage in the country and guarantee that it would not occur again in the future. To the Brazilian leadership, all Washington's attempts to avoid concrete discussion of the problem are equivalent to a display of imperial haughtiness and hostility. If the Brazilians had any hopes for an «equal partnership» with the United States in the 21st century, they are now gone. Theoretically, it is just such a partnership that could have helped Washington to maintain its position in South America. However, the Obama administration fumbled its chance, thus guaranteeing the further penetration of extra-regional powers into the continent.

On the backdrop of the Syrian failure, which revealed Washington's dirty methods of organizing «humanitarian interventions», the Obama administration's failure in Brazil is not so noticeable, but it is a momentous one for the countries of the Western Hemisphere. The Brazilians have finally shown publicly that they are displeased with the hostile actions of the U.S. Previously, difficult issues were kept quiet and, at Washington's insistence, were resolved «through diplomatic channels», that is, they were relegated to oblivion. U.S. diplomats and intelligence agents took the Brazilian leadership's political correctness for weakness and a lack of political will. Several times (during the presidency of Inacio Lula da Silva) the Brazilian government limited itself to «moderate reprimands» even when they had proof of specific subversive activities by Americans. It is sufficient to remember the U.S. intelligence operations for preparing the seizure of the Amazon basin on the pretext of «preserving» strategic reserves of fresh water «in the interests of humanity».

Amid increasing criticism of the U.S. in Brazilian society, President Dilma Rousseff is expanding relations with China, this time without the traditional glances at Washington's possible reaction. China, one of Brazil's partners in BRICS, is skillfully making use of this alliance's potential to strengthen its positions in the country. The Obama administration has no leverage to hinder this. All of the U.S.'s resources are being used to keep the positions it has won in oil-producing countries in Africa and Asia and on maintaining pressure on Syria and Iran. The U.S. is gradually losing political and economic influence in Latin America, and the vacuum is being filled by powerful competitors.

If one were to analyze the intensity of visits of high-ranking Chinese leaders to the continent, Beijing definitely holds first place in this regard. As a rule, the visits are well-planned and end in the signing of specific agreements, and, most importantly, these agreements are subsequently implemented. At the turn of the millennium, the Chinese promised Latin America that it would implement a program for capital investments in the region's economy. The program is being carried out successfully, from Mexico to Chile and from Ecuador to the island states of the Caribbean Sea. Without fuss, step by step, the Chinese are opening up the region, demonstrating the effectiveness of their industry, their aerospace potential, their technologies for manufacturing modern armaments, and their agriculture. The United States can only conduct an increasingly noisy campaign about the growth of the «yellow peril» on the continent, but the Chinese barely react to it. They are confident in their strengths. And that is one more proof that China has come to the Western Hemisphere, including to the U.S., for the long term, or more accurately, for good.

Experts predict the further consolidation of Brazilian-Chinese relations. Dilma Rousseff is essentially giving a signal to other countries: favorable conditions are now taking shape for getting out from under imperial guardianship and seeking alternatives for development and collaboration without ultimatums and dictates. Alliances of states have been created in Latin America, such as UNASUR, SELAC, ALBA and others, for which Brazil's fundamentally independent foreign policy and economic course will mark a rebirth. Previously, many of these alliances' decisions were made with a backward glance at Brazil's position in order not to exacerbate relations with Washington. In particular, this was the case with the issue of creating a South American defense system. The need for one has come to a head. Sooner or later, the United States will be pushed out of foreign territories, but it will resist this with all its might. Is that not why dozens of U.S. military bases have already been created in Latin America?

Une nouvelle Route de la Soie reliera l’Asie à l’Europe

Une nouvelle Route de la Soie reliera l’Asie à l’Europe

Par Tatiana Golovanova

Ex: http://fortune.fdesouche.com

Les pays regroupés dans l’Organisation de coopération de Shanghai (OCS) pourront rétablir la Voie de la Soie sous forme d’un corridor de transport spécialement aménagé. Comme l’a annoncé vendredi au sommet de l’OCS à Bichkek (Kirghizie) le ministre de la Recherche et des technologies de la Chine Wang Gang, ce projet a trouvé un soutien auprès de tous les pays membres de l’organisation.

Les membres de l’OCS sont prêts à développer les échanges économiques et commerciaux. Durant ces trois mois des spécialistes de Chine, qui a pris l’initiative de faire renaître la Voie de la Soie, ont visité les pays d’Asie Centrale – le Kazakhstan, l’Ouzbékistan et la Turkménie.

La Voie de la Soie rénovée pourra relier la Chine à l’Europe via la Russie et les États d’Asie Centrale

Des ententes ont été conclues au sujet de la réalisation des projets communs pour des dizaines de milliards de dollars. L’aménagement d’un corridor de transport de l’Asie à l’Europe est une étape suivante de l’essor de ces rapports, remarque Sergueï Sanakoïev, secrétaire de la Chambre sino-russe.

« Il s’agit de créer un corridor transnational traversant le territoire du continent eurasiatique. Comme toujours, l’aménagement de tels corridors en plus de rendre possible la circulation des marchandises et des services prévoient aussi la création de grappes d’entreprises industrielles, de nouvelles productions, de technologies de pointe. Cela veut dire que cela ouvre de plus larges possibilités à la coopération dans le cadre de l’OCS lors de la mise en œuvre d’une telle initiative. »

Le projet est censé mettre en place un réseau routier reliant le Pacifique à la mer Baltique, anéantir les barrières commerciales, réduire les délais de livraison des marchandises et augmenter les règlements mutuels en monnaies nationales. L’une des variantes possibles de la future Voie de la Soie est le corridor de transport « Europe –Chine Occidentale ».

Il passera par le Kazakhstan, approchera la frontière de la Russie et se prolongera par Orenbourg et les autoroutes fédérales vers Saint-Pétersbourg et la Golfe de Finlande et la mer Baltique. La longueur de ce parcours pourra atteindre près de 8 500 km. Voici le commentaire d’Alexandre Potavine, analyste de la compagnie « RGS – Gestion des actifs ».
« En regardant la carte du monde et en évaluant les possibilités d’aménager une telle voie, on verra que les marchandises de Chine seront livrées via la Russie, l’Asie Centrale en Europe. Ce projet profite évidemment à la Chine. Il permet de minimiser les frais de transport, étant donnée que la Grande Voie de la Soie est d’environ un tiers est plus court que la voie maritime, contournant l’Asie et la péninsule Arabique. »

Si on réussit de mettre en œuvre cette conception, la Chine réduira les délais de livraison de ses marchandises. Actuellement les frets parviennent à l’Europe par mer au bout de 45 jours, par le Transsibérien – cela prend deux semaines. La nouvelle voie sera la plus courte et ne prendra pas plus de dix jours.

En plus de la Chine le corridor de transport permettra de se développer à d’autres participants. Ils pourront gagner bien sur le transit et la logistique, et vont encore attirer des investissements chinois pour leurs projets de transport, remarque Sergueï Sanakoïev.

La Voix de la Russie